

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD390955
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO: unclassified
FROM: confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES
TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY
30 May 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD390955
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO
confidential
FROM
secret
AUTHORITY
30 May 1969 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.


SECRET

1st AFCEV OPERATIONAL REPORT

ORIGINAL CONTAINS COLOR PLATES. ALL DDC
REPRODUCTIONS WILL BE IN BLACK AND WHITE.
ORIGINAL MAY BE SEEN IN DDC HEADQUARTERS

AD390955

FILE COPY



JUL 10 1968

DDC CONTROL
NO. 82937

66-256
CMR DIV, 03, USARPAC

MC 66 S 911

G-2 HUPAC

1966 100X

SECRET

G5-S-66-1148

ARV-C-66-S

3710

G3-S-66

1432

File No. 66 1417

G4-S-66

1734

HQ USARPAC

E-66-

3752

COPY...

OF 25

COPIES

SECRET

FFS-461-66

1413

2611723

61-66-2233 Fw/210 9083
ARH65-1379

BEST

AVAILABLE

COPY

SECRET

OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED

	Para	Page
SECTION I - Significant Organizational or Unit Activities		
General.....	1	1
Intelligence.....	2-2g	1
Operational and Training Activities.....	3-3k	6
Logistical Activities.....	4-4g	23
Civil Affairs.....	5-5e	27
Personnel and Administrative Action.....	6-6h	28
Inspector General.....	7-7b	32
Information Office.....	8-8g	32
SECTION II - Commanders Recommendations		
Lessons Learned.....	1	33
Commanders Recommendations.....	2	44

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

ORIGINAL CONTAINS COLOR PLATES: ALL DDC REPRODUCTIONS WILL BE IN BLACK AND WHITE. ORIGINAL MAY BE SEEN IN DDC HEADQUARTERS

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPERATED

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DDC CONTROL
NO. 82937

ARV-C-66-S

SECRET

SECRET

LESSONS LEARNED, HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM (U).

AVF-GC-TNG

15 MAY 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report, ~~Lessons Learned~~ for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966, (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

18 OACSFOR

19 OT-RD-660123

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General:

a. In the first four months of 1966, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) under the operational control (OPCON) of I Field Force Vietnam (I FFORCEV), conducted operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) II Corps area. These operations were characterized by rapid maneuver of brigade size forces into widely separated areas of operation where Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) concentrations were suspected. Within the areas of operation, battalion and company size airmobile forces were deployed into multiple landing zones for local search and destroy (S&D) operations. Reserve/reaction forces were held poised to exploit and pursue contacts developed by the S&D forces. Maximum advantage was taken of the organic airmobile capability of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Separate infantry brigades supported by airmobile companies moved with equal dispatch throughout the corps area. Other FWMF conducted operations of a more static nature in support of the requirement to secure and pacify the coastal plains. Operations were conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Korean Marine Brigade in the Tuy Hoa Valley and by the Capital Republic of Korea (ROK) Infantry Division in the Qui Nhon - Binh Khe area. I FFORCEV and GVN tactical operations during the reporting period resulted in the following enemy losses within II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ): 6,989 killed in action (KIA), 1,508 Viet Cong captured (VCC), 1,405 individual weapons and 152 crew served weapons captured. US/FWMF alone accounted for 4,330 KIA with a kill ratio of 6.6 to 1 (incl 1). The most notable aspect of operations against the VC and NVA during the past four months has been the increasing reluctance of the enemy to stand and fight, even to defend his base areas and supplies, and the success of the enemy units in avoiding contact with the FWMF.

b. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division arrived at Pleiku in January 1966. Since that time the brigade, consisting of three infantry battalions and supporting units, has completed its in-country familiarization and has been committed to full scale operations. The only other unit to arrive since 1 January has been the 26th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of 3,089 officers and men which arrived in Qui Nhon on 16 April. This regiment comprises the third regiment of the Capital ROK Infantry Division (CRID) and will be employed with the remainder of that division to pacify the Qui Nhon Binh Khe area, an objective of the National Campaign.

2. (C) Intelligence

a. General:

(1) During this quarter, the intelligence collection and production base established during the previous quarter was further expanded, refined, and made more responsive to command requirements. The production

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

FOR DOD DIR 5200.10

660123

SECRET

Copy 1 of 25 Cops

Page 1 of 45 Pages

FTS-461-66

(003 650)

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS GSGPO-28 (R1) (U))

of intelligence to support the planning and conduct of operations was kept abreast of increased demands and requirements. Basic intelligence estimates and special intelligence studies were produced and disseminated for each operation planned or implemented. Also, efforts were made to acquire additional collection resources to support each operation.

(2) During January, the only aerial surveillance resource directly responsive to HQ, I FFORGEV was lost when the 20th ASTA Detachment was committed in support of other theater requirements. However, this loss was offset in some measure by the improvement in imagery interpretation capabilities attained by the organic 55th MI Detachment (Corps) and the supporting 45th MI Detachment (ARS), and the arrival in country of US Air Force RF-4C (infrared and photographic) reconnaissance aircraft. The command's collection capability was greatly enhanced during February when five ARVN NOCs (interpreters-translators) were placed in support of the 55th MI Detachment Interrogation Section. Their assistance proved invaluable in view of the previous lack of organic linguistic capabilities. Operations during the period such as Jefferson, Masher/White Wing, and Garfield proved once again that human sources and captured documents are generally the richest sources of intelligence information.

(3) Counterintelligence activities were also expanded from the previous dependence on liaison with other agencies to the active exploitation of original sources. Greater flexibility in counterintelligence operations was also facilitated by the allocation and receipt of intelligence contingency funds. Normal personnel security and safeguarding of defense information activities and programs were also continued.

b. Significant Sources, Agencies, and Techniques:

(1) The results of Operations Jefferson/Harrison in Phu Yen, Masher/White Wing in Binh Dinh and Garfield/Lincoln in Darlac/Pleiku Provinces confirmed that sustained ground operations in an area permit the development of better and more precise intelligence. This in turn contributed to more effective operations. Operations extending over longer periods provided the time needed to acquire and exploit captives, other local human sources, and documents. The immediate tactical exploitation of information thus acquired contributed toward the acquisition of additional sources.

(2) Captives, returnees, and captured documents are highly significant and useful sources for developing an understanding of the enemy's order of battle, status of equipment, supplies and personnel, combat effectiveness, rationale for past operations, possible future operations, and tactics and techniques. Their exploitation, however, has been slow, tedious, and subject to misinterpretation because of the scarcity of qualified US linguists. The extraction of useful information from these sources depended almost entirely upon attached ARVN interpreters-translators or on reports translated by RVN agencies. As a result, preliminary reports were frequently inaccurate or distorted.

(3) Aerial photography and visual air reconnaissance was highly useful in revealing enemy movements, dispositions, positions, and facilities in areas not obscured by jungle or other heavy vegetation or by cloud cover. Interpretation of aerial photography was particularly useful in the preparation of detailed studies of specific land areas. The enemy's lack of heavy equipment and other material detectable by airborne infrared and radar sensors inhibited the usefulness of these collection means. Nevertheless, infrared was used extensively, weather permitting, to detect enemy positions revealed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TMC

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966

by fires and occupied structures. However, infrared emanations from non-enemy originated fires, and other heat sources, made positive determination of enemy presence in a specific area virtually impossible through infrared imagery alone. Confirmation was required in almost all cases through other reconnaissance means. Airborne radar was unable to provide useful land target information within the II CTZ. It did detect moving seaborne traffic during test runs. However, distinguishing friendly and innocent shipping from enemy craft required other confirmatory means.

(4) Except in those cases involving only US personnel, the conduct of counterintelligence investigations and operations directed against suspected or potential enemy threats was hampered by lack of linguistically qualified agent personnel. Successful counterintelligence efforts directed against external threats depended on close coordination with an active cooperation by RVN agencies as well as by other US intelligence and security agencies in the area. This coordination and cooperation was achieved and effectively maintained during the period.

(5) The simultaneous conduct and planning of multiple operations in widely separated areas within the II CTZ necessitated highly flexible and immediately responsive intelligence production procedures and techniques. In view of the large geographic size of the II CTZ (approximately 30,000 sq miles), the necessary responsiveness was achieved through assignment of specific geographic areas of responsibility to individual G2 action officers and order of battle analysts. Further, basic information and data extracted from all sources was categorized by type of information, and coded and filed by geographic areas. This permitted the ready assembly of basic data on specific areas and the analysis and interpretation of this data by individuals already familiar with current trends in the area.

c. Current Intelligence Doctrine:

There was no major departure from current intelligence doctrine during the period. It was found, however, that intelligence production in support of counterinsurgency operations requires the consideration of political, economic, and sociological factors of the area of operations to a degree not normally expected of the intelligence staff of comparable tactical headquarters. Additionally, in view of the fundamentally subversive nature of insurgency, the distinction between counterintelligence and positive intelligence requirements and efforts was relatively obscure.

d. Significant Changes from Previous Report:

The assignment of five Army Vietnam (ARVN) interpreter-translators during the period in support of the intelligence effort greatly enhanced and facilitated the exploitation of captives and captured documents. Their assistance and the resulting improvement in the operational capability of the 55th MI Detachment Interrogation Section contributed materially to the development of more accurate and timely order of battle intelligence and local counterintelligence.

e. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Despite the heavy losses suffered by NVA and VC regular and irregular forces throughout the II CTZ as a result of ARVN and US/USAF operations during the period, there were indications at the end of the period that NVA and VC forces maintained or regained their personnel strength through the absorption of replacement troops infiltrated from North Vietnam and recruitment and/or forced conscription of locals. Although the arrival

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS GSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

or formation of new units within the II CTZ during the period could not be confirmed, the arrival of newly infiltrated units such as the NVA 22d Regiment (QUIET TAM) in Binh Dinh Province during the previous quarter, and the formation of divisional type headquarters such as the 610th (SAO VANG) and the 630th was accepted. Indications are that the 610th Division Headquarters may have been formed as early as May 1965.

(2) Losses inflicted on the enemy by US, FVMAF, and GVN units in the II CTZ during the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 are:

ENEMY LOSSES - II CTZ

FORCES	TOTAL KIA	VOC	INDIV WPN	CREW SERVED
				WPN
US	145	17	22	0
FVMAF	948	39	57	6
GVN	744	163	187	10
TOTAL	1,837	219	266	16

FEB 66

US	1,280	192	185	62
FVMAF	290	46	23	6
GVN	1,017	215	282	26
TOTAL	2,607	453	497	94

MAR 66

US	623	105	230	7
FVMAF	439	356	48	3
GVN	406	101	153	23
TOTAL	1,468	462	431	33

APR 66

US	389	34	69	9
FVMAF	216	59	29	0
GVN	472	181	115	3
TOTAL	1,077	274	213	12

(3) Enemy strength within the II CTZ as of 30 April 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS GSGPO-28 (R1) (U))

15 May 1966

consisted of:

17,200 NVA Troops

11,900 VC Regulars (4400 Main Force, 7500 Local Force)

24,200 VC Irregulars

53,300 Total

Disposition of NVA and Main Force units are shown in Incl 2; of VC Local Force and Irregulars in Incl 3.

f. Significant Enemy Activities:

(1) VC and NVA forces within the II CTZ attempted no major operation on their initiative during the period. Enemy initiated actions were limited to battalion-size and smaller limited objective attacks against vulnerable units and installations. The majority of the attacks were of platoon and company-size, directed primarily against weak and lightly armed RVN RF and PF units. However, during the month of April there was an increase in mortar attacks, some in conjunction with ground attacks, directed against airfields, and POL/Ammo storage areas.

(2) Incidents of terror, sabotage, harassment and other forms of intimidation directed primarily towards the local civilian populace remained at a fairly consistent level throughout the period, with minor variations between reporting periods. It appeared during the first three months that the level of incidents decreased whenever there was an appreciable increase in VC attacks. All categories of attacks and incidents dropped off sharply in mid-April but turned upward again during the last week of the month. (Incl 4)

(3) Friendly unit offensive operations were opposed primarily by local force and guerrilla units. Although NVA and VC main force elements were engaged in Binh Dinh (Operation Masher/White Wing), Phu Yen (Operation Van Duren/Harrison) and Darlac/Pleiku Provinces (Operation Garfield/Lincoln) and determined resistance was offered by those engaged in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces, the enemy consistently avoided having their regular formations engaged or committed in any sizeable numbers in areas and under circumstances not of their own choosing. This pattern was consistent with the enemy's tactic of employing guerrillas and local force units for local intelligence and security missions, local harassing and interdiction missions, and in covering and screening roles while reserving main force and other regular formations for deliberately planned and rehearsed operations conducted on their initiative with a well calculated probability of success.

g. Enemy Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action: Based on the enemy's order of battle and trends at the end of the period, the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action are as follows:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) Attack with one or more regiments in Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Darlac Provinces.

(b) Attack with up to one regiment strength in Quang Duc and Phu Yen Provinces.

(c) Attack isolated outposts, installations, units and

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

AVF-GC-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS GSGO-28 (R1) (U) 15 May 1966)

attempt to ambush relief forces in up to reinforced battalion strengths.

(d) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassinations and probing activities throughout II CTZ.

(2) Discussion and Analysis:

(a) VC attacks on isolated installations and subsequent ambush of relief forces have been one of the basic VC tactics and can be expected to continue. The most likely provinces in which VC reinforced battalions can initiate this activity are Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Darlac, Quang Duc, and Phu Yen.

(b) VC/NVA units have had time to reorganize, regroup and reposition forces enabling them to initiate actions of their choosing, such as harassment, sabotage, assassination and probing activities. It is probable that the VC will increase activities of this nature and exploit every opportunity to widen their area of influence and embarrass GVN or US/FMMAF, while taking full psychological advantage of the situation, to counter their lack of a recent major victory.

(c) Reports of enemy movement continue to be received in the highlands, and coupled with numerous indications of infiltration, lend credence to the reports of planned campaigns to take advantage of the monsoon.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption.

(a) Avoid contact with major GVN/FMMAF while continuing to harass units and vulnerable installations, overrun isolated RF/PF outposts and district towns where chance of success is greatest. In conjunction, continue sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda.

(b) Attack, in strength of up to reinforced battalion, vulnerable forces and installations; employ the tactic of laying siege to a unit or installation in an attempt to ambush possible relief forces.

(c) Launch multiple attacks in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces at one or more places simultaneously in up to reinforced battalion strength, on vulnerable units and installations in an attempt to cause GVN/FMMAF to be committed piecemeal.

(d) VC/NVA forces are not expected to defend in strength when pressed by GVN/FMMAF except in major base areas. They will avoid major engagements and allow local forces and guerrillas to maintain contact, thus retaining the option of choosing the time and place for engagement.

3. (8) Operational and Training Activities:

a. Plans:

(1) Two major FMMAF units moved into the II CTZ during the reporting period. The 3d Bde 25th Inf Div moved into the Pleiku Province and came under the direct CPGON of this headquarters. The 26th Republic of Korea (ROK) segmental Combat Team moved into Phu Yen Province and joined the Capital ROK Inf Div.

(2) I PFGONV gained direct CPGON of two units, activated in Khanh Hoa Province; the 7th Aviation Group and with it the 44th Aviation Battalion and also the 245th Psychological Warfare Company.

(3) Six detachments were assigned to the headquarters; in

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 Apr '1 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

engineer (terrain) detachment, an infantry (radar) detachment and four field artillery (radar) detachments. Inclosure 5 shows all OFCON, assigned and attached units during the reporting period.

(4) The command relationship of major FVMAF forces in II CTZ is shown in Inclosure 6.

(5) There were 18 operational plans produced and distributed as shown in Inclosure 7.

h. Operational Activities:

(1) From 4-18 January, the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) conducted Operation Matador (Incl 8), a search and destroy (S&D) operation to locate enemy infiltration routes from Cambodia into the RVN and to disrupt this infiltration in the area along the Cambodian border north of Chu Pong Mountain. Here, although sizeable quantities of foodstuffs were found and destroyed along these routes, the enemy refused to be engaged and the enemy losses were negligible.

(2) (a) During the same general period, 1 - 16 January, the 2d ROK Marine Brigade was conducting Operation Jefferson (Incl 9) in conjunction with elements of the 47th Regiment (ARVN) to clear the mountainous area along the coast south of Tuy Hoa. The ROK Marines were joined in mid-January by two, and later three, battalions of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div for Operation Van Buren (Incl 10).

(b) Since beginning of Operation Jefferson, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and two battalions of the ROK Marines have conducted continuous operations in the Tuy Hoa area, participating also in Operations Van Buren, Reconstruction, Harrison (Incl 11), and Fillmore (Incl 12). Fillmore is currently in progress. Operating in conjunction, throughout this period were elements of the 47th Regiment (ARVN). The significance of these continuing operations is that a sizeable amount of II Corps' second most productive rice growing area is now under GVN control. In the February rice harvest, 33,363 Metric tons of an estimated crops of 50,000 tons were harvested and secured. The bulk of the remainder was destroyed to prevent its capture by the VC. To date also, approximately 1,500 enemy have been killed in this area.

(3) The Capital ROK Inf Div conducted Operation Flying Tiger VI, (Incl 13), a three day S&D operation within its tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) to destroy enemy forces. This operation supported the continuing Cap ROK Inf Div's mission of clearing and pacifying the vital Qui Nhon-Binh Khe area, a primary objective of the National Campaign Plan.

(4) Having completed Operation Matador, the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) began moving into Binh Dinh Province on 24 Jan for Operation Masher. (Incl 13) After making a feint south of Bong Son and east of Highway 1 the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) moved in force into the coastal plain north of Bong Son and paralleling Highway 1. After initial heavy fighting the VC/VVA units broke contact and moved west towards the mountains and the An Lao Valley. On 4 February the 1st Cav Div deployed into the An Lao Valley in the Operation now renamed White Wing. Contact in the An Lao Valley was sporadic; the enemy refused to fight to defend his base areas. Of significance during

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

this phase was the favorable response of the people towards the FVMAF and GVN and their rejection of the VC/NVA control under which they had been living. At the request of the people, over 2400 refugees were evacuated by the 1st Cav Div from the An Lao Valley to the Bong Son area. As contact lessened in the An Lao Valley, the 1st Cav Div moved southwest into the "Eagle's Claw" (Coordinate BR6085 center of mass). Here the most intensive fighting of the entire operation took place and the enemy suffered his greatest losses. The last phase of the 1st Cav Div's operation was Black Horse (Coordinate 9594 center of mass), an assault into the Cay Giap Mountains southeast of Bong Son. Here contacts were negligible as the enemy avoided contact whenever possible. By 12 March the Operation Masher-White Wing was terminated. The enemy had suffered 2,365 KIA (BC) and had lost 432 individual and 56 crew served weapons. In addition to the 622 Viet Cong captured (VCG) and 2,544 Viet Cong suspects (VCS) detained, 600 VC rallied to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. The 2d Bn, 5th Cav, 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) captured the most important prisoner of the operation, Capt Dang Doan, a battalion commander of the 2d VC Regt. The wounded battalion commander, was captured on 15 February, vicinity of BR 767783 (Incl 14).

(5) On 13 March the 1st Cav Div began Operation Jim Bowie (Incl 1) in the upper Dak Son River Valley. This two-week S&D operation failed to make significant contact with the enemy as the 1st Cav Div moved from the Dak Son west to the Song Ba River Valley in the northwest portion of the 1st Cav Div TAOR.

(6) Shortly after completing a three-day S&D Operation Taylor (Incl 8), the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div was ready to begin its first major operation, Garfield, (Incl 15) in the area north and west of Ban Me Thuot against suspected enemy installations and infiltration routes. In this month-long operation, contacts were made with up to platoon size NVA forces infiltrating through the area, but no sizeable regular enemy units were encountered. The operation terminated on 24 March.

(7) On 23 March, the Cap ROK Inf Div (GRID) launched Operation Mang Ho V (Incl 13), a three-day S&D operation to clear the area east of Highway 1 in the northern part of the GRID TAOR and south of the Phu Cat Mountains. This operation, which resulted in 341 VC KIA, with only 14 friendly KIA was followed immediately by a pacification or reconstruction operation called Su Bok, to secure the same area and which continues as of 30 April.

(8) Following Garfield, the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div joined with the 1st Cav Div for Operation Lincoln (Incl 16) in the first entry into the Chu-Pong-Ia Drang River since the battles of October - November 1965 between the 1st Cav Div and NVA forces. This time however, the enemy chose not to employ his major units, keeping them behind a screening force that maintained contact with our forces as we pushed towards the Cambodian border. This rear guard action was moderately costly to the enemy, resulting in enemy losses of 450 KIA, with only 41 friendly KIA during the period 25 March - 8 April.

(9) Operation Bun Kas, (Incl 13) a ten-day S&D operation by the Cap ROK Div began on 2 April to clear the area west of Hwy 1 in the northern portion of the Cap ROK Div TAOR for the surveying and

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWC

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (GCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

future construction of a new jet airfield. Contact was heavy and resulted in enemy losses of 292 KIA, and 30 individual weapons captured.

(10) Immediately following the termination of Lincoln, the 1st Cav moved north for Operation Mosby I (Incl 17) along the Cambodian border in the area west from Pleiku, Kontum and Dak To. This operation, lasting from 11 to 16 April, produced negligible enemy contact but did again result in the locating of numerous infiltration routes running from Cambodia into the RVN. Of significance was the finding of an NVA ammunition storage area where sizeable quantities of ammunition were found, including 7.62mm, 57mm, 75mm, and 30 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition.

(11) On 12 April, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div began Operation Austin II (Incl 18) along the II/III Corps boundary with two maneuver battalions which had deployed from the Tuy Hoa area. This operation, which continued until 26 April, revealed the absence of large enemy forces and secret enemy base areas in the Phan Thiet area. The largest enemy unit engaged was less than platoon size.

(12) After completing their portion of Lincoln the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div moved north of Dak To and on 13 April began Operation Longfellow, (Incl 19) a two-week S&D operation to search the area west of Hwy 14 north from Dak To towards Dak Pek. Here again, the largest enemy formations engaged were of squad size or smaller as the enemy again refused to be engaged. While infantry units of the brigade, operating in conjunction with ARVN (Army of Vietnam) forces, were searching the areas, ARVN and US engineers were repairing Highway 14. By 30 April, Highway 14 was capable of supporting class 30 traffic from Pleiku north to Dak Pek.

(13) Following Mosby I, the 1st Cav commenced Mosby II, (Incl 20) on 21 April in the area east of Highway 14, sweeping north from Pleiku to Kontum, then making a recon in force in the Plateau Gi - Mang Buk area. This operation continues as of the end of this reporting period. Contact has again been all but non-existent.

(14) Techniques:

(a) While no really new techniques have been developed and the lessons learned are actually old lessons being relearned, probably the issue that demands our primary attention is the need for establishing a system that provides for immediately available reaction forces. This is especially pertinent in view of the limited number of contacts with enemy forces and the necessity to exploit a contact when one is made.

(b) The need for reaction forces is not limited to instances of FIMAF/enemy contact. It is even more valid for the exploiting of contacts between ARVN or RF/FF (Regional Forces/Popular Forces) and the enemy since the vast majority of enemy platoon and larger size attacks are against isolated outposts.

(c) Techniques are continually being developed to exploit such contacts. Instructions have been issued for units to pursue the enemy whenever contact is made. If contact is made at night, the unit will pursue at first light even though contact with the enemy

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TNG

13 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-2S (R1)) (U)

may have been lost in the interim. Pursuit by airstrikes along likely enemy withdrawal routes is another technique which has been reemphasized.

(d) Another technique being tried is the maintaining of reaction forces to include helicopters immediately available on ground alert, ready to exploit an enemy contact or an enemy sighting. This has the disadvantage of "tying up" helicopters that might be used for other purposes but does insure that a truly "ready" reaction force is available should an opportunity to use such a force present itself.

c. G3 Air Operations:

(1) Tactical Air Support: Tactical air sorties varied from 4 to 77 daily during the reporting period depending on the following major factors: number of major operations in progress, intensity and number of enemy contacts, intelligence on secondary targets and weather. The mean number per day was 28 sorties.

(a) Priority: Priority of missions established in HQ's MACV Directive 95-2 is:

1. Priority A - Troops in contact with enemy.
2. Priority B - Air cover and prestrikes for major operations.
3. Priority C - Air cover for trains, convoys, ships and aircraft.
4. Priority D - Other targets: D-1 targets directly affecting current missions; D-2 lucrative perishable targets; D-3 lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time; and D-4, others.

A message from COMUSMACV established "pursuit" as the "highest" priority. The concept for use of air support in pursuit operations is to attack withdrawal routes and assembly areas within a five-kilometer radius of the point of contact.

(b) Sorties flown in support of major tactical operations during the period were:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL STRIKES</u>	<u>SORTIES/DAY</u>	<u>UNITS SUPPORTED</u>
Jefferson	184	11.5	2d ROK Marine Bde
Matador	344	22.9	1st Air Cav Div
Tyler	28	5.6	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Van Buren	482	14.2	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div 2d ROK Marine Bde
Masher/White Wing	725	17.9	1st Air Cav Div Cap ROK Inf Div (1st ACD used 634 sorties)

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-OC-TWG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSQPO-28 (R1)) (U)

15 May 1966

Garfield	319	11.4	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
Harrison	458	16.9	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div 2d ROK Marine Bde
Jim Bowie	196	12.2	1st Air Cav Div
Fillmore	233	6.3	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div 2d ROK Marine Bde
Lincoln	245	16.4	1st Air Cav Div 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
Ban Kae	22	2.0	Cap ROK Inf Div
Mosby I	106	10.6	1st Air Cav Div
Austin 2	151	10.0	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Longfellow	85	6.1	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

(e) Comparison of sorties flown in I, II and III CTZ is shown in Inclosure 21.

(2) A flare ship was on airborne alert from 1900 to 0800 nightly, orbiting centrally in the II CTZ in order to support all I FFORCEV and ARVN operations in I CTZ. There was an adequate supply of flares to support all units engaged with the enemy and the number of flares used nightly varied from 0 to 396, dependent upon the enemy contact. But, to conserve flares, a restriction existed throughout the period limiting the use thereof to the support of units in contact with the enemy.

(3) Strategic Air Support.

(a) B-52 strikes were available to support ground operations on an immediate basis (24 to 48 hours) against confirmed, large enemy positions. Strikes conducted were:

DATE	CODE NAME	SORTIES	OPERATION
120005Z Jan	Pleiku 69	12 AO	Matador
090045Z Feb	Phu Yen 3	6 AO	Van Buren
172300Z Feb	Phu Yen 4	18 AO	Van Buren
090235Z Feb	Binh Dinh 8	9 AO	Masher
020200Z Feb	Binh Dinh 9	6 AO	Masher
210800Z Feb	Binh Dinh 10	6 AO	White Wing
122000Z Mar	Phu Yen 7	18 AO	Harrison
122000Z Mar	Phu Yen 8	9 AO	Harrison
142100Z Mar	Phu Yen 9	15 AO	Harrison
242233Z Mar	Phu Yen 10	15 AO	Fillmore

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TMG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(b) Although most of these strikes were followed up by ground exploitation, no significant results were discovered. The time lag between acquiring the target and conducting the strike was 24-48 hours. This enabled the VC to employ their defensive tactic of breaking up into small groups and moving to new assembly areas. The lack of immediate responsiveness limits the effectiveness of B-52 strikes in direct support of brigade tactical operations.

(4) Limitations and Capabilities:

(a) Preplanned requests for tactical air support must reach Direct Air Support Center (DASC) by 1100, the day before the support is desired. Normally ground tactical units do not make their plans this far in advance, so a conference was held at Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) to discuss the problem. The conference resulted only in the US Air Force restating its requirement and explaining the necessity therefor. USAF planning must be completed, orders published and the aircraft prepared.

(b) From Inclosure 21, it is seen that the use of tactical air support increased in March and then decreased in April. The decrease was due to fewer contacts with the enemy and to a restriction imposed by TACC which precluded TAC air support of D-2 and lower priority targets. (See para 3c(1)(a)).

(c) Night and bad weather have been a serious limitation in the use of tactical air support. In March, the AN/MSQ-77 Skyspot Radar Guided Bombing System became operational at Bien Hoa. A second system was installed and was being checked out at Pleiku in April. This system provides all-weather bombing support for a maximum range of 98 miles from the system site. Currently, friendly troops should be no closer to the desired ground zero than 1,000 meters.

(d) The A1E aircraft is an effective aircraft for close air support, because of the long stay time in the target area (2-3 hours), the heavy load of ordnance it can carry and the lower ceilings it can work under compared with high performance aircraft.

d. Army Aviation Operations:

(1) During the reporting period, this headquarters gained OPCON of the 17th Aviation Group Headquarters and through it, also OPCON of four airmobile light companies with a total of 100 UH-1 aircraft and a medium fixed wing company with 16 CV-2 aircraft. Another airmobile light company arrived in-country with 25 UH-1 aircraft in April. When it becomes operational, OPCON will be exercised by this headquarters through the 17th Avn Gp. The addition of these new units will provide I FFORCEV a total of 210 UH-1 and 16 CV-2 aircraft to support FIMAF and ARVN operations within II CTZ, excluding the aircraft of the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile). Those units gained are:

UNIT	DATE ARR RVN	DATE OPERATIONAL	LOCATION	PARENT UNIT
17th Avn Gp	Feb 66	1 Mar 66	Nha Trang	Avn Bde (Prov)
48th Avn Co	Nov 65	15 Jan 66	Phan Rang	10th Avn Bn
129th Avn Co (AML)	Oct 65	15 Jan 66	Dong Ba Thin	10th Avn Bn

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGFO-28 (R1)) (U)

161st Avn Co (AML)	Dec 65	21 Feb 66	Phu Tai	52d Avn Bn
170th Avn Co (AML)	Dec 65	21 Feb 66	Pleiku	52d Avn Bn
174th Avn Co (AML)	Apr 66	Est 15 May 66	Phu Tai	52d Avn Bn
135th Avn Co (CV-2)	Dec 65	15 Feb 66	Dong Ba Thin	10th Avn Bn

(2) The US Marine Helicopter Squadron, HMM 363, was released from OPCON this headquarters on 26 Jan 66, having provided support for four months.

(3) An area aviation support concept was established on 15 January within II OTZ (Inol 22). This concept provides that routine aviation requirements be submitted directly to the 10th and 52d Avn Bn's which have the responsibility to furnish aviation support to units in Area South and Area North respectively. The dividing line between Area South and Area North is the northern boundary of the 23d ARVN Div (Inol 23). Requests for support beyond the capability of the battalions were referred to this headquarters.

(4) Direct OPCON of the 10th and 52d Avn Bns was passed to the 17th Avn Gp as soon as it became operational on 1 March. The 17th Avn Gp organizational chart and I FFORCEV's relationship is shown in Inclosure 24.

(5) Aviation units under OPCON of I FFORCEV participated in the following significant operations in II OTZ during the reporting period:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>UNIT(S)</u>	<u>UNIT(S) SUPPORTED</u>
Jefferson	117th Avn Co HMM 363 (USMC)	2d ROK Marine Bde ARVN
Van Buren	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	2d ROK Marine Bde 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Harrison	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	2d ROK Marine Bde 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Taylor	170th Avn Co	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
Masher/White Wing	119th Avn Co 135th Avn Co	ARVN Airborne 22d ARVN Div Cap ROK Inf Div
Garfield	119th Avn Co 135th Avn Co 170th Avn Co	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
Lincoln	119th Avn Co 135th Avn Co 170th Avn Co	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (ROS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Mang Ho V	161st Avn Co 119th Avn Co	Cap ROK Inf Div
US Special Forces (Emergency reaction force - Buon Ea Yang)	155 Avn Co 170th Avn Co	US Special Forces (CIDG)
Longfellow	155th Avn Co 170th Avn Co	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
Fillmore	129th Avn Co (-)	2d ROK Marine Bde 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
Austin	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

(6) During lulls in the above operations, aviation support was shifted therefrom to small ARVN operations of one-to two-day duration. The aviation support varied in size from a six aircraft platoon for Eagle Flights to company size airmobile units for battalion operations. Planned operations and also operations to exploit targets of opportunity were supported.

(7) On 20 March 1966, personnel of the Special Forces camp at Buon Ea Yang (Coord BQ 0706), located a Viet Cong (VC) main force battalion in the vicinity of BQ 2806. Upon request from the 5th Special Forces Group, two airmobile companies, the 155th and 170th, were diverted from Operation Garfield, 31 miles to the north, to lift Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops from scattered camps to the objective area. Commencing at approximately 1100 hours, four of these companies were air shuttled from Buon Ea Yang to the objective area. The lift terminated at approximately 1630 hours. The 155th Avn Co remained on standby at Ban Me Thuot to lift reserve forces while the 170th Avn Co returned to Operation Garfield. The results were significant in that the VC battalion was effectively neutralized, suffering 156 KIA by body count (BC). The operation further demonstrated the flexibility available with Army aviation in that airmobile assets were shifted rapidly from one operation to exploit a target of opportunity in another area.

(8) Elements of the 10th and 52d Avn Bde supported a Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) sponsored Fire Power Demonstration for the benefit of the ARVN commanders and staff at Dus My with 28 UH-1D (slicks) and 10 UH-1B (guns) on 16, 21, 24 Feb and 2 Mar 66. The aircraft came from the 48th, 117th, 129th and 155th Avn Co's. Aviation support of the demonstration which occurred during Operation Harrison resulted in a curtailment of that operation which had depended upon helicopters for support.

(9) The medium helicopter company (OH-47 Chinook), due in II OTZ in March 1966 was diverted to III OTZ as a result of the Department of the Army planning conference held in Hawaii in January 1966. The diversion of the OH-47 aircraft adversely affected the operational capability of I FFORCEV in that they were needed to move artillery on extended airmobile operations.

(10) To offset the loss of this medium helicopter company,

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWO

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSOP-28 (R1)) (U)

MACV stationed six USAF OH-30 helicopters at Nha Trang on 15 Mar 66, for an intended period of 60 days. These aircraft, under OPCON I FFORCEV, were to be used to lift artillery. A test lift was conducted in the central plateau region with the M-101 105mm howitzer stripped to 4900 lbs. The following conditions existed at the time:

- (a) Pressure altitude 2370 ft.
- (b) Temperature 85 degrees F.
- (c) Density altitude 4300 ft.
- (d) Wind 10 knots.
- (e) Fuel 1050 lbs (25 NM radius plus 30 min reserve).

(11) This test proved that the OH-30 helicopter was unsuitable for the movement of artillery in the highlands. However, it did successfully lift the lighter M-102 105mm howitzer, at near sea level conditions. MACV was advised in CONFIDENTIAL message 1770, this headquarters, subject: Medium Helicopter Support, DTC 161500 Mar 66, of the OH-30 limitations. In the same message this headquarters recommended employment of the OH-30's in III CTG at or near sea level altitudes in exchange for six (6) OH-47's from III CTG for use by this headquarters. The OH-30's departed on 29 Mar 66, after having performed numerous resupply and cargo type missions for I FFORCEV.

(12) The OH-30 helicopters were replaced by six OH-47 helicopters on 18 April, by MACV, from the 11th Avn Bn in the III CTG. Three of these aircraft are deployed at the end of the reporting period in support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div conducting Operation Austin and three are in support of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div conducting Operation Longfellow.

(13) In January, one of the four OH-34 helicopters assigned to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) crashed. While the cause of the crash was not definitely determined, the theory exists that a cargo strap which was not secured, became entangled with the tail rotor causing a loss of control. The only remaining OH-34 in COMUS arrived 18 Apr 66 as a replacement.

(14) This headquarters tasked the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) to recover a number of aircraft during the reporting period. These missions involved the movement by the OH-34 of larger aircraft from crash sites to the maintenance base at Qui Nhon.

(15) There remains one problem area at the end of the reporting period; insufficient aircraft in HQ's Co, I FFORCEV to support command, and staff liaison visits of this headquarters. Experience proved that the eight aircraft authorized by TOS 32-25 to the aviation section of HQ's company is insufficient in view of the size of II CTG, diversity of the operations, and the fact that all extended travel must be made by air. This headquarters forwarded a MTOB on 29 March to USAFV requesting authorization for eight OH-1 and one additional U-8 and U-6 aircraft with necessary pilots and maintenance personnel.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

14 May 1966

e. Psychological Warfare:

(1) During the period 1 Jan through 9 Feb 1966 psychological warfare support was provided to I Field Force Vietnam, other Free World Military Assistance Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) by the 24th and 25th Psychological Operations Detachments.

(2) On 10 Feb 66, the 24th and 25th Psy Ops Detachments were deactivated and the 245th Psy Ops Company activated with headquarters in Nha Trang. The personnel and equipment of the deactivated detachments were absorbed by the 245th Psy Ops Company. Presently, the company has detachments in Nha Trang and Pleiku and four teams in Qui Nhon, (Incl 25).

(3) During the reporting period, the 245th Psy Ops Co supported II Corps Tactical and Pacification operations with 19,394,416 printed leaflets and 353 hours of aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions. The operational support of this total is as follows: Operation Masher/White Wing - 5,000,000 leaflets; Operations Van Buren/Harrison/Fillmore - 2,500,000 leaflets; Operations Mosby I and II - 4,000,000 leaflets; and the leaflet support for Operation Austin was 1,000,000. The loudspeaker support for these operations consisted of one loudspeaker plane a day throughout the operations. The remainder of the leaflets were used in the II CTZ Pacification programs. In addition, field loudspeaker teams were provided to I FFORGV tactical units on a direct support mission basis, while leaflet production was provided on a general support basis.

(4) Elements of the 245th Psy Ops Co supported I FFORGV tactical operations as follows:

(a) One Audio Visual Jeepster (HE) team to each of the following operations: Van Buren, Harrison, White Bear, Longfellow, Fillmore, Austin, Mosby I and II.

(b) Two HE teams to Masher/White Wing.

(c) General support to Lincoln.

(5) Main themes stressed in above operations were:

(a) Before operations:

1. Allied superiority.
2. Exploitation of VC hardships enroute to combat in Republic of Vietnam.
3. Division of cadre from rank and file.
4. Credibility of VC cause.
5. Reduction of civilian casualties.
6. Chieu Hoi program.
7. VC atrocities.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-OC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS OSQPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(b) During the operations: VC atrocities, Allied superiority and the Chieu Hoi program were reemphasized. The theme of demoralization was also included.

(c) After operations, the themes which were again stressed were: Allied superiority; Chieu Hoi program; and Demoralization.

(6) For specific examples of leaflets used in tactical operations during the reporting period refer to Inclosure 26, demoralization leaflets; Inclosure 27, quick reaction leaflets; and Inclosure 28, pacification leaflets.

(7) Of particular significance are the demoralization leaflet 1-66-15, in Inclosure 26 and the quick reaction leaflets in Inclosure 27, which were used in Operations Masher/White Wing. The former warned that combat operations would take place in the area, to break away from the VC and to go to a safe place. The latter, seising upon a psychological opportunity, emphasized again that after seeing, hearing, and feeling the bombs, there was still time to leave the area allegorically to the GVN cause.

(8) During the reporting period, II OTZ psychological operations supported the following programs/campaigns:

(a) Defoliation Program: Leaflets were dropped and loudspeaker missions flown prior to each defoliation mission informing the people that the chemical was harmless to animal life and that it was being used on the vegetation to deprive the VC of cover and concealment.

(b) TET Campaign: Approximately 24,000,000 leaflets were dropped during the Vietnamese New Year celebration emphasizing the happiness and joys of family life, unity and prosperity under a free government as opposed to the disruption, death and hardship caused by VC aggression. During this campaign, the standard National Safe Conduct Pass was instituted for the first time to be used in all of Vietnam. Use of all other Safe Conduct Passes was discontinued. The National Safe Conduct Pass is being used throughout II OTZ during all tactical operations and 500,000 are dropped monthly along suspected infiltration routes into South Vietnam (Incl 29).

(c) NVA Campaign: The campaign directed against North Vietnamese Army personnel in South Vietnam was begun during March. This program is an extension of and reinforces the strategic Psy Ops campaigns conducted in North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Standard NVA leaflets as well as locally produced leaflets are dropped in conjunction with all tactical operations conducted in the Corps area where suspected or known North Vietnamese are operating.

(9) Throughout the reporting period the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program was continuously emphasized. This program is directed to persons who would "voluntarily return to GVN control after having actively supported the Viet Cong in some political or military activity". It stresses that the returnee will be treated with respect and dignity and that his decision to return to the Republic of Vietnam was a wise one. Food and medical attention plus job training are all integral parts of the program. In addition substantial rewards are offered when the returnee comes in. For the reporting period approxi-

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

mately 3,240 individuals rallied (returned) to the GVN side. Of particular significance was the number of ralliers, 1,405 in Binh Dinh Province where Operation Masher/White Wing was conducted from 24 January through 12 March. Operation Masher/White Wing supported by the psychological themes stressing the Chieu Hoi program resulted in excess of 600 people rallying to the GVN. In Phu Yen Province an excess of 650 people rallied during Operations Van Buren and Harrison.

f. Chemical Operations:

(1) General:

(a) Two chemical seminars were held in February 1966. These seminars covered riot control agents (RCA) munitions and their uses, the herbicide program in general, and reporting results/ recommendations on RCA field expedients. The MACV Chemical Officer conducted the first, at his headquarters, for key chemical officers in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The second seminar was held in Nha Trang by this headquarters for chemical officers of OPCON units (Incl 30).

(b) During the reporting period limited quantities of new RCA munitions were introduced in-country. These munitions (E158-E159) and (E8), still in the research and development state, are designed to give the commander an area coverage RCA munition. The E158/159 is an airdropped munition which separates into numerous canisters and covers approximately 5.75 acres with a heavy concentration of CS agent. Several of these munitions have been used by the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) and 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The E8 (Popgun) has not been supplied to the support areas which supply I FFOCEV units. This back-packed munition, capable of covering an area approximately 50x150 meters with a heavy concentration of CS agent has promising possibilities as a defensive munition.

(2) Crop Destruction Operations:

(a) Binh Dinh Province — Crop destruction operations 2-18 were conducted against VC crops during March and April for the 3d consecutive season (Incl 31). Spray aircraft although sustaining 63 hits flew 28 sorties against an estimated 8,500 acres of foodstuff. In the last operation 20 sorties were flown destroying an estimated 6,900 acres of foodstuff.

(b) Phu Yen Province — Crop destruction operations 2-22 were conducted against VC crops during March and April for 2d consecutive season (Incl 31). An estimated 8,960 acres of foodstuff was covered by 26 sorties. In the last operation six sorties were flown destroying an estimated 1,440 acres of foodstuff.

(c) Kontum Province — Crop destruction operations 2/28/01 have been requested for Kontum Province to be conducted during Sep - Oct 66. The four target areas (Incl 31) cover approximately 65% of the province. The majority of crops in these target areas consist of small, scattered, mountainous plots. During Jul - Sep 65, 14 sorties were flown in these target areas destroying an estimated 3,600 acres of crops.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWC

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(d) Tuyen Duc Province — Potential crop destruction targets 7-21 have been reconnoitered in this province (Incl 31). Proposed scheduling is for the period Jun - Aug 66. Crop destruction operations have not previously been conducted in this province.

(3) Defoliation Operations:

(a) Pleiku Province — Defoliation operations 20-69 were conducted in the Chu Pong Mountain area of western Pleiku Province during Jan - Mar 66 (Incl 31). A strip approximately one-half mile wide and 8-10 miles in length was defoliated on the north-eastern side of the mountain range. This strip was then ignited by napalm on 11 March 66 in an attempt to burn off a large area of the mountain complex. A final after-action report has not been released by Joint Research and Test Agency (JRATA) (action agency) but it is believed the burning phase fell considerably short of its objective. Project 20-65 (Mang Yang Pass area of Highway 19) has been sprayed at various times during the reporting period (Incl 31). This is a continuing project which is scheduled whenever the vegetation begins to grow. The project covers about 16 miles of highway area. Project 2/20/01 (defoliation in vicinity of Plei Me and Plei Djereng SF camps) has also been completed during this period.

(b) Binh Dinh Province — Project 20-76 (An Khe Pass area of Highway 19) has been sprayed several times during the reporting period (Incl 31). This is a continuing project which is scheduled as the vegetation grows. The project involves approximately six miles along the highway and the national railroad. Project 20-61 (not shown on map Incl) consists of numerous small target areas throughout Binh Dinh Province. The 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) has requested and received approval for certain areas in the vicinity of their base camp to be defoliated utilizing C-123 spray aircraft. The operations have been temporarily suspended, however, because of crop damage claims by the local farmers in the area. The problem is expected to be resolved in the near future and the defoliation operation will resume.

(c) Khanh Hoa Province — Project 20-77 consists of six target areas along the National Railroad and Highway 1 covering approximately 11 miles of area and four target areas along Highway 21 between Ninh Hoa and Ban Me Thuot covering approximately 14 miles of highway area (Incl 31). Targets 1-7 have been sprayed to date. Defoliation operations in these areas have increased the visibility considerably.

(d) Phu Yen Province — Project 20-60 consists of six target areas in Phu Yen Province covering about 14 miles along the National Railroad and Highway 1 (Incl 31). Targets 1 through 4 have been sprayed during this reporting period. Because of the dense foliage in the vicinity of targets 1, 2 and 3, they will have to be resprayed at a later date. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div has requested that four small areas be defoliated (within the area of target 1, crop destruction 2-22) in the vast mountain complex south of Tuy Hoa. These are desired to increase the visibility in the area and for possible use at a later date as landing zones. The areas concerned are densely foliated and will require repeated spraying to insure 100% defoliation. A few sorties were flown in these areas during late April.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-CC-TWO

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSUFC-CC (R1)) (U)

(e) Binh Thuan Province — Project 20-81 consists of a six mile stretch of Highway 1 (Incl 31). This target area is approximately 50 percent complete.

(4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations:

(a) In late December 65, the CG, I FFORCEV was delegated authority to approve the use of RCA for OPCON units. Since that time, RCA authority has been requested by and granted to US/PMAF units for all operations within the I CTZ. On 29 Apr 66 this headquarters received MACV Directive 525-11, subj: Employment of Riot Control Agents and Defense Against Chemical, Biological and Radiological Attack, dtd 23 Apr 65, authorizing the CG, I FFORCEV to further delegate RCA approval authority to the level he deems necessary for timely and judicious employment.

(b) RCA have been used in all operations during this reporting period. In some instances this use consisted solely of isolated use of RCA grenades for cave and tunnel clearing operations, while in other cases it involved attacking villages and area type targets with air-dropped munitions (E158/159) or helicopter-mounted hose made dispensers capable of delivering RCA grenades over a large area. Some of the more significant operations and the results of RCA usage are as follows:

1. Operation Jefferson (1-16 Jan 66) — Two E-159 air dropped RCA munitions were tactically employed for the first time in Republic of Vietnam by 2d ROK Marine Brigade on 3 Jan 66 against suspected VC positions in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa. They were delivered from an O-1 aircraft flying at 600 feet. The munitions functioned perfectly and covered an area of approximately 25,000 square meters with a dense cloud of agent CS. Ground forces did not reach the area for several hours and the results of the RCA employment could not be evaluated. The 2d ROK Marine forces also encountered numerous caves and tunnels in which they successfully employed CS grenades in conjunction with Mity Mite blowers.

2. Operation Masher/White Wing (24 Jan - 12 Mar) — 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) utilized RCA employment for reconnaissance by fire. This concept of employment with RCA has promising capabilities and eliminates the necessity for sending in ground reconnaissance forces in many cases. RCA were also used against a village in the An Lao valley where numerous VC suspects were captured without a shot being fired (Incl 30). No extensive tunnel systems were encountered during these operations.

3. Operation Mang Ho V (23 Mar - 7 Apr 66) — The Capital ROK inf Div encountered small caves and tunnel systems on this operation. A detailed after-action report on this operation is at Inclosure 32.

(a) The 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) built an expedient dispenser for dropping up to 400 M7 type CS grenades from 1500 feet absolute altitude. It is made of empty 2.75 inch rocket cans modified to hold 5 grenades per tube. This device covers approximately a 350-meter area with an incapacitating agent cloud.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-20-FW3

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (R03 CSOFO-28 (R1))(U)

(4) The 1st Bde, 201st Abn Div has fabricated a device similar to the one in (c) above. The brigade has also been experimenting with filling 105mm leaflet rounds with bulk CS-1 and using them in H & I fires.

(e) A limited amount of VC protective equipment has been captured during the reporting period. Many locally fabricated protective masks (Incl 33) have been captured throughout the area. Tests run by Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland on these type masks reveal that they are of little practical value. Test personnel wearing these masks were incapacitated in ten seconds when exposed to a field concentration of CS agent. During tactical operations in the Bong Son area of Binh Dinh Province, one of the latest known Soviet masks was captured (Incl 34). This is a SBR-1 with MO-44 canister which has previously been tested at Edgewood Arsenal and found to afford good protection against all known toxic agents. Its capabilities are similar to the US9A1 and M17 series protective masks. It is believed that only a limited number of these masks are available in South Vietnam, possible for use by North Vietnamese cadre personnel in OBR training. An insignificant amount of decontaminants has been captured along with medical supplies which may be effective in neutralizing effects of liquid vesicants on skin or clothing, but ineffective against nerve agents.

(5) Summary/Observations:

(a) Herbicide Operations -- Defoliation along lines of Communications (LOC's) and in the vicinity of base camp areas has improved security by increasing the visibility in these areas. Crop destruction operations is difficult to evaluate, but it is believed to have a definite effect on the availability of food to the VC in areas where these operations have been conducted.

(b) Riot Control Agent Operations -- The overall effectiveness of using RCA in combat operations is encouraging. During this reporting period numerous field expedient devices have been perfected and used which have been definite assets to the commanders. The use of these agents (CS and CN) and munitions has provided the much needed training, practical experience, and munitions development for employment of chemical agents in a tropical environment. While there are only riot control agents, their behavior (with respect to meteorological conditions) and concepts of employment are comparable to all types of chemical agents. The relatively few items of captured chemical protective equipment indicates that the VC and NVA forces in South Vietnam are not capable of conducting offensive chemical operations.

g. Training:

(1) The in-country orientation team which was organized on 26 Dec 65 began orientation of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div on 3 Jan 66. By 31 Jan the team had completed the instruction of over 1800 troops of the brigade.

(2) On 29 Jan a document for orientation of US troops on Montagnards and related US/GVN policies (Incl 35) was published and distributed to all CPOON units to company level.

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPG-28 (R1)) (U)

(3) A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Conference was held on 15 Jan at HQ, I FFORCEV, as a result of COMUSMACV's emphasis on the necessity of finding, fixing and destroying enemy forces. Representatives of I FFORCEV OPCON US units, 5th Special Forces Group (SPG) and II Corps Advisory Headquarters attended. The purpose of the meeting was to insure that all unit representatives had a complete understanding of the basic concept in the use of long range patrols. Also discussed was the optimum patrol size, patrol composition and patrol equipment. As a result of this meeting, it was decided that each battalion-size infantry unit should form one patrol of 11 men. The patrol should be trained under brigade supervision before beginning operations.

(4) On 4 February a briefing was given at I FFORCEV for the Commanding General by the Senior Advisory personnel of the II CTZ. The Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps and Senior Advisors from the 22d and 23d Divisions and the 24th Special Tactical Zone attended. The briefing covered all aspects of ARVN training in the II CTZ. The Commanding General, I FFORCEV, as Senior Advisor to II CTZ, issued new guidelines and criteria to be followed in raising the standards of ARVN training.

(5) During the period 1 - 15 March a team consisting of an officer, an enlisted man and three DA civilians oriented personnel of this headquarters and units of the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div on the M-102 (105) howitzer. The team held orientations in three artillery units of the 1st Air Cav Div and one artillery unit of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(6) During the period 4 - 14 Apr a planning group from Fort Lewis, Washington headed by Brigadier General David O Byars visited I FFORCEV HQ's, US units, ROK units, and ARVN units within the II CTZ. The purpose of the visit was for the team to perform reconnaissance for the possible sites for elements of the 4th Infantry Division in the II Corps Tactical Zone and gain as much information as possible to assist in the movement of the Division to Vietnam. The group departed I FFORCEV on 14 April 1966 for II FFORCEV.

h. Doctrines:

(1) On 3 February distribution was made on the "Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam". This handbook was written by the Doctrine and Training Section in December 1965. Distribution was made to squad level of all US assigned units of MACV. Distribution was also made to COMARC and all major defense installations in CONUS.

(2) On 12 January I FFORCEV Regulation 524-3 (Incl 36) was published and distribution made to all OPCON and assigned units. This directive required that all significant combat operations by US/Free World Military Assistance Ground Forces be critiqued. By the end of the reporting period all units were holding after-action critiques following significant operations.

(3) On 1 March, COMUSMACV published a message (Incl 37) which expressed concern over the lack of pursuit action by US, ARVN and FJMAF's against the Viet Cong. The contents of the message were forwarded to all OPCON units and on the 25th of March a seminar was

SECRET

SECRET

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-22 (R1)) (U)

held at HQ, I FFORCEV, on the subject of pursuit. Representatives of all US OPOON units, 30K units and ARVN II Corps major units attended. COMUSMACV's message of 1 March was thoroughly discussed to insure that all attending personnel clearly understood the concept of pursuit as desired by COMUSMACV.

1. Organization: Evaluation of US Army Combat Operations in Vietnam.

During the reporting period an evaluation team headed by Brig Gen George L Mabry, Jr, conducted an evaluation of the four types of maneuver battalions engaged in operations in Vietnam. Brigade and division echelons were also examined to the extent that they influenced battalion effectiveness. Recommendations for changes to doctrine, material, and organization to increase the efficiency of the organizations are to be included in the evaluation. The 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div units were evaluated. The report of the evaluation had not been received at the end of the reporting period.

j. Research and Development: During the period, OPOON units received numerous developmental items of material and ammunition for test and evaluation. Requirements for many new or improved items of equipment to meet the needs of combat operation in Vietnam were developed and actions were initiated under provisions of letter AGAM-P(M) AOSFOR, Headquarters Department of the Army, 3 Jan 66: Procedures for Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ensure) (Incl 36). One of the tasks assigned to the combat operations evaluation board, headed by Brig Gen Mabry was to conduct an appraisal of each of 177 developmental items of equipment authorized in the airmobile division. The report on the evaluation board has not been received at this headquarters at the end of the reporting period.

k. Signal Operations:

(1) Maintenance and upgrading of all I FFORCEV communications and development of mid and long-range communication plans have comprised the majority of the signal activities.

(2) Considerable success has been met, with operation of USARV Signal Section, in the program to relieve I FFORCEV Signal elements of the responsibility for base camp communications. Some equipment has already been released for use in support of tactical operations.

(3) Plans were formulated and equipment procured to provide a semi-fixed communications facility at the new location of HQ, I FFORCEV, two and $\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of the present site.

(4) Communications support was provided for I FFORCEV Tactical OP twice during this reporting period: once for Operation Masher/White Wing and once for Operation Lincoln.

4. (c) Logistical Activities:

a. General: During the reporting period, assistance was provided to FMAF units in solution of logistical daily problems.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

G4 representatives insured the adequacy of logistical support and provided liaison between I FFORCEV units and the 1st Logistical Command support elements for every major tactical operation. Air and surface transport was also procured and monitored for troop and resupply movements.

b. Supply:

(1) Supply conditions affecting operational capability have shown a marked improvement during the reporting period, however several items are still in short supply. Among these items are: refrigeration, power generators, boots, fatigues, poncho liners and repair parts for aircraft and certain engineer equipment.

(2) Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies have been adequate to support all operations. Existing shortages did not affect the success of the tactical operations. There has been a general improvement of Class V availability during the reporting period and the restrictive available supply rates (ASR) were lifted on all but the following:

ITEMS	RATE
105mm I11	.64 rds/tube per day
4.2 I11	.75 rds/tube per day
2.75 HE	.30 rds/tube per day
M-66 LAW	10/bde/per day

c. Service and Support: Service and support was adequate throughout the period. Bath and laundry facilities were provided by 1st Logistical Command to forward operational areas in major operations. Maintenance elements deployed with forward support elements in support of major operations and provided rapid and complete service as required. Graves Registration efforts were extremely well planned and executed.

d. Transportation: Transportation remained a limiting factor in support of operations. Extensive use of airlift was required to move combat troops, supplies and equipment. The quantity of trucks was insufficient to move troops by road and also continue logistical support of operations. (Further, sufficient roads are not open to allow effective use of land LOC's). Port clearance requirements have restricted use of lighterage to resupply those operation areas contiguous to beaches. The national railroad was used for partial resupply of units at Phan Rang.

e. Roads opened by I FFORCEV units throughout the reporting period included:

Route 1, from Qui Whon to Bong Son: 24 Jan - 19 Feb;
from Song Mao to Phan Thiet: 26 Apr;
from Ninh Hoa to Phan Rang: throughout the period

Route 7, from Pleiku to Oheo Reo: 29 - 30 Mar and 2 - 24 Apr;
from Oung Son to Tuy Hoa: 23 - 24 Apr

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Route 14, from Pleiku to Dak Pek: 24 - 28 Apr

Route 19, from An Khe to Pleiku: 6 - 23 Jan; 10 - 21 Feb;
4 - 21 Mar; 27 Mar - 19 Apr; 21 - 30 Apr;
from Qui Nhon to An Khe: the entire reporting
period.

Other road openings were secured by ARVN forces for specific movements including Route 21 from Vinh Hoa to Ban Me Thout; Route 14 from Pleiku to Ban Be Thuot; Route 11 from Phan Rang to Dalat; and Route 20 from Dalat to Bao Loc.

f. Medical:

(1) There were no major medical problems encountered during the first two months of this period. However, malaria began to increase during the month of April - particularly in units operating in the western part of the II OTZ.

(2) Malaria decreased to a relatively insignificant problem with the onset of the dry season. The last two weeks of April showed a rapidly rising case rate coincidental with the onset of rains and operations in the highlands. This can be expected to increase significantly.

(3) Approximately 40 cases of amebiasis occurred in the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div because of tactical operations conducted from a brigade base at Buon Brieng with an inadequate water point. Water was in such short supply that an erdinator could not be used without drying up the only source of water for the village. Raw water was treated chemically but without filtration which is inadequate to prevent amebiasis.

(4) The helicopter lifted surgical pod in the 1st Air Cav has had little value up to this time as currently designed and utilized. Rapid helicopter evacuation to fixed hospitals which has been available, results in better care with less risk than operating on high risk patients without a full surgical team. Medical service at field unit level is designed to resuscitate, sustain and prepare patients for further evacuation. Consequently unit medical sections are not staffed with skills equipped or designed to perform definitive medical care at this level.

(5) Deployment of Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) in support of brigade operations:

(a) MASH hospitals were especially designed during Korea to provide early surgical care for severely wounded "non-transportable" cases at division level.

200/ (b) This requirement has been almost eliminated by the development of air ambulances.

(c) The MASH is too large for support of brigade size operations, generates additional security requirements, and limits the mobility of a brigade when in direct support. A cellular organization might be more appropriate.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(d) The MASH hospital was not designed to hold patients beyond 72 hours and generally will evacuate them in 48 hours. With dust and noise nuisances around airfields, lack of air conditioned operating rooms and relatively poor facilities for patient care, little is gained by utilization of such units when the patient can reach ideal conditions with an additional 20 or 30 minutes of flying time.

g. The major Engineer activities of I FFORCEV during the reported period consisted of:

(1) Updating highway and highway bridge information within II CTZ from information received from field units.

(2) Providing staff engineering assistance to separate brigades without a staff engineer (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div).

(3) Coordinating engineer support for Operations Jefferson, Van Buren, Masher/White Wing, Harrison, Tiger V and Austin.

(4) In the Tuy Hoa area where there has been five US/FMMAF tactical operations since 1 Jan, the following was accomplished:

(a) Coordinated arrangements for support to remove harvested rice.

(b) Coordinated engineer effort to rehabilitate Tuy Hoa South Airfield to accommodate sustained C-130 aircraft by placing M8 Pierced Steel Planking (PSP) on turnarounds and T-17 membrane on parking aprons.

(c) Aided district chief in determining method best suited for clearing the irrigation dam west of town.

(d) Coordinated the placement of T-17 membrane to provide dust free parking for one airmobile company on the sand dunes.

(e) Conduct a coordinated meeting on the development of an improved road net in the Tuy Hoa Valley. The purpose of the road net is to provide a land line of communication (LDC) for tactical troops defending the area; it will also serve the economic development of the valley.

(5) Developed plans in coordination with G3 and G4 on the upgrading of existing airfield and sites for new airfields throughout II CTZ.

(6) Coordinated the engineer effort to upgrade Song Cau and Quang Son Airfields. These airfields can now accommodate C-123 aircraft.

(7) Developed the plan and coordinated the engineer effort for the repair of Chao Rao Airfield.

(8) Provided engineer staff planning for Operation Long-fellow. This operation provided security for Co D, 65th Engr Bn, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div to repair Route 14 from Kontum to Dak Pek.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(9) In addition, the progress of I FFCRCEV OPCON units base development was monitored and plans made for the location of future OPCON units.

(10) Continued liaison and staff visits to ARVN, US and ROK engineers to assure that commanders were aware of:

(a) Planned tactical operations.

(b) Incoming units so that engineer service support could be planned.

(c) The planned engineer tasks to prevent duplication of plans and effort.

5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. One of the civic action activities of all major units is oriented toward assisting the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the QVN in accomplishment of the revolutionary development mission. This assistance is provided essentially in the following ways:

(1) Roads and bridges are being built or repaired in order to facilitate travel. This enables materials to be moved to construction sites and produce to market.

(2) Security is provided for roads, hamlets and villages, thus, providing freedom of movement and permitting the reconstruction of homes in previously insecure areas.

(3) Trucks have been provided to the QVN to assist in rice harvesting and rice securing efforts.

(4) Air transportation has been provided to USAID and the QVN for the movement of material to rural construction areas and to provide USAID personnel with a means for visiting outlying reconstruction sites. JUSPAO activities have also received transportation support.

b. Another purpose of civic action is to ensure Vietnamese acceptance of US/Free World Military Assistance Force (FIMAF) troop presence. Units have engaged in widespread humanitarian and public relations activities such as:

(1) Medical treatment for civilians and provisions for Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) supplies. Vietnamese civilians are present in base camp and operational areas.

(2) Refugee centers and orphanages are supported with food and clothing.

(3) Unit personnel are teaching English classes to Vietnamese.

(4) Refugees are being assisted in the development of local industries such as soap and brick manufacturing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

(5) Vietnamese are given assistance in form of manpower and machinery for the repair of schools, houses of worship, market places and homes damaged during combat operations.

c. It is too early to adequately evaluate the 1966 revolutionary development program. Progress thus far can be measured only in the status of training and availability of revolutionary development cadre. This progress varies from unsatisfactory in Kontum Province to good in Binh Dinh. The latter is a high priority area. A major obstacle continues to be the lack of trained and motivated personnel. The recent replacement of province chiefs in three key provinces, Vinh Thuan, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, occurred just as the program began. The effects of these personnel changes are not yet discernible but progress is being monitored closely to detect any changes in attitude.

d. Overall, the last few months have been a period of consolidation and integration of US/FWMAF efforts with the revolutionary development program. It has been a period of education for all concerned. US/FWMAF personnel have been gradually made aware of the importance of the revolutionary development program to the attainment of US objectives in South Vietnam. Vietnamese officials and US civilian and military advisory personnel have been made aware of the availability of US/FWMAF units to support this program. They have already begun to call upon these units for assistance. As the security situation improves, further integration of US/FWMAF units and the revolutionary development program is expected. If there is no deterioration in the attitude of GVN personnel at corps and province level, the next quarter should bring significant results.

e. Nine refugee teams of the 41st Civil Affairs Company were deployed within the II CTZ during this period. The primary mission of the refugee teams is to assist the tactical units with refugee control. When not employed in this role they are utilized to initiate, supervise and coordinate civic action projects under the control of the sector advisors. Their present deployment in II CTZ is three with 1st Air Cav Div, two with 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, one with 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, two with 5th SF Gp and one with the Sector Advisor of Phu Yen Province.

6. (C) Personnel and Administrative Action:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(1) HQ, I FFORCEV key personnel and FWMAF senior commander are shown in Incl 39.

(2) Authorized and assigned strength of I FFORCEV units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Replacements have been received in adequate numbers except for several hard skill MOS's. Particular hard skill US shortages are linguists, aircraft maintenance, signal maintenance and medical personnel. Personnel strengths of assigned and Operational Control (OPCON) units are listed as Inclosure 40.

(3) Outstanding requisitions for replacements are not considered a critical problem at this time. Lack of lead time notification to gaining units generates some anxiety on part of commanders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

more than presenting a real problem. The optimum would be for the commanders to know they will receive one for one replacements in a time frame to permit a short overlap on the job therefore assuring complete continuity of counterinsurgency operations. During peak rotation months commanders are sometimes concerned as to their capability to commit their units to sustained operations. However, current replacement plans are well established and HQ, United States Army Vietnam does not anticipate slippage.

b. Personnel Management:

(1) Assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation are very sporadic. Some personnel receive assignment instructions as much as nine months in advance and others as little as 30 days or less in advance of rotation date. In one instance this headquarters was queried on or about 15 March on availability of an officer for a directed reporting date. This headquarters interposed no objection, and so advised HQ, USARV which in turn notified Department of the Army on 31 Mar 66. As of the closing date of this report, assignment instructions for this officer had not been received and should he be assigned as queried his departure date is only 10 days hence.

(2) The vast majority of personnel serving in Vietnam are highly qualified, motivated, and have an intense desire to accomplish the mission. However, there are a very limited few who do not have or soon lose the characteristics of motivation and personal integrity desired in a combat zone. The procedures (USARPAC Reg 614-5 and AR 614-30) to eliminate or remove these personnel from Vietnam imposes a hardship on commanders who must retain marginal personnel for extended periods pending the administrative procedures that are outmoded, cumbersome and time consuming.

(3) (a) Hospitals within Vietnam do not reassign patients to a detachment of patients morning report. Patients evacuated to hospitals within the Pacific Command (PACOM) area for less than 90 days are not normally reassigned. Patients evacuated to Continental United States (CONUS) are reassigned to the Detachment of Patients by the receiving hospital. As a result of these varied reassignment procedures units are unaware of the location and status of a large percentage of their medically evacuated personnel. This has caused problems in strength accounting and in requisitioning. In addition, hospital Admission and Disposition Sheets are published and dispatched to units daily; however, slowness of distribution and lack of familiarity of administrative personnel with these sheets has been a problem.

(b) Observation: Re-emphasize the importance of screening each Admission and Disposition sheet received by the unit for personnel admitted or discharged from the hospital. Also, transfer of patients to a detachment of patients morning report in Vietnam would materially assist in reducing administrative problems of the units. (Currently only out-of-country hospitals have detachments of patients).

c. Civilian Personnel: The hiring, management, and release procedures for civilian personnel were greatly improved during this period because of HQ USARV's publication of appropriate civilian personnel regulations. However, in the Phu Trang/Cam Ranh Bay area pay

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

procedures are still inadequate and difficult to manage. Civilian personnel status of this headquarters is reflected below:

AID in KIND (AID) employees authorized	86
AID employees on hand 1 Jan 66	48
Released during reporting period	23
Released for cause	(5)
Released per individual request	(16)
Transferred	(2)
Number of employees on hand 30 April 66	53

The most difficult positions to find qualified employees to fill are:

Interpreter/Translator

Administrative Assistant

Plumbers

Intelligence Analyst

d. Enlisted promotion allocations are contained in Incl 41.

e. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The morale of all assigned and OPCON units remained excellent. Morale services throughout the command steadily improved during the reporting period.

(a) Three hundred seventy-two R & R quotas were received and distributed as shown in Incl 42.

(b) Thirty-seven Bronze Stars, one-hundred four Air Medals, eighteen Army Commendation Medals and twelve Soldiers Medals were awarded as shown in Incl 43.

(c) Dates on which personal letter mail was not received is shown in Incl 44.

(2) (a) Memorial services which are currently held in the unit areas of operation are definitely preferred to the general type services formerly held each week in Saigon. The present arrangement allows for maximum attendance with only slight interruption in military operations.

(b) Chaplains reporting for duty in Vietnam should be required to have the following professional equipment:

1. Chaplain Kit.

2. Portable aluminum folding altar.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

3. Portable battery operated public address system with connecting tape recorder and tapes having the Church Call and some appropriate church hymns. Without this equipment chaplains find it most difficult to conduct a dignified service because of disturbances from passing vehicles, artillery fire, flying aircraft, or gasoline operated generators. These items are available for issue through the Army supply system.

(c) Reinforced brigades operating as separate units should have five permanently assigned chaplains, two Catholics and three Protestants, as does the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. They are necessary to provide adequate religious services to all men in widely separated places in the field. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div is currently working on an augmentation which will authorize five rather than the presently authorized four.

(d) Upon arrival in Vietnam all chaplains should be thoroughly briefed on three very important subjects: the status, privileges and obligations of a chaplain as a non-combatant; the current policy set forth by the Chief of Chaplains regarding the carrying of weapons; and holding interviews with representatives of news media.

(e) Jewish Passover supplies should be requisitioned at least six months prior to the date of the Holy days.

f. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order: No unusual law and order problems developed. Continuing rate continued favorably with the USARV rate for offenses and incidents. Traffic accidents continue at a high rate and commanders have been directed to take corrective action.

g. Headquarters Management:

(1) During the last April, the security of the Headquarters compound and the security of the primary command, control and communications center, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, was evaluated and appropriate recommendations to improve the physical security plan is being developed.

(2) The General and staff moved from the old compound to the new compound on 15 April. The organization of the new compound is being completed. It is planned to have the remainder of the staff moved to the new compound during the next quarter.

h. Miscellaneous:

(1) This Headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam with the arrival in-country of another US Field Force headquarters, by General Order 56, (inal 47) HQ, USARPAC, 11 March 1966, effective 15 March.

(2) Community Relations Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, community relations committee meetings emphasized the necessity for implementing counter

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

inflationary measures. Among these measures suggested which appear to have the greatest promise of curbing inflation were price lists of items frequently purchased on the local economy by US personnel. These price lists were to be discussed with province chiefs and distributed to all US units.

(b) A second measure discussed was a proposed wage scale for locally hired nationals to be distributed to US personnel.

(c) Community Relation Committees and Friendship Councils have been established in each major troop concentration area and major city within II CTZ. These committees and councils meet monthly and copies of the minutes are forwarded to this headquarters for review.

(d) The most frequently listed subject having a significantly beneficial impact on community relations were civic action projects such as planning for the construction of additional classrooms and facilities at local schools, planning for the construction of village parks and playgrounds, and the support of orphanages.

(3) Protocols: There were 121 distinguished visitors to the command during the reporting period (Incl 48).

(4) Problems Encountered:

Tactical units such as the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div do not have augmentations to handle base area functions; consequently when these commands depart their base areas on extended operations (which is most of the time) the staff remaining at the base is extremely small and is oriented towards supporting combat operations distant from the base area. This situation does not permit devoting the time and effort necessary to organized and supervised community relations activities effectively. If tactical unit support personnel at the base area become too preoccupied and involved with community relations, the capability to support extended tactical operations could undergo a degree of degradation.

7. (C) Inspector General Activities:

a. The Inspector General section received and processed 11 complaints and 25 requests for assistance, advice or information during the period. Five of the complaints were unjustified. None of the complaints indicated any evidence of trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

b. Four special inspections were conducted: one of the I FFORCEV Commanding General's Mess Association; one of the Headquarters Company, I FFORCEV lounge, one of the Kiowa NCO's Club and one of the Kiowa Officer's Club.

8. (U) Information Activities:

a. The increasing tempo and frequency of I FFORCEV combat operations during the period brought a corresponding increase in the activity of the Information Office and in press interest in I FFORCEV. The establishment of four daily C-130 press flights by HQ MACV to major troop areas in Vietnam, Nha Trang included, facilitated the movement

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GG-TMG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPC-28 (R1)) (U)

of civilian media representatives of I FFORCEV for interviews with the Commanding General and for transportation to OPCON units. In January and February, an estimated 54 news media representatives visited this headquarters; thirty visited in March and April (Incl 49)

b. The deployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to Tuy Hoa in January and subsequent combat operations were instrumental in increasing civilian press interest. Operation Van Buren, the rice protection operation in Tuy Hoa area, was given wide news coverage within the US. This headquarters, through MACV IO, released a news feature on the operation which was used by a number of civilian media as the basis for stories on this important operation (Incl 50).

c. In February, Mr Tom Reedy of the Associated Press visited I FFORCEV, interviewed the Commanding General and wrote an interpretive AP wire story about I FFORCEV which was used in a large number of US and Canadian newspapers. During February, this headquarters also assisted the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) by arranging transportation for newsmen covering Operation Masher/White Wing.

d. This headquarters launched a campaign to bring more press, Army and civilian, to the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. As a result, the brigade was visited by news media representatives of CBS, ABC, Newsweek, AP and UPI. A marked increase in press coverage resulted.

e. During April, I FFORCEV continued to support units by sending a representative to the advance Tactical Operations Center (TCO) at Pleiku, during Operation Lincoln. In addition, a program was initiated to utilize the facilities of the DA Command Information Unit to make releases through the Army Photo Features which reaches more than 750 US newspapers. Photo features were done on Operation Garfield (Incl 51).

f. There were 111 news releases made of which 17 were photo features, and 22 other features. One hundred and thirty-five war communiques were also made and 225 hometown news releases dispatched to the Hometown News Center.

g. Three of the five Command Information Topics produced and distributed during the period are attached as Inclosures 52, 53 and 54.

SECTION II: COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel:

Personal Letter Mail

(1) Item: Receipt of personal letter mail.

Discussion: Receipt of personal letter mail by this headquarters and assigned/attached OPCON units has been sporadic during the period. Personal letter mail is considered the most important category of mail affecting morale. Mail must be delivered by air from Saigon to destinations in II Corps area. It is recognized that non-availability of aircraft because of tactical emergencies and weather

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSOPC-28 (R1)) (U)

conditions will periodically have an effect on daily mail delivery. However, units on occasions do not receive personal letter mail on dates that a number of aircraft arrive with adequate space to have delivered mail.

Observation: Higher headquarters have been of great assistance in attempting to solve the above problem. However, a satisfactory solution has not been achieved.

Security of Billeting Facilities

(2) Item: Billeting facilities for the headquarters staff were scattered throughout the city without adequate guards and physical security. The USASO Nha Trang did not have the resources to furnish sufficient guards or install necessary physical security features.

Discussion: The 272d Military Police Company provided guards for villas housing I FFOREX officers and senior enlisted men. Dispersal of facilities to be secured required excessive personnel and physical security materials. Utilization of the 272d Military Police Company for guarding villas denies required flexibility for supporting tactical operations.

Observation: That more realistic planning for physical security of facilities, where major headquarters are located, is needed.

Highway Traffic Control

(3) Item: Lack of an agency for the regulation and control of highway traffic in support of Operation Masher/White Wing during January 1966.

Discussion: Since normal highway traffic regulation and control in II CTZ was non-existent, a concept for regulating and controlling military convoys on Hwy #1 between Qui Nhon and Bong Son was developed in coordination with G4. The concept included the establishment of a I Field Force Vietnam Traffic Headquarters at Qui Nhon, regulating and control posts at several strategic locations, and military police patrols on the highway. To insure adequate control of all elements, representatives of I Field Force Vietnam, ARVN II Corps, Cap ROK Inf Div, 1st Air Cav Div, USASO Qui Nhon and the 504th Mil Pol Bn participated in the regulation and control of the traffic. All military police patrols and traffic posts were composed of two or more nationalities. Thus by thorough planning, coordination, and effective liaison, a single agency involving several nationalities was established to accomplish a given mission.

Observation: Where traffic regulation and control involves forces of various nationalities, each must be represented in the traffic headquarters and at control points.

Treatment of Detainees

(4) Item: Improper segregation, interrogation and treatment of detainees during Operation Masher/White Wing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Discussion: Initially detainees were held in the district jail which soon became inadequate, because of its small size. During the later phase of Operation Masher/White Wing, an adequate collecting point with necessary facilities for proper processing and treatment of detainees was constructed by the ARVN 22d Div in the vicinity of Bong Son. Subsequent action taken by this headquarters in coordination with II Corps Advisory Staff resulted in the Commanding General, II CTZ, issuing instructions for a collecting point to be established for each future operation by the appropriate ARVN unit. The solution used was based on a re-emphasis of basic principles and techniques already known.

Observation: That civilian facilities are not appropriate for handling captives and military facilities designed for this purpose must be provided.

Pre-Trial Investigation

(5) Item: Absence of subpoena power and authority to pay witness fees seriously hampers the conduct of Article 32b pre-trial investigations.

Discussion: Vietnamese civilians have demonstrated substantial reluctance to appear to testify at Article 32 Investigations. Their written statements are generally poor because of the low caliber of the average interpreter, thus rendering their presence even more desirable. However, without subpoena power of authority to pay witness fees, the US Army is hard-pressed to produce satisfactory testimony without alienating the witness rendering him hostile for future use.

Observation: While subpoena power over foreign nationals will never occur, alienation of witnesses would be kept to a minimum if they could be paid for appearance at pre-trial investigations.

b. Intelligence.

Patrols

(1) Item: Patrolling

Discussion: Recent experience indicates that the greater majority of the mortar attacks on the airfields at Tan Son Nhut, Phan Thiet, and New Ploik as well as the numerous mortar attacks on base camps, CP's, outposts, and villages have been conducted with the 81 or 82mm mortars. There also have been many instances of base camps and CP's being infiltrated by a few VC who planted satchel charges, threw grenades, and used small arms.

Observation: Since the range of the 81 and 82mm mortars is slightly over 3000 meters, aggressive patrolling around base camps, airfields, and CP's out to 4000 meters would preclude many mortar attacks, reduce the infiltration, and lead to the killing or capturing of enemy personnel and equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GO-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Mosaics and Photo Maps

- (2) Item: Preparation of Mosaics and Photo Maps.

Discussion: Contrary to service wide consensus, 9x9 and 9x18 inch photographic formats will continue to be required for the preparation of uncontrolled and controlled photo maps for airmobile operations.

Observation: Imagery interpreters and engineer topographic units should be fully trained in the preparation of uncontrolled and controlled photo mosaics respectively.

e. Organization and Training.

Organization of Psy Ops Company

(1) Item: The present organization of the psy ops company does not provide adequate personnel and teams to fulfill its assigned mission.

Discussion: The present organization does not provide for maintenance support personnel (i.e., press, signal, vehicle) or an adequate number field loudspeaker/jeepster teams (HB, HE Teams) to effectively support tactical operations.

Observation: A letter requesting augmentation to the organic structure as implemented by USARPAC General Order activating the unit was submitted by the 245th Psy Ops Company to Commanding Officer 6th Psy Ops Battalion, APO US Forces 96307 on 27 Feb 66. Battalion consolidation for augmentation will be submitted to USARV 1 June 1966.

Loudspeaker Equipment

(2) Item: Loudspeaker equipment organic to the loudspeaker/Jeepster teams has proven to be bulky and not portable for extensive man packing during field operations.

Discussion: The loudspeaker equipment that is organic to the loudspeaker/Jeepster teams, fits the requirements to accomplish the mission when the area of tactical operations and the situation allow for the use of vehicular movement. However, when the situation requires the equipment be dismounted and carried by team personnel on foot, it is too bulky and heavy to man pack for sustained periods.

Observation: Letter requesting issuance of transistorized more portable loudspeaker equipment was submitted through Commanding Officer, 6th Psy Ops Bn on 25 April 1966 for forwarding to Commanding Officer, 2d Logistical Command and, ATTN: CDEO, APO US Forces 96248. Present status of request is unknown.

Taped Loudspeaker Messages

(3) Item: Friendly forces are not able to understand taped loudspeaker messages that are directed toward civilian and hostile Vietnamese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

13 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSQPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Discussion: In many instances, taped loudspeaker messages in Vietnamese giving instructions to hostile or civilian personnel have not been understood by friendly forces. This has caused some problems, for example, the correct method to accept one surrendering.

Observation: A summary of the taped message should also be broadcast to friendly forces to make them aware of what the Vietnamese message contains.

Care of Protective Masks

- (4) Item: Protective masks must be kept dry.

Discussion: During recent operations in which the friendly use of ROA was imminent, personnel approaching the objective crossed a deep river. Their protective masks were not in the waterproof bags and as a result were rendered useless when exploiting the ROA employment. This also required that the filters be taken out and dried or replaced.

Observation: Protective masks should be kept in water proof bags until they are needed. If they are removed from these bags prior to the attack they must be kept out of the water to be of any value.

Handspray Defoliation

- (5) Item: Supervision of handspray defoliation operations.

Discussion: There have been instances around base camps and cantonments where careless application of herbicide chemicals have caused damage to surrounding areas. Defoliant chemicals can drift a considerable distance if applied in a careless manner and during periods of strong winds.

Observations: Proper supervision and use during periods of relative calm will keep accidental damage, arising from the use of herbicide chemicals, to an absolute minimum.

d. Logistics.

Truck Transportation

- (1) Item: Sufficient vehicles have not been available for support of brigade size operations.

Discussion: TON units have insufficient vehicles, requiring that additional trucks be furnished to move forces on operations. 1st Logistical Command has insufficient vehicles to support tactical and logistical requirements simultaneously. It is estimated that a light truck company is required to support a brigade size operation. If the parent unit cannot provide trucks the 1st Logistical Command must be tasked for the requirement, curtailing available logistical lift support.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TWG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSOPD-28 (R1)) (U)

15 May 1966

Observation: Vehicular support must be planned early for each operation and maximum efforts made toward consolidation of loads.

Convoy Operations

(2) Item: Increased traffic on Highway 19 has adversely affected convoy operations.

Discussion: Lack of control among individual vehicles, logistical convoys and security forces has increased traffic control problems. Single vehicles delay convoys at critical points in the road. This headquarters in message 2133 on 30 March requested that Traffic Management Agency (TMA) assume responsibility for controlling vehicular movement on Highway 19. TMA in message 10453 on 2 April stated that it will assume responsibility for forming individual vehicles into controlled convoys.

Observation: Although not yet implemented, the plan to form individual vehicles into convoys will greatly assist in traffic control.

Water Purification

(3) Item: During Operation Garfield a need for light, air transportable water purification equipment at brigade level was obvious.

Discussion: This movement of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div to Ban Me Thout revealed that the TOE-3000-QPH water purification set was too heavy and bulky to be transported by air to forward operational areas. Further, there were no light air transportable sets available. As a result water trailers and 50 gal drums had to be flown to forward areas. As units moved farther from the base areas, troops resorted to individual purification treatment of local water. Several individuals experienced amoebic dysentery as a result. This headquarters has requested in message 1507, subject: Water Purification Sets Air-mobile to USARV, dated 6 March that air transportable water purification units be made available for brigade size units.

Observation: Provisions of air transportable water purifications sets to units will greatly facilitate water supply on operations and extend unit operational capability.

Medevac Capability

(4) Item: Request for direct support medevac increased.

Discussion: Direct support medevac is normally furnished for battalion size operations when one-way flying time to medical installations exceeds 30 minutes. Some units requested direct medevac support for company size operations. Sufficient aircraft are not available to support every operation within II OFS in a direct support role.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVP-GC-TWG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

15 May 1966

Observation: Resources available restrict direct support medevac to battalion size operations where distances from medical facilities exceed 30 minutes flying time.

Wear-Out of Canvas Items

(5) Item: Tents and other canvas items wear out more rapidly in Vietnam than in other theaters.

Discussion: Extreme humidity and heat conditions cause high wear-out in tentage and canvas. During rainy periods, extensive rainfall over short periods causes strain and often tears truck tarpaulins and tops. Present usage factors are based on World War II and Korean data and do not allow for this higher wear-out problem.

Observation: The usage factor of canvas items should be increased to provide for more timely resupply.

Materials Handling Equipment

(6) Item: Requirements exist during every major operation for Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) at the forward area for offloading of supplies.

Discussion: I FFORCEV unit operations require hundreds of tons of supply to be delivered to forward areas daily. Initial occupation of base areas involves rapid input of troops, equipment, supporting troops and initial buildup of supplies. To enable maximum off-load speed during the logistical buildup, MHE is required at the outset of each major operation. 1st Logistical Command elements must provide the bulk of MHE for their forward support area operations. In many cases, augmentation has been required from Air Force sources at airheads.

Observation: MHE must be moved to operational areas early in each operation.

C-130 Capable Airfields

(7) Item: Multiple operations in II OTZ require extensive use of aircraft for troop movement and resupply.

Discussion: Limited road networks and concurrent conduct of several operations within II OTZ requires a maximum reliance on airlift for troop movement and resupply. C-130 aircraft with a maximum load capacity of 30,000 pounds provide the best means of aerial resupply for forward supply bases when C-130 capable airfields are available. Lack of C-130 capable airfields in many portions of II OTZ has limited operations in that C-130 or smaller aircraft must be relied on for resupply. Another factor is that units can sustain themselves a maximum of 40 KM from their operating base. If C-130 capable airfield were available within 40 KM of any portion of II OTZ, any operation could be supported by C-130 aircraft.

Observation: This headquarters is studying construction of new C-130 airfields and the improvement to C-130 capability of existing smaller airfields to insure coverage with C-130 of all portions of II OTZ.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TNG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSQPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Ability of Units to Carry Basic Loads

(8) Item: OPOON units are unable to carry a basic load of supplies into operational areas.

Discussion: The 1st Air Cav Div considers one day of supply to be their basic load. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div consider three days of supply as basic load. The 1st Air Cav Div cannot move its basic load with organic transportation. In the past this has resulted in complete reliance on 1st Log Command's having supplies in forward areas on D-day. This drain on initial stocks limits buildup within the required time frame of approximately five days.

Observation: Units must bring the basic load at the outset of each operation.

Office Equipment

(9) Item: Supply of Office Equipment.

Discussion: The supply situation pertaining to office supplies and equipment continued to be a problem affecting the accomplishment of the mission of Administrative Services Division. The TOE of the Adjutant General Section does not provide for items of powered equipment required to perform the administrative mission. This activity had to seek approval of items essential to the operation. Theater supply availability of new requirements was such that items were not available and were procured by means of a purchase request.

Observation: G1 of I FFORCEV has purchased a total of \$99,000.00 worth of equipment and office supplies to include mimeograph, thermo fax, stencil making machines, a multilith machine, typewriters, desks and file cabinets. The AG Section is now adequately equipped to perform its present and programmed mission.

(10) Engineer.

Airmobile Combat Engineer Support

Item: Standard engineer construction equipment is too large and heavy to be practicable of air movement or helilift.

Discussion: Most of the S and D tactical operations require movement away from secure base camp area utilizing helicopters and medium cargo aircraft as transportation. Much of the TOE construction equipment and water purification equipment cannot be moved by air into the forward airfields. For example, the dozer of a combat engineer battalion is overweight (48,900 lbs) and is too wide for the cargo compartment of the C-130 aircraft.

Observation: Airmobile equipment of the type organic to the 8th Engr Bn, 1st Air Cav Div is required for engineer combat support in most areas of the II CTZ.

f. Civil Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GC-TMG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Civil Affairs Personnel

- (1) Item: Lack of School Trained Civil Affairs Personnel.

Discussion: Of the 75 officers arriving in-country with the 41st Civil Affairs Company only 9 were school trained in Civil Affairs.

Observation: Schooling is necessary and it would be better to have future replacements attend school prior to arriving in-country, even if it delays their arrival by six weeks. It has been requested that all officer replacements be programmed through the Civic Action Course of the Civil Affairs school at Fort Gordon, Georgia or the Counterinsurgency Course at the Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Interpreters

- (2) Item: Lack of Interpreters.

Discussion: Successful accomplishment of a civil affairs mission is dependent upon communicating with the local population. The 41st Civil Affairs Company is authorized 19 US military interpreters. Eight have been assigned but none speaks Vietnamese. Efforts to acquire ARVN and/or civilian help has met with negative results.

Observation: With this type unit, interpreters are a necessity and a higher priority should be given. Functional teams are approximately 90% effective without an interpreter.

Securing Rice

- (3) Item: Rice Harvest Tuy Hoa.

Discussion: A plan was formed to allow harvesters to carry the rice to designated collecting points. At these points a private Co-Op would purchase the rice from the harvester and the rice would then be transported to government warehouses in secured areas. The individual harvester would be permitted to retain enough for the needs of his family.

In practice these procedures were not workable. Efforts to secure the harvest on the part of the troop units were successful. However, the efforts to buy the rice from the harvester failed completely. In order for the Co-Op to purchase the unmilled rice low enough to permit it to sell the milled rice at or below the government ceiling price, it could not afford to pay the harvesters what they wanted. Consequently the bulk of the rice remained in the hands of the harvesters.

When it became apparent that the Co-Op system would not work the province chief arranged for the harvesters to bring the rice into one of the designated hamlets which was located in a secure area. Thus the bulk of the rice was moved into a secured area in the vicinity of the city of Tuy Hoa.

CONFIDENTIAL
41 of 23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-00-TWG

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSQPO-28 (R1)) (U)

The province chief stated that he was going to control the rice by insisting that everyone declare the amount on hand and then check to insure that no excess amounts went undeclared. This was considered inadequate.

Observation: It was recommended that in the future, prior to committing troops to the security of a rice harvest that a practical plan for securing the rice after the harvest be made. Also, that earlier and more detailed coordination be made among all interested agencies prior to the completion of detailed plans by any of them. MACV should encourage the GVN to give province chiefs legal authority to take and store the rice for the owner giving him a credit for the rice he gives up for storage. He should be permitted to retain on hand only enough for his family for a limited time (one month) and he should be made to adequately justify any excessive withdrawal of rice from the central storage facility. Price controls should be established to avoid speculation and severe penalties imposed for violations.

Protocol

(A) Item: Attendance at Vietnamese Official Functions.

Discussion: It has been found that excessive numbers of Americans are present at functions which concern only the Vietnamese Community. Their Vietnamese hosts are often unprepared for them and their reception leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of courtesy and protocol.

Observation: A policy was established directing that military personnel under the control of this headquarters attend by invitation only, Vietnamese official functions. Invitations will not be accepted unless they are directed to the individual personally and are in writing or are extended orally by a person directly and officially associated with the function.

Minimizing of Non-Combatant Casualties

(9) Item: Search and Destroy Operations in Heavily Populated Areas.

Discussion: The minimizing of non-combatant casualties and excessive destruction of civilian homes is a policy directive of MACV. It is essential to winning the support of the populace. While it may be necessary to conduct operations in heavily populated areas to clear the area, the pacification effort should be so coordinated that it becomes unnecessary to conduct planned operations in the same area at a later date.

Observation: When planned operations are to be conducted in a heavily populated area, plans should include military occupation of the area to avoid having to repeat the operation to clear the area again.

g. Signal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-CC-TWO

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (ROS CSQPO-28 (R1)) (.)

Mobility of Communications Equipment

(1) Item: Mobility of communications equipment is serious? - hampered in Vietnam.

Diagnosis: The Signal Battalion (Corps) in support of I FFORCEV is designed to support a corps type headquarters in conventional warfare where friendly forces have at least nominal control of the road networks between the corps and division headquarters. The current Army inventory of tactical communications equipments consists primarily of van-mounted 2 1/2 ton truck configurations. In Vietnam, friendly forces do not exercise control of roads, except on a selected basis, and normally a combat operation must be mounted to open a road for a specific period of time. Consequently, the conventional road mobility of the corps signal battalion has become a liability rather than an asset. The following problems have been encountered in moving signal equipment in support of tactical operations.

Inadequate or non-existent mechanical loading equipment at airfields.

Airfields in remote areas not able to accept the type of aircraft required to move necessary equipment.

Difficulty in obtaining correct harness for helicopter lift.

Observation: There is a valid requirement to drastically reduce the cube and weight of almost all communications equipment organic to the corps signal battalion. If 12-channel VHF equipment, carrier vans, medium-power radio sets, and tactical switchboards were configured to roll on and off of Army aircraft such as the CV-2, the mobility problem for communications equipment in Vietnam would be solved.

Communications Doctrine

(2) Item: Command and control communications for I FFORCEV do not follow the US Army doctrine for communications between a corps headquarters and subordinate headquarters.

Diagnosis: Command and control circuits used by I FFORCEV in most instances are routed through systems not under the control of this headquarters. Circuits are controlled by up to four separate organizations; i.e., STRATCOM, 2d Signal Group, 14th Signal Battalion, and Air Force communications agencies. Consequently, the circuits are not immediately responsive to the needs of the Commanding General, I FFORCEV.

The unconventional "no front line" aspects of the war in Vietnam make it extremely difficult to secure, hold and logistically support the great number of VHF sites which would be required to install and operate an adequate VHF multi-channel command and control

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSOPO-28 (R1)) (U)

communications system. Furthermore, the corps signal battalion is organized and equipped to provide command and control communications in a type corps area of operations which is nominally 75 miles wide by 100 miles deep. I FFOCEV area of operations is approximately 136 miles wide by 309 miles deep, or roughly one half of the land mass of RVN. Thus, the large land mass, coupled with a completely fluid tactical situation, presents a communications problem which a typical corps signal battalion is neither manned nor equipped to solve.

Observation: All efforts should be directed toward making the existing communications systems more responsive to the commander. Centralized system control at signal brigade level should bring this about. However, a requirement exists for command and control systems controlled by and directly responsive to I FFOCEV. By providing the corps signal battalion with tactical troopscatter equipments, this requirement can be met.

Planning and Engineering VHF Systems

(3) Item: Practical experience in planning and engineering VHF systems has proven that techniques taught in the service schools are not necessarily valid, and that these techniques should not be considered as hard and fast principles.

Discussion: A great number of VHF systems, established in the II CTZ, would not work if profiling and frequency engineering principles are accepted as gospel. Higher frequencies in C band sometimes give better obstacle gain systems than A and B band frequencies. Systems have been established over terrain that should have completely blocked or absorbed the signal. Other unusual techniques have been used; for example, bending antenna masts from the vertical plane to a position where the antenna is pointed skyward has been successful in some instances in overcoming obstacles in the near foreground of the antenna. The technique of bank shots in valleys is working well also.

Observation: VHF systems planners and operators should use ingenuity and take advantage of the unusual propagation effects that appear to exist in Vietnam. A research program by appropriate DA agencies may provide added valuable techniques in VHF systems engineering.

2. (U) Commanders Recommendations.

Name

FOR THE COMMANDER

44 Incl
as

John E. Thane, Jr.
JOHN E. THANE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

AVP-QC-TTC

15 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSQPO-26 (R1)) (U)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - ACEFOR, Dept of the Army
- 1 - CINCUSARPAC
- 3 - CG, USARV
- 1 - CG, II FFORCEV
- 1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 1 - CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
- 1 - CG, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
- 1 - ACofS, G1, I FFORCEV
- 1 - ACofS, G2, I FFORCEV
- 10 - ACofS, G3, I FFORCEV
- 1 - ACofS, G4, I FFORCEV
- 2 - ACofS, G5, I FFORCEV
- 1 - 13th Mil Hist Det

43 of 43

UNCLASSIFIED

1469K

SECRET

AVC-IH (15 May 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966 (HCS CSOPO-28 (RI)) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

21 JUN 1966

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the comments and lessons learned
in the I Field Force, Vietnam Operational Report on Lessons Learned.

2. (U) Reference Section II, paragraph 1a(1): Mail is moved by the
8th Aerial Port Squadron to all APO's in Vietnam on a priority basis. Personal
air mail is given top priority in accordance with AR 65-31. Personal letter
mail normally arrives at Tan Son Nhut on afternoon Pan American flights. Mail
is processed by the Air Mail Terminal and tendered to the 8th Aerial Port
during the night. It is placed on the first available flight the following
morning. Mail arriving in Vietnam has been processed through many terminals
to the West Coast Postal Concentration Centers, then to Pan American and to
the Saigon Air Terminal. There is not an even daily flow of letters. In
spite of the number of handlings, distances involved, and geographical loca-
tion, the mail service to Vietnam and in Vietnam is considered excellent. The
USARV postal inspection team will be instructed to look into this matter on
its next scheduled visit to I FFORCEV installations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

54 Incl
26

Henry L. Denney
HENRY L. DENNEY
CWO USA
Assistant Adjutant General

S- 66 - 256
CRR Div, G3, USAFAPAC

Sig Br. 96 1417

MC 66 911

G4-S-66- 1734

G3-S-66 1432

G3-S-66
1966 10056 SECRET

HQ USAFAPAC
S-66- 3752

SECRET

Copy 1 of 5 Copies
2611723

"This document may be regraded 'UNCLASSIFIED'
when separated from classified inclosure"

46

ARV668 1780

SECRET

GPOF-MH (15 May 66)

2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966 (RCS CSGFO-28 (R1)) (U)

HQ, U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 AUG 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report on Lessons Learned of I Field Force, Vietnam, for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 is forwarded herewith. This ORLL, one of the best to come from USARV units, is truly outstanding, well-organized and written, and highly informative. The attachment of significant supporting documents greatly enhances the value of the basic ORLL for both CD and historical purposes.

2. This headquarters concurs with the action as described in the last sentence of paragraph 2, USARV 1st Indorsement. The remaining comments in this CINCUSARPAC 2d Indorsement are keyed to paragraphs of the basic ORLL.

3. Section I, paragraph 3f, pages 18 - 21. Concur with comments and observations.

4. Section I, paragraph 4f(5), pages 25 - 26.

a. Sub-paragraph (a). The statement as presented is not entirely correct, although the MASH's in Korea were used in the manner stated. However, the MASH was organized before the Korean War, and is an outgrowth of a recognized requirement for forward surgical care furnished during World War II by Field Hospital-HU augmented by members of an auxiliary surgical group.

b. Sub-paragraph (b). The statement is true only as it applies to some areas of the RVN (e.g., Bien Hoa and Long Binh). It is not yet valid to reach a conclusion to eliminate MASH's in the RVN, considering the limited operating experience and the level of combat in the RVN.

c. Sub-paragraph (c). This statement is considered inappropriate. The normal mission of a MASH is to support a division, while as a general rule a brigade is supported by divisional Medical services. If additional surgical capability is required to support brigade-size operations, TOE 8-500 surgical teams can be attached to divisions or brigades. It is recognized that MASH's have been employed to support brigade-size operations in Vietnam, either as an expedient or as the result of the mission assigned the brigade. MASH's can be modified or tailored to support most operations at the level of brigade, division (-), or division (+).

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when
Separated from Classified
Inclosures

47

SECRET

HQ US ARMY
S 3752

G3-S-00

Cy 1 of 5 Copies

2611723

SECRET

GPOP-MH (15 May 66)

17 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966 (RCS CSGFO-28 (R1)) (U)

d. Sub-paragraph (d). The MASH's provide resuscitative surgery and medical treatment necessary to prepare critically injured or ill patients received from divisional medical elements for extended evacuation. The stay, or holding time, of patients in a MASH is not limited by a specific number of hours; rather, the patients' medical condition should be the governing factor in determining stay time. The statement that MASH's have "relatively poor facilities for patient care" is herewith challenged. Of course, MASH facilities may be considered poor when compared to facilities in COMZ or CONUS hospitals, but MASH facilities for patient care are approximately the same as those of any other hospital in the combat zone. This is particularly true in the RVN, where most hospitals are operating in fixed or semi-fixed facilities. There is no medical requirement to locate MASH hospitals at airfields. However, to propose the elimination of MASH's because 20 - 30 minutes more flying time will permit patients to reach hospitals with "ideal conditions" is both invalid and unacceptable. For many cases of injuries or wounds, the extra 20 - 30 minutes of flying time is unacceptable if the patients' life is to be saved.

5. Section I, paragraph 6b, page 29.

a. Sub-paragraph (2). USARPAC Regulation 614-5, which supports paragraph 21b, AR 614-30, provides for the reassignment of personnel involved in circumstances that may reflect discredit or embarrassment to the United States. It is not believed that USARPAC Regulation 614-5 imposes any undue administrative burden. It is not clear with the cited sub paragraph if the basic ORLL refers to personnel who may discredit or embarrass the United States or to personnel who should be court-martialed locally in the RVN. The statement about loss of "the characteristics of motivation and personal integrity desired in a combat zone" can be interpreted as indicating violations of the UCMJ.

b. Sub-paragraph (3)(a). The statement that "patients evacuated to hospitals within the Pacific Command (PACOM) area for less than 90 days are not normally reassigned" is incorrect. The current USARPAC procedure is to reassign patients to the Medical Holding Detachment of the receiving hospital within 48 hours after arrival. However, some problems currently exist in accounting for medically evacuated personnel, and this headquarters and HQ USARV are now studying means to correct such problems.

6. Section II, paragraph 1c, pages 36 - 37.

a. Sub-paragraph (1). Personnel augmentation of the PSYOP companies has been requested and is included in CINCPAC Letter 3010, Serial 000255, 18 June 1966, subj: CY 66 Requirements.

SECRET

GPOF-MH (15 May 66)

17 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966 (RCS CSGFO-28 (RI)) (U)

b. Sub-paragraph (2). The Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) of HQ 2d Logistical Command, on Okinawa, is presently processing the requirement for portable loudspeakers.

c. Sub-paragraph (3). Concur. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has the capability to make the translated summaries recommended.

d. Sub-paragraph (4). Concur.


e. Sub-paragraph (5). Concur.

7. Section II, paragraphs 1d and 14, pages 37 - 40. Concur with all observations.

8. Section II, paragraph 1g, pages 42 - 44. Concur with all observations.

9. This headquarters concurs with all observations made in Section II of the basic ORLL not specifically mentioned or commented upon in the foregoing paragraphs of this 2d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


D. A. HARRISON
Capt. AGC
Asst AG

54 Incl
nc

Copy furn:

CG USARV, Attn: AVC-DH

CG I FFV, Attn: AVF-GC-ING

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES FOR I FORCEV

<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>		<u>KIA</u>	<u>VIETCONG KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US	446	50	2,437	348
ROK	202	19	1,893	500
TOTAL	<u>648</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>4,330</u>	<u>848</u>

KILL RATIO:

FMFAP 6.6 to 1

US 5.5 to 1


ROK 9.0 to 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Page #1


CONFIDENTIAL

As of 30 April 1966




CONFIDENTIAL


As of 30 April 1966



CONFIDENTIAL




ATTACKS



HAMLET ENTRY & PROPAGANDA

TERRORISM




SABOTAGE & RR INCIDENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITS ATTACHED OR ASSIGNED TO
OR UNDER OPCON OF I FFORCEV
DURING 1ST QUARTER, 1966

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
HQ Co, I FFORCEV	No Change		Nha Trang	Assigned
64th Engr Det	12 January		Nha Trang	" "
HQ I FFORCEV Arty	No Change		Nha Trang	" "
1st Bn, 30 Arty	" "		Qui Nhon	" "
6th Bn, 14th Arty	" "		Pleiku	" "
54th Sig Bn	" "		Nha Trang	" "
Det 4, 3d BRU	" "		Nha Trang	Attached
209th Sig Det	" "		Nha Trang	Assigned
17th Avn Op	1 March		Nha Trang	OPCON
10th Avn Bn	No Change		Dong Ba Thien	OPCON*
14th Avn Bn	1 March		Nha Trang	OPCON*
52d Avn Bn	No Change		Pleiku	OPCON*
13th Mil Hist Det	" "		Nha Trang	Attached
41st CA Co (-)	" "		Nha Trang	OPCON
55th MI Det	" "		Nha Trang	Assigned
77th FA Det (Radar)	26 March		Pleiku	" "
235th FA Det " "	26 March		Qui Nhon	" "
237th FA Det " "	26 March		Qui Nhon	" "
238th FA Det " "	26 March		Cam Ranh Bay	" "
68th Inf Det " "	26 March		Pleiku	" "
245th Psy Ops Co	12 February		Nha Trang	OPCON
24th Psy Ops Det	12 February		Nha Trang	OPCON
272d MP Co	No Change		Nha Trang	Assigned
II Corps Adv Op	" " "		Pleiku	OPCON
1st Air Cav Div	" " "		An Khe	OPCON
1st Bde, 101st Air Div	" "		Tuy Hoa	OPCON
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	" "		Pleiku	OPCON
2d BCK Mar Bde	" " "		Tuy Hoa	OPCON
BCK Tiger Div	" " "		Qui Nhon	Mutual Cooperation
26th BCK BCT	16 April		Qui Nhon	Assigned to 9th Inf Div

* As of 1 March 1966 these units passed to OPCON 17th Avn Op.



—— OPCON

--- MUTUAL COOPERATION

Handwritten signature

I FORCEV OPLAN'S - 1 JAN 66 TO 30 APR 66

OPLAN 1-66 (VAN BUREN) - I FORCEV operation conducted to protect the rice harvest in Tuy Hoa Valley.

OPLAN 2-66 (HARRISON) - I FORCEV operation to the north and west of Tuy Hoa to destroy the 95th PAVN Regt.

OPLAN 3-66 (MASHIE-WHITE WING) - Directed operation by COMUSMACV to destroy the 18th NVA Regt and established base areas in northern Binh Dinh.

OPLAN 4-66 (TAYLOR) - I FORCEV operation to break in the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div after its arrival in Vietnam.

OPLAN 5-66 (MORNINGLIGHT VICTOR) - USAFV directed deployment of a tank company and cav troop of the 25th Inf Div from Qui Nhon to Pleiku.

OPLAN 7-66 (GRANT) - I FORCEV directed operation to destroy VC base area, vicinity Phu Cat Mountain. (Cancelled because one of the participating units, a US Marine Special Landing Force, was assigned to a higher priority mission.

OPLAN 8-66 & 15-66 (LONGFELLOW-BRONCHO) - I FORCEV operation employing units in northwest Kontum Province to interdict suspected infiltration routes from Laos across Kontum Province.

OPLAN 9-66 & 12-66 (LINCOLN) - COMUSMACV directed search and destroy operation in the central highlands of southern Pleiku, northern Darlac and western Phu Ben Province.

OPLAN 11-66 & 14-66 (FILLMORE) - I FORCEV directed operation to protect rice harvest in Tuy Hoa.

OPLAN 16-66 (ROUNDOUT) - USAFV directed operation to receive and process the 26th Cap ROK Inf Regt at Qui Nhon.

OPLAN 17-66 (AUSTIN) - COMUSMACV directive to conduct operations astride the II Corps and III Corps boundary.


OPLAN 18-66 & 20-66 (MOSEY I & II) - COMUSMACV directive to conduct pre-monsoon reconnaissance to check suspected infiltration routes.

OPLAN 19-66 (PAUL REVERE) - COMUSMACV directed operation in southwest Pleiku Province.

OPLAN 21-66 (LONGSTREET) - Operation requested by HQ, 35th Engr Gp to provide security for Engineer reconnaissance made via Vung Bo Bay.

SECRET

Level #2



CONFIDENTIAL

Ban	ban
Chau	chance
De	montagne
Ea	village
Hon	riviere
Kong	montagne
Kong	le
Kong	assé
Kong	riviere
Lung	village
Nui	montagne
Phu	montagne
Piet	village
Sung	riviere
Sung	riviere
Vung	base
Xa Xom	village

NEEFERSON
116 JAN

ARMED



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

22 CR

30 CQ

VAN BUREN

19 JAN - 21 FEB



ROK



2

ARVN



47



CONFIDENTIAL

CHINA

2

CR

BO CO

2

N BUREN
9 JAN - 21 FEB

SEA



1-101



OK

12



AN

47





H-101

ROK



2

SSS



ARVN



47



CONFIDENTIAL

BO

CO

13



H-101




2

SSS



47



CONFIDENTIAL

BQ CO

4

CONFIDENTIAL

BR CR

ED CO

HARRISON
26 FEB-24 MAR



1-101

CONFIDENTIAL
OR CR

CHINA


HARRISON
FEB-24 MAR

SEA



GLOSSARY

	baie	bay
B	Ban	village
	Cho, Chu	montagne
	De	village
	Eu	riviere
	Hon	montagne
	Hon	ile
	Kong	massif
	Krong	riviere
Kg	Lang	village
L	Nui	montagne
N	Phu	montagne
Pi	Plei	village
S	Song	riviere
S	Suoi	riviere
	Vung	baie
X	Xa, Xom	village



CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

13



4

SECRET

FILMORE
25 MAR



HO



21 APR

XUAN DAI

LANGA

DAM

SECRET

2

CHINA

WILLMORE
25 MAR-

SEA

X HOI

XUAN DAI

CQ3

7
LAO MA NHA

GLOSSARY

Ban	base	ban
Cho	camp	cho
Chu	mountain	chu
Da	mountain	da
Da	mountain	da
Han	river	han
Han	river	han
Kong	river	kong
Kong	river	kong
Lam	river	lam
Nu	mountain	nu
Phu	mountain	phu
Phi	mountain	phi
Song	river	song
Song	river	song
Yung	river	yung
Xa Kum	village	xa kum



101



2 (ROR)


SSS

SECRET

BQ


CO

3



CONFIDENTIAL


1



R U N 8 4 G P A N

2





SOUTH

12

MASHER WHITEWING 24 JAN - 12 MAR

MANG HO V
23 MAR-

JIM BOWIE
13-28 MAR

CAP FOLK

BUNK

CONFIDENTIAL

2-12A

3

UN KAE TIGE
12 APR B-1

UN KAE TIGER VI
12 APR 64 JAN

14



CONFIDENTIAL

Y A Z A

YV IV

YV7

Zi

YVZ


ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΑΣ

24

GARFIELD
25 FEB - 8

CONFIDENTIAL

1



GARFIELD
25 FEB-

2

4

CONFIDENTIAL

3


GARFIELD
25 FEB - 24 MAR

3-25


CONFIDENTIAL

4

CON



12




3-25

25 MAR - 8 APR

CONFIDENTIAL


ACS


5



CONFIDENTIAL

12





Scale 1:250,000



CONFIDENTIAL


3

MOSBY-1
11-17 APR

Scale 1:250,000

CONFIDENTIAL

4



CONFIDENTIAL




I-101

TYLER

13-17 JAN

2



AUSTIN 2


12-26 APR



I-101

CONFIDENTIAL

2



13

CONFIDENTIAL

LONGFELLOW

13 APR



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ZB AS

LONGFELLOW

13 APR


13-25

CONFIDENTIAL

2


CONFIDENTIAL

1




CONFIDENTIAL

12



T



MOSBY I
21 APR


CONFIDENTIAL

3

MOSEBY II
21 APR

4

SECRET



WEEKLY SUMMARY

I Corps total includes I FFV sorties, which are also reported separately below.
II Corps totals include US/AF support and GVN support.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-AV

8 February 1966

SUBJECT: Aviation Support

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Effective 15 January 1966, all U.S. Army aviation support in the II Corps Tactical Zone will be provided on an area concept. For the purpose the II Corps Tactical Zone will be divided into Area NORTH and Area SOUTH, the boundary being the northern boundary of the 23rd ARVN Division.

2. Commanding Officer, 10th Aviation Battalion will provide aviation support to ARVN and US/FWMLF units in Area SOUTH, which includes the following provinces; DAR LAC, KHANH HOA, QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, MINH THUAN, LAM DONG and BINH THUAN.

3. Commanding Officer, 52nd Aviation Battalion will provide aviation support to ARVN and US/FWMLF units in Area NORTH, which includes the following provinces; KONTUM, BINH LINH, PLEIKU, PHU BON and PHU YEN.

4. Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Advisory Group and the units over which he exercises OPCON will be supported by the 52nd Aviation Battalion in the north and by the 10th Aviation Battalion in the south.

5. Aviation Support in each area will be provided on a general support basis with the priority of effort to major units conducting operations in that area. US/FWMLF units will submit requests directly to the responsible aviation battalion; requests for support of ARVN units will be submitted to aviation battalions through advisory channels. Request channels diagram is at Inclosure 1.

6. Requests for operational airlift which require more lift than is normally available will be submitted to Field Force Vietnam through the aviation battalion normally providing support. This headquarters will determine priority and notify the requesting unit and the aviation battalion concerned of support to be made available. Aviation battalions will coordinate with local supported units to provide support for unexpected urgent missions.

Incl #22

AVF-AV

SUBJECT: Aviation Support

7. Requests for aviation support will be submitted to the appropriate aviation battalion COC as far in advance as possible. Aviation battalions will hold periodic planning conferences to forecast requirements, make tentative allocations and determine possible conflicts.

8. Current allocations of U.S. Army fixed wing utility and cargo aircraft to Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps remain unchanged.

9. The COC, 52nd Aviation Battalion can be contacted by calling DRAGON 30 (off PLEIKU Switchboard). The COC, 10th Aviation Battalion can be contacted by calling MUSTANG 3 (off TYPHOON Switchboard).

10. This letter rescinds letter, this headquarters, subject as above, with one inclosure, dated 19 January 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. C. BALDWIN
Captain, AGC
Asst AG


1 Incl
Channels Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: D
(Less 1st Air Cav Div)

Plus:

- 10 - OPCON Bns
- 5 - 17th Avn Gp
- 6 - FFV G3 D&T
- 10 - FFV Avn

FIELD FORCE VIETNAM




OPCON

COORD AND


REQUESTS

Inclosure 1



CONFIDENTIAL

AVIATION ORGANIZATION CHART



--- OPCON
--- COMMAND

NOTE 1 - OPCON 5th Special Forces

NOTE 2 - Assets provided to various individual commands other than I FFORCEV


CONFIDENTIAL

Sh-c #24

ENCLOSURE 5

Encl #25

ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS



* These tms can be made up when required of det officers augmented by ARVN personnel-- are not part of 1081, organization

1.28.71

L

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

WARNING

Allied forces will soon conduct combat operations in this area.
Break away from the VC. Protect yourself. Go to a safe place now.

WARNING


PICTURE

Vietnamese Flag

LEAFLET

1-66-15

Used with Operation Masher



Inc #2-13

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

COUNTRYMEN

Government and allied forces will soon begin military operations in your area. Daily we observe the amount of rice being harvested and we carefully note the locations.

Do not permit your rice to fall into the hands of the V.C. invaders.

We will buy your surplus rice for a good price at a later date.

Thank You Countrymen

PICTURE


Vietnamese Flag

LEAFLET

2-66-1

Used with Operations
Harrison/Van Buren

Printed 1 Feb 66



WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

WARNING

You have heard the bombs. Do not delay. Leave now while there is still time.

WARNING


PICTURE

Vietnamese Flag

Used with Operation Masher

LEAFLET

2-66-2 Printed 2 Feb 56



WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

WARNING

Do not shoot at our aircraft. Hiding and shooting places will be destroyed.

You have no place to protect you from our shots from the sky.

We will seek out and destroy all that shoot at our aircraft.


PICTURE

Vietnamese Flag

Used with Operations Masher/White Wing

LEAFLET

2-66-12 Printed 11 Feb 66



2-66-12

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

Dear Countrymen,

As to the last rice crop, you farmers in the two Districts Hieu Xuong and Tay Hoa were so worried as you didn't know if you can gather your products because almost all of your rice fields are in VC suppressed areas.

The VC intention are to rob the rice of the people, then to move it to the mountains to feed their soldiers, and to supply their cadres, in the west Highlands, who are in starvation.

Fortunately, your legitimate concern was particularly taken care of by the Government and our Army. The ARVN cooperating with the allied forces have launched many pursuit operations to destroy VC, to lighten all communist oppression, to protect you farmers gathering your rice to the utmost amount.

You sweat, from watering your soil and from earning your food and clothes is guaranteed protection by our Army.

In front of the forces of our Army, and the close support of you people VC intruders are forced to be disbanded. Peace will then come and your soil will be eternally green in tranquility and the rural families will forever live in happiness.

PICTURE Vietnamese Flag

LEAFLET 3-66-6 Printed 19 Mar 66

ĐỒNG-BÀO THÂN-MẾN

Trong mùa lúa vừa qua, nông-dân thuộc 2 Quận Hiếu-Xương và Tuy-Hòa đã tỏ ra bận khoăn lo ngại, không biết họ có thu hoạch

Bon chúng chủ trương cướp đoạt vụ lúa của đồng-bào, chuyển lên miền núi tích trữ, nuôi quân lính và phân phát tiếp tế cho

và Quân-Đội đặc biệt quan tâm và giúp đỡ. Quân-Đội Việt Nam

sân, nhằm bảo vệ an ninh cho nông-dân thu hoạch số lúa thóc của họ một cách vô cùng mỹ-mãn.

WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

The allied forces are here to protect you from the V.C.

You now see how the cowardly V.C. react to the superior might of the allied forces.

Help the GVN and its allies to defeat the V.C. If the V.C. come near you report their presence to a GVN or allied soldier or a government official.

In order to keep your rice from the VC ensure that your rice is transported to the secure hamlets of: Phuoc Loc Phu Le, Phu Lam Dong Lac, Hoa Thanh, Soon government officials will be in your village to buy excess rice that was not transported to a secure area.

When the rice harvest is completed all unharvested rice will be destroyed to prevent the V.C. from harvesting it.

Give this paper to your friends if they cannot read, explain it to them.

PICTURE Two Hands shaking on VN Flag background

LEAFLET 2-66-11 Printed 9 Feb 66 Used with Operation White Wing



WRITTEN SIDE OF LEAFLET

SOLDIERS OF THE VIET CONG

Your leaders have pushed you into a dishonorable war. In this terrible conflict many of your comrades have been killed, and will never see their village again.

Because you are the sons of the beloved fatherland of Vietnam we urge you to join the Republic of Vietnam and its allies in stamping out the Communist aggressions.

To achieve a new life, follow these instructions:

Proceed south on the road beside the An Lao river.

Bring a safe conduct pass if you have one.

Look for an allied patrol. Stand in open area with hands raised.


Do not be afraid ----- Do not run!

PICTURE

Vietnamese Flag

LEAFLET

2-66-8 Printed 5 Feb 66 Used with Operation White Wing



2-66-8 (A)

This is a standard Safe Conduct Pass.

Leaflet No. 11

N. B. (Note)

Date, serial Numbers and locations of all dissemination of this leaflet must be recorded and reported in weekly milrep.

ĐÂY TẤM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ - QUAN
QUÂN CHÍNH VIỆT - NAM CÔNG - HÒA VÀ LỰC - LƯỢNG ĐỒNG - MINH.
SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES
이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-GC-TNG

23 January 1966


SUBJECT: Orientation on Montagnards and Related US/GVN Policies

TC: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached information topic on the Montagnards and related United States and Government of Vietnam policy has been prepared for troop orientation. It provides guidance for personal and military relations with the various Montagnard tribes.

2. Units under operational control of Field Force Vietnam will conduct an orientation for all personnel within 30 days after receipt of this material. Subsequent orientations will be conducted as required to inform new arrivals and to reacquaint unit personnel with the US and GVN policies toward the Montagnards.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



NEIL M. MATZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Special:
OPCON units
company level

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE CHEMICAL OFFICER
APO US FORCES 96240

AVF-CM

3 March 1966

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. On 17 February 1966, an RCA Seminar was held in the FFORCEV conference room. The following personnel were in attendance:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>JOB TITLE</u>
Maj Nord	MACCOC13	Cml Opns O
SSgt Blackwell	USARV	Spec Opns, G3
Lt Col Meyer	FFORCEV	Det, G3
Capt Arnold	FFORCEV	CmlO
Capt Schmidt	FFORCEV	Asst CmlO
MSgt Faber	FFORCEV	Opns Sgt
Lt Col Einsel	1st Air Cav Div	CmlO
Capt Tadey	1st Air Cav Div	Asst Opns O
Maj Kim	Cap ROK Inf Div	Asst CmlO
Capt Kwan	Cap ROK Inf Div	
Capt Browning	1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	CmlO
Lt Pavlat	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	CmlO
Capt Metaloff	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	LNO
Maj Yoo	2d Korean Mar Bde	CmlO
Capt Lee	2d Korean Mar Bde	
Capt Nee	II Corps	Cml Adv
Capt Lubenow	FFORCEV	PIO

b. A detailed synopsis of the RCA Seminar is attached as inclosure 1.

c. The seminar provided an opportunity for chemical and operations personnel of OPCON units to exchange their experiences and to become abreast of current developments in the field of riot control agent employment in tactical situations.

d. This information sheet is written to supplement the RCA Seminar and to pass on other information of a general nature which time did not permit discussing at the seminar. It is hoped that a similar seminar can be held in the near future to discuss other subjects of chemical interest.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDC DIR 5200.0

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl #30

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-G1


SUBJECT: CSB Technical Information Report (T)

2. (C) MAJOR UNIT ACTIVITIES:

a. 1st Air Cavalry Division:

(1) RCA Operations:

(a) The division has built an expedient dispenser for dropping up to 400 M7 type CS grenades from 1500 feet absolute altitude; can be dropped in 1/8 load increments; coverage is 350 meters by 150-300 meters depending on winds; usual speed of a/c is 60-80 knots; device is made of empty 2.75 inch rocket cans modified to hold 5 grenades per tube. Dispenser requires approximately twenty minutes to load (4 men). Loading procedure is to pull pins, replace carton top over grenade and handle, and insert in tubes. A system of doors at the bottom of the tubes enables grenades to drop out when opened. Weight of M7 type CS grenade allows penetration of jungle canopies.



Mounts on chopper skids. Each device has 200 grenade capacity.

(b) CS has been incorporated into division base defense plan as an initial response to an attempted penetration.

(c) CS authority has been requested for all division operations. Grenade dispenser has been used many times. Lessons learned from these uses are as follows:

1 Must be used close enough to assaulting troops so that they can exploit area in about 20 minutes.

2 CS placed in very densely foliated areas is an effective blocking agent for short periods.

3 Must have close coordination at point of release to make last minute adjustments in location of strike due to winds.

4 Attacking troops must take care of masks (particular care should be taken to keep masks dry). Division policy is to keep protective masks in waterproof bags until RCA use is planned or imminent.

5 Type targets attacked--enemy in trenches and spider holes; suspected automatic or crew weapons locations.

6 Aerial rocket artillery or Air Force TAC are on standby is an excellent method of exploitation.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-CM

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (U)

(d) During operation ~~ASBESTOS~~/WHITENING, choppers were receiving sporadic ground fire from a village in the MLC valley. Leaflets were dropped over the village telling inhabitants to stop firing at aircraft or suffer the consequences. Fire continued from the village and new leaflets were dropped telling the people that they were warned and must now be dealt with unless they left the village. Many villagers heeded the advice and left. CS was then dropped on the village and followed by a ground sweep with ground forces. Numerous VC's were taken during this sweep without a shot being fired. Since this employment, no ground fire has been received from this village. This concept was considered highly effective and has promising possibilities.

(e) No extensive tunnel complexes have been encountered to comment on tunnel clearing by use of Mity Mite blowers.

(2) Defoliation:

(a) Considerable defoliation accomplished around base area.

(b) In process of completely defoliating a 12 KM by 200 meter wide band around base area using agent BLUE.

(c) Prefer agent ~~ALUMINUM~~ because:

1 BLUE very corrosive to valves, spray bars, aircraft, etc.

2 BLUE requires repeated spraying.

2 Rain interferes more with agent BLUE spraying.

4 Agent BLUE requires more manpower to mix.

(d) Have used defoliation quite effectively to:

1 Clear paths and trails.

2 Mark boundaries of ranges, such as aerial rocket artillery.

3 Mark firing lanes on quick reaction course.

4 Clear machine gun and rifle ranges.

5 Keep vegetation from growing up in existing concertina belts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-G1

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (T)

(e) Defoliation equipment:

- 1 40 Gal/hr sprayers for D.T.
- 2 30 Gal/hr push cart sprayers for D.T. and malathion.
- 3 2 Gal hand sprayers for small operations.

4 Helicopter-mounted spray bar for large terrain. Consists of 55 gal drum, a P/T pressure bottle at 1800-21 PSI, a pressure regulator to reduce operating pressure to 5-8 PSI, a quick cut-off valve, and 8 foot spray bar and necessary hoseing. Spray from a solute minimum altitude at 20-30 knots. Coverage of 55 gallons is approximate 5.6 hectares in 11 minutes of flying time. Width of swath is about 8-12 meters.

5 Similar system developed for truck mounted use with 55 gal drum, commercial gas cylinder and 1000 spray nozzles--usually two nozzles/truck.

6 Mity Mite works very well if operating with all valves virtually completely closed.

(f) Other spraying operations.

1 Mity Mite used frequently for D.T. and malathion spraying.

2 40 Gal/hr skid mounted apparatus and 30 gal/hr push cart apparatus have also been used for insecticide spraying.

(3) Flame expedients:

(a) Division has installed No. 10 cans and/or empty 50 caliber ammunition boxes at 50 meter intervals around the interior of the base defense barrier system. Each of these is filled with kerosene and diesel fuel; has a paper cover to retard evaporation and prevent entrance of rain. Mounted directly over the can is a trip flare, with a wire leading back to the nearest foxhole. To light the barrier or guide supporting aerial artillery, alternate flares are tripped. The remaining flares are reserved for either a second attack, or for extending the period of illumination. Normal burning time is approximately 45 minutes.

(b) A similar expedient signal is used in field operations. A C-ration can is usually used. One gallon (full of diesel fuel) JP-4 is sufficient for several lightings to guide aircraft or indicate a direction of fire by placing two signals, or an extension of an observer-target line.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-QM

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (U)

(c) A lesson re-learned has been that foliage, and even brush is very difficult to burn due to the high humidity. Napalm has been tried, pouring up to 300 gallons of diesel fuel/200 square meters, using flame throwers, using fire bombs. Some limited success has followed when defoliants are used initially.

b. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division:

(1) To date, the brigade has employed four (4) E158 munitions. These munitions were dropped from an altitude of 1500 feet. Timers on the munitions were all set at 6.9 seconds but observation revealed that one munition detonated at about 500 feet, two a few hundred feet above the ground, and one was a total malfunction. Extremely dense foliage prohibited observation of results in target area.

(2) During disassembly of an E159 munition, a partial detonation occurred at step f (foxtrot) of disassembly. Two modules of the after E158 ignited and disseminated CS over the area. It is felt that this was a definite malfunction and not the result of improper disassembly. The other E158 was salvaged.

(3) The brigade has rigged a similar "jury rig" affair to the one mentioned in the 1st Air Cavalry Division notes. Approximately 49 M7 type grenades are loaded into each of two launchers. These launchers rest on the floor of the chopper and are tipped up at desired release time, the grenades falling out by gravity.

(4) To train pilots and improve accuracy of the above mentioned systems, a grid system has been scribed in front of the pilot for use as a reference point. Sandbags with smoke grenades attached are then dropped from 1500 feet on command from the pilot using his grid system. In a relatively short time, pilots can get quite accurate at placing the sandbags (simulated munitions) on target.

(5) During operations in the IICTB, the brigade encountered no large tunnel systems. Numerous dug-outs, caves, and spider holes were found but did not warrant the use of Mity Mite blowers.

(6) Conclusions:

(a) The E159/E158 munition meets the requirement for delivery of RC on an area type target but needs improvement in the following areas:

1. The timers are not dependable as evidenced by dropping four (4) E158's with the same time setting, resulting in 1 dud and 3 activations at different altitudes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVP-G1

SC33527: CBK Technical Information Report (U)

2. The sub-munition M49 will not penetrate a dense jungle canopy.

(b) Satisfactory results can be achieved using a system to deliver M7 type grenades. Such a system must have a capacity of 200-400 grenades to have a satisfactory concentration and area coverage. The M7 type CS grenades will penetrate the jungle canopy and not rupture on impact with the ground.

c. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division: The brigade is relatively new in-country and has not had occasion to use ROK yet.

d. Capital ROK Infantry Division:

(1) To date the "Piger" Division has not used ROK in offensive operations.

(2) No tunnel systems requiring Mity Mite use have been encountered within the division AOR. As a result, no information on which to evaluate Mity Mite has been gathered.

(3) The division has plans for construction of a proficiency course to include tunneling system for training in the use of Mity Mite blowers.

e. 2d Korean Marine Brigade:

(1) The brigade employed two M49's from an U-1 aircraft on 3 January 1966. The munitions were dropped from 500 feet and activated by lanyard. The munitions functioned perfectly and covered an area approximately 2.5 hectares with a dense cloud of CS. Intense ground fire from the flank of the objective prohibited observation of results from the air.

(2) During operation JALAN, the Korean Marine Brigade encountered several large tunnel systems in which Mity Mite blowers were used. Reports from the CMIC indicate that satisfactory results were received, resulting in numerous WVC and VCS. One complaint was that the blowers were virtually useless, thus reemphasizing the requirement for large capacity blowers. No maintenance problems have been encountered with the Mity Mite blowers.

3. (c) NEW DEVELOPMENTS:

a. People Sniffer: JALAN is in the process of developing a "people sniffer" device which can detect the presence of humans within tunnels. No availability date is available at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-Q1

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (U)

b. Explosive Foam: JMW is also developing a system whereby foam and acetylene are pumped into a tunnel (the acetylene is trapped in the bubbles created by the foam). The explosive mixture can be detonated as desired. If candles or other open fires are present within the tunnel system, premature detonation will occur.

c. Gas and CS Slurry: USMCV Special Operations Branch has received word that a 40% gasoline and 60% powdered CS mixture can be made into a slurry and when burned gives off a dense cloud of agent CS. No further data is available. Field tests are encouraged and should be reported to this headquarters.

4. Miscellaneous Info:

a. Instructions pamphlet for operating Mity Mite blowers which is classified CONFIDENTIAL has been declassified by 12000013.

b. Every effort will be made to play up the humanitarian aspect of RCM usage. Further, the terms "tear gas" and "gas masks" should be discouraged. The term "riot control agents" and "protective masks" should be used.

c. Any information received on VC reaction to RCM use by US/Korean Forces will be reported to this headquarters.

d. USMCV and USMCV are interested in any comments, recommendations, or definite problem areas which occur with respect to Mity Mite blowers.

e. Three warning notes with respect to the E159/E158 and E8 munitions systems:

(1) Once timers are installed on the E158 munitions, they cannot be removed. If the timers are removed, they are no longer usable.

(2) Do not, repeat not, remove the protective covers from the top of the E8 munitions. These covers insure protection against the elements and will be blown off when the munition is fired.

(3) When disassembling E159's have protective masks available.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-GM

SUBJECT: CBR Technical Information Report (U)

f. Lt Col John P. Crispell, who was at CONARC, will arrive 5 March 1966 to replace Capt Robert Arnold who departs 13 March 1966 for CUCGBRA, Ft McClellan, Alabama.

1 Incl
as

s/ Robert W. Arnold
t/ ROBERT W. ARNOLD
Capt, CmlC
Chemical Officer

DISTRIBUTION:


- 3 - MACV
- 3 - USARV
- 2 - 1st Log Comd
- 3 - 1st Air Cav Div
- 3 - 1st Inf Div
- 3 - Cap ROK Ind Div
- 3 - III MAF
- 2 - 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
- 2 - 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
- 2 - 2d Korean Mar Bde
- 2 - 173d Abn Bde (sep)
- 2 - 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
- 2 - DSA II Corps
- 12 - FFORCEV CmlC
- 2 - RAR


CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

**SPECIAL MAP
II CTZ, RVM**

SCALE: 1:1,000,000 (APPROXIMATE)





LEGEND

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

CTZ BOUNDARY

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

ROADS

CITY

CROP DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS

DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE CHEMICAL OFFICER
APO US FORCES 96240

AVF-CM

22 April 66

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: RCA After-Action Report for Operation Heng-Ho 5 (Consolidated)

1. General

- a. Period covered: 23 March-7 April 66
- b. Unit involved: ROK Cap Inf Div and Cav Inf Regt.

2. Details

a. 23-26 Mar 66--Employed 52 grenades against 16 shallow caves and villages resulting in 33 VCS captured of which 4 were from the village. Caves were 1 meter in diameter at entrance, widening to 2 meters on inside. Length of caves were 5 to 10 meters. Mity Mite blowers were not used during this phase.

b. 2-5 April 66--Employed 22 grenades against 14 caves. Entrances approximately 80 centimeters in diameter, widening to 150 centimeters on inside. Length was 5-6 meters. A total of 17 VCS were captured in these caves. Mity Mite blowers not used.

c. 5-7 April 66--During this period 11 small caves and 10 tunnel systems were searched. Details as follows:

(1) 05 Apr 66--The tunnel system with 4 shafts (see Inc 1 inclosure 1) was located. Grenades in conjunction with Mity Mite blowers were used. Two VC were immediately captured. Additional grenades were used and after 5 minutes, 4 additional VC came out. After flushing system with air and opening vents and exits, the system was searched with the following results: 2 ea carbine w/270 rounds of ammo; 7 ea hand grenades; 1 radio set; medicines; and various clothing were captured. Tunnel system destroyed with TNT after thorough search.

(2) 06 Apr 66--Eleven small caves found in which 9 grenades were used. Resulted in 1 VCC. 5 tunnel systems were located in village vic (BR861390). Tunnels were approximately 15 meters long and were "L" shaped. Eighteen grenades were used with the Mity Mite blowers. Five VC

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Incl #32

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVF-CM

22 April 66

SUBJECT: RCA After-Action Report for Operation Meng-Ho 5 (Consolidated)

were killed and 1 VC captured along with 3 carbines w/200 rds of ammo and 25 hand grenades. Resistance was encountered from the tunnel system but was quickly neutralized by CS agents.

(3) 07 Apr 66--Tunnel entrance was located along river bank by Village vicinity (BR360388). Four grenades were used with Mity Mite blower. Because of VC resistance, tunnel was destroyed by 5lbs TNT charge without searching. As a result 2 VC were killed and 7 hand grenades captured. Dimensions of tunnel unknown.

d. An under-water tunnel (See Fig 2 incl 1) was discovered on 24 March in the vicinity of CRO26385. It would not have been noticed except that VC prisoners upon interrogation revealed its location. The entrance was concealed by reeds and air vents and emergency exits were found in thick bamboo groves. The main entrance was through a small 60 centimeter hole partially concealed by water. Total length of system was 10 meters. It was approximately 2 meters high. CS was not used against the system because of intense small arms fire. M79 grenades were used to secure the entrance and a total of 7 VC were killed along with 5 weapons captured.

3. Summary and Recommendations:

a. A total of 119 M7A2 CS grenades were used in conjunction with Mity Mite blowers against 26 tunnel systems and 25 small caves resulting in 7 VC killed, 25 VC captured, 32 VCS, 10 weapons w/470 rounds of ammo, 39 hand grenades, 1 radio set, clothing, and medicines of various types.

b. Prior to searching tunnel systems in which RCA is used, they must be flushed thoroughly with air to remove as much of the agent cloud as possible.

1 Incl
as


JOHN P CRISPELL
Lt Col, CMIC
Chemical Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

G3
G2
Cml


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCL#1 MULTIPLE TUNNEL SYSTEM




1. Overhead Cover 3 Meters
2. Concret Block Walls

INCL#2 UNDER-WATER TUNNEL SYSTEM



- STRUCTURE
1. ENTRANCE
 - a. DIAMETER 60cm
 - b. HEIGHT 150cm
 - c. 5 STEPS TO TAIL SYSTEM
 2. INDOOR
 - a. DIAMETER 2m
 - b. LENGTH 10m


EMERGENCY EXIT 60cm
IN DIAMETER




1. 1. 1. 1. 1.



h.c #32 (2/2)



huc *33 (3/2)



Incl #34

MONTAGNARDS AND RELATED US/GVN POLICIES

INTRODUCTION

1. The information contained herein is intended to provide a background of Montagnard environment, culture, and political aspirations, and to set forth the general US/GVN policies relating to Montagnard affairs.

2. It is essential that officers and enlisted men of the United States Military Forces operating in Vietnam have an understanding of the Montagnard and the governmental policies pertaining to him, in order to take proper action when occasion arises to advance US/GVN policies and to counter Communist subversion.

GENERAL

3. The word "Montagnard" is the French equivalent to the English word "Montaineer". The word applies to all of the members of the ethnically complex tribes which inhabit the highlands areas of Indo-China. The Montagnard tribes are not ethnically related to the lowland Vietnamese who primarily inhabit the coastal and Delta regions of North and South Vietnam. The people present a bewildering mixture of racial and linguistic groups in varying stages of civilization. The Montagnard environment, culture, and religion are primitive. However, increasing exposure to an advanced civilization and the influence of modern governmental politics are requiring the Montagnard to modify his pattern of existence to meet the changing times.

ENVIRONMENT

4. The Montagnard's life is conditioned by his immediate environment. He knows little of what exists beyond his own village's domain. The Montagnard depends primarily upon nature to provide him food, shelter and clothing. Only the great fertility of the soil permits these people to survive. Agriculture is limited to raising enough rice, corn, millet, and sometimes sugar cane to feed the residents of the village. Tools are simple and easy to use: a wooden digging stick, iron hoe, ax, adze, and machete. Fertilizers are of the natural variety; ashes from burned off forested areas or cooking fires, and buffalo manure. The Montagnard is not nomadic by nature, but moves his habitation as soon as he has exhausted the natural resources of the land he occupies. Other causes for exodus are fire, an epidemic, or frequent raids by the tiger. Such mishaps are invariably attributed to evil influence of local spirits. To dispute the possession of the ground with a powerful divinity would be sheer madness and accordingly he yields with grace and moves elsewhere without regret.

5. Fishing and hunting contribute to the food supply. Game traps, crossbows and arrows, and spears are implements of the hunt for game. Firearms are practically non-existent as a possession.

6. Wild fruits, bamboo shoots, edible leaves and roots are gathered by women to supplement the diet.

7. Not only vegetation, but also animals, play a large role in highland life. Cats and dogs are favorite pets. For food and sacrificial purposes the most important animals, in ascending order are chickens, pigs, goats, and buffalo. The buffalo is especially prestigious. In many villages a man's wealth is gauged by the number of buffalo he has sacrificed. A few wealthy Montagnards have horses, and among some tribes elephants are found.

CULTURE

8. The culture of the Montagnard tribes and tribal groups is considered the world's most ethnically complex. Language in the highlands is the means by which the greatest distinction can be made between tribes. With few exceptions, each dialect is mutually unintelligible to members of other tribes. The more advanced tribal groups like the Rhades and Bahnar, have a considerable understanding of Vietnamese and French and have their own written language.

9. The typical Montagnard house is a simple bamboo and wood structure, on pilings, and roofed with thatch. A long, central corridor divides the interior, with compartments on each side; each room houses a monogamous or polygamous family, usually with its own hearth. In addition, the house contains a larger common room for family gatherings and the reception of guests. Unmarried men live in the bachelors' house, a well built structure on high pilings easily identified by its unusually high, sweeping roof. It often serves as the ritual center of the village, the place of learning from their elders, and the mobilization center for war. Women are taboo there. Each village has its spirit house. It is usually small and most often dedicated to the spirit of the soil. Better developed villages have personal gardens and communal granaries. Most villages of certain tribes usually orient their houses on particular axis. The Bahnar, for example, follow the east-west axis, while the Jarai and Rhade use the north-south.

10. Among many Montagnard tribes the head of the family is not the man, and descent is not necessarily along the male line. The Jarai, M'non, Raglai, and Rhade have matilineal systems; in these tribes the women own the land, houses, domestic animals, produce and family prestige items. Leadership in the Sedang family goes to "the more forceful of

the spouses". Within a kin group itself, these are usually taboos against marriage between close relatives; furthermore, when the group has an "alliance" with a certain animal, which is frequently the case, no member of that kin group may kill or eat that animal.

11. Marriage customs vary according to the male or female domination society. At the marriage meal the two families discuss the price of the bride, or groom. This is often fixed by tribal or local law and may be considerable. Polygamy is permissible among the various tribes but is rarely practiced. Some tribes also practice polyandry. Divorce is rarely requested because of economic reasons: if the wife desires a divorce, she may have to return the value of the bride price if it is the husband's wish, he must often make specified ritual sacrifices.

12. The domestic unit in Montagnard society is the household. Birth is treated as part of the natural cycle of human life. The pregnant mother continues working up to the time of birth. She then goes outside and kneels over a shallow pit, either clutching a bamboo pole or being held by another woman. Shortly after birth the mother returns to her daily chores. Child rearing differs greatly among the tribes. However, all tribes give responsibility to the young early. The rules of inheritance are similar to those of the western world.

13. Religion plays a dominant role in the life of the Montagnard. He believes in spirits associated with inanimate objects, topographical features, ancestors, birds, and animals. There are spirits of the paddy, the soil, water, fire, forests, the sun, and the moon. The spirits may be good, bad, or neutral. They are ranked in some sort of hierarchy and they are always present. They must be appeased when custom demands. The "Shaman" or magicians are considered to be in intimate contact with the spirits, and have considerable importance in their villages. They interpret omens and carry out cruel sacrifices. It behooves any stranger to treat such figures with the same deference accorded them by the Montagnards. Rituals, addressed to the spirits and led by the religious figures, occur frequently in Montagnard life. Religious services are characterized for most tribes by periods of ritual sacrifices and heavy drinking. During these times, the area where the ceremonies are taking place is usually not entered without specific permission. If it is important to enter a village at these times permission must always be asked first.

14. The industrial arts serve practical purposes. What the Montagnards produce they use. Most important are the simple tools for agriculture, and weapons for hunting. Iron has a special value consequently the blacksmith is a respected member of the village. The next most important of their industrial arts that of making utensils for cooking.

Most of the clothing worn by the tribesmen is hand woven. Jewelry has considerable prestige value. The Montagnard's love for personal decoration and passion for finery gives rise to embittered rivalry among the women and takes many curious forms, such as elongation of the ear lobe into which various ornaments are placed. A few tribes make and use primitive musical instruments.

SOCIOPOLITICAL

15. The Montagnard village is the basic sociopolitical unit. Villages are predominately autonomous and self-sufficient. Villages have a strong collective spirit and everyone in them shares in the same style of life and subscribes to the same set of values. The native headman, as opposed to the Vietnamese representative, is selected either by a council of elders or by the adult village population. He represents justice in disputes between families or between his village and another. He is aided and advised by a council of elders. The council forms tribunals for the resolution of most village disputes, distributes the cultivable plots in the swiddens*, and generally supervises land ownership. Membership in the village is usually obvious enough to be informal although among some tribes, such membership is accorded only those who drink from the same water source. It is, to say the least, a loose political structure. Breaches of custom do not go unnoticed, and the sanction of the village is brought to bear on offenders. With the exception of the Stieng, who hold the whole family responsible for the wrongs of one of its members, guilt usually is treated as an individual matter, and the guilty party must make reparations to the community according to custom.

16. Little trade occurs between tribes. A few tribes are known to trade pigs and poultry to other tribes in return for buffalo, salt, gongs, and jars. Some trade wood and charcoal, and woven cloth and baskets with Vietnamese for luxury items such as textiles, cigarettes, and metal items. Jars, tom-toms, and gongs are the most prized Montagnard possessions.

17. Within the Montagnard society today, four classes can be distinguished: free men, debtors, foreigners, and slaves. Free men make up the bulk of society. Within the class itself, certain distinctions

*Cultivated plots. Swidden agriculture often is referred to as "slash and burn" or "shifting" agriculture, a process which utilizes selective cutting and burning of woodland vegetation to clear a piece of land, then planting crops on the cleared land, utilizing the ashes for fertilizer. When the fertility of the piece of land is exhausted, another piece of woodland is selected and burned off, and the former plot is abandoned.

up the bulk of society. Within the class itself, certain distinctions are made: wealth and age contribute to influence and prestige. Bachelors and spinsters have very low status. Wealth is not always measured by western standards: it is not how many buffalo a man has but how many he has sacrificed, that is vital. A slave may be either the son of a slave, a prisoner of war, a captive from a family that has refused to honor a debt, or a simple purchase. Slaves are usually treated well, and may often work their way to the status of free men.

18. The majority of Montagnards are timid people who live in a world of hunger, cold, fear, and debilitation by constant disease. They should be approached whenever possible without what might appear to them as frightening, overpowering force. Or, as has been said, "Don't go stomping into the village". On the other hand, if invited, a stranger should accept with joy and alacrity. Speak softly. Do not touch anyone else unless and until you must. When greeting a stranger if you are going to shake hands, try to do it their way unless you are sure he is familiar with Western customs. The Montagnard greeting is to hold your own wrist while shaking hands. Be alert and adaptive enough to understand the ways of these people and then be sensible enough not to violate them.

19. Although it was officially abolished by the French colonial rulers in the areas then firmly under their control intervillage warfare still occurs today, and feuding is prevalent. As in the past, a system of highly ritualistic "alliances" and "Blood oaths" serves to create ties that prevent or end many feuds, though at times these artificial bonds are invoked for the more effective prosecution of war or the carrying out of vendettas.

20. Historically a buffer zone in the struggles among Siamese, Lao, Vietnamese, and colonial powers, the highlanders have had varying experiences and fortunes in their contacts with outsiders. Missionaries and French colonial administrators, for example, have had a considerable influence on some ethnic groups, while others have resisted French control with instances of active rebellion as recent as 1938. By and large, contact with outsiders has tended to be more disturbing than beneficial. The French-Viet Minh war caused dissension among the highlanders as some fought for the French and others for the Viet Minh. Today in the struggle between the Viet Cong and the government of South Vietnam they are once again divided.

PRINCIPAL MONTAGNARD TRIBES

21. THE RHADE TRIBE

- a. The Rhade tribe is considered the most important and the

most strategically located of the highland tribes. It is centered around Ban Me Thuot and can be found in the provinces of Darlac, Quang Duc, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa. It is estimated that the tribe numbers approximately 100,000 people. The Rhade are Malayo-Polynesian in origin.

b. After the Geneva Treaty in 1954, it is estimated that approximately 6,000 tribesmen of the Rhade migrated north with the communists. Also, nearly 75 percent of the Rhade doctors joined the communist movement to North Vietnam. There have been many reports of communist Rhade and VC agents in the villages. The issues which the agents emphasize are those concerning the South Vietnamese government's lack of respect for the Montagnards, and promises made by the government which the agents claim will never be carried out. They point out that in the North the government has formed an autonomous state for each minority and they promise that the same will be done for the Montagnards in the south if they support the Viet Cong.

c. Rhade tribesmen respond to the new ideas but will only act when they believe that their actions will please the spirits or better the village. Therefore, any civic action program should take these factors into consideration. The South Vietnamese government has made efforts to induce a change in the habits and customs of the Rhade. Since November 1963 the South Vietnamese government has apparently become concerned with the effects these changes will have on the attitude of the tribesmen.

d. Currently the government is approaching the Rhade concerning their attitude in learning other languages such as French, English, and Vietnamese. The Rhade response indicated acceptance of the idea of sending their children to school to learn another language. The attitude of the Rhade toward aid and technical assistance in the form of supplies, and advisors from foreign organizations is generally favorable.

e. As far as can be determined by Special Forces advisors, there are now no evidences of activities within the tribe which would indicate massive subversion by communists or extreme reluctance to support actions against the communists. Some hamlets employ a courier responsible for reporting the presence of any strangers attempting to enter the village.

f. The ability to absorb and put to use military instruction and training is limited but worth developing. The Rhade, because of their knowledge of their mountain areas and the people who live there can be useful in aiding ARVN troops.

← JUNGLE AREA

MAIN ENTRANCE

CORRAL

PADDY

PADDY

PIGS

PIGS

GARDEN

LONG HOUSE

LONG HOUSE


MAIN
DOOR

GARDEN

VILLAGE MEETING HALL

^
RHADÉ VILLAGE

THE LONG HOUSE OF THE RHADÉ



22. THE BAHNAR TRIBE

a. The Bahnar are one of the most important tribes in the Republic of Vietnam. Estimates of tribal census indicate a population of some 200,000. They occupy an area of some 4,000 square kilometers extending from the vicinity of Kontum on the west to An Khe on the east, including the western part of Binh Dinh Province. The tribe has a written language. The Bahnar have obeyed orders of the RVN government, but with much complaining, and apparently only because of the ability of the government to enforce its orders by use of troops.

b. The Viet Cong propaganda is based on an autonomy theme: If the Viet Cong win, and if the Bahnar have aided the Viet Cong, the tribe will be permitted to organize and govern its own tribal state, like the reputed tribal states in North Vietnam. The Viet Cong aid their own psychological operations among the Bahnar by living with and under the same conditions as the tribesmen. The Viet Cong are quick to capitalize on any government action not favorably accepted by the tribe. Viet Cong propaganda has been effective with the tribe. A few wealthy Bahnar have radios and listen to the Viet Cong propaganda which is broadcast in the Bahnar language. The South Vietnam government places posters in the villages; a move of doubtful wisdom inasmuch as most of the Bahnar are illiterate. The best means of information dissemination has been to use Bahnar friendly to the South Vietnamese government to present the government's cause.

c. From the history of the Bahnar it may be concluded that their bellicose nature and the large population must be considered an invaluable asset to the government in order to control the highlands. The French used Bahnar tribesmen effectively against the Viet Minh. Experience has shown that with military training and possession of firearms, they tend to become a problem for neighboring tribes.

23. THE JARAI TRIBE

a. The Jarai has an estimated population some 200,000 including subgroups, and is considered the second largest tribe in the Republic of Vietnam. The Jarai are a powerful and historically a bellicose tribe found mainly in the plateau provinces of Pleiku, Kontum, and Darlac. Other Jarai are located in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. Due to the South Vietnamese government's resettlement program, the larger villages will be found near the towns of Pleiku and Chao Rao. The Jarai are the largest group of Montagnards in the II Corps tactical zone of Vietnam. The Jarai live along the established main roads and trails as well as in the mountains, in isolated areas.

b. The Jarai do not have a harmonious relationship with the

uth Vietnamese government. They object to the government program of land utilization which allows Vietnamese who have migrated into the areas occupied by the tribes around Pleiku, to farm the fallow lands. Although title to these lands has not been given to the tribe, the land is considered the property of the tribe because of long years of tenure. During French colonial rule many Jarai lived and worked on the French plantations. Relationships with the French were harmonious and the tribesmen benefitted from contact with the French.

c. One of the main communist objectives is to win the tribe's loyalty from the South Vietnamese government, or at least, to impair the tribes' loyalty to the government. Communist control of the area adjacent to the Cambodian border would open a supply route for Viet Cong operations. The control and support from some 200,000 tribesmen in a critical area of the highlands is most important for control of the central Vietnam highlands.

d. There are some villages which, if visited, would only show evidence of habitation by old men and women and children. If asked, the villagers might pretend not to know where the young people are. The Viet Cong are taking the young men and women from the villages and are training them in the Viet Cong jungle training camps. Jarai tribesmen are being trained as Viet Cong irregulars to conduct raids, ambushes, and to terrorize friendly villages under control of the South Vietnamese forces.

e. Psychological orientation of the Jarai is a major program being undertaken by the Viet Cong. Propaganda is disseminated to the tribesmen by agents talking to the people in each hamlet. Radio stations located near the Cambodian border broadcast propaganda in the Jarai language. Communist agents from the North have been sent to live with the tribe to learn the customs, language, and desires of the villagers and to spread communist influence among the tribesmen. The Viet Cong have used forceful means such as burning a village and forcing the villagers to resettle in Viet Cong controlled areas where the Jarai can be subjected to communist indoctrination. Communist propaganda and subversion among the Jarai have been most influential along the western edge of the Jarai tribal area near the Cambodian border and near Buon Blec southwest of Cheo Reo. In these areas the Jarai have heard the communist plea frequently - "Do help us, and don't help the government." In aiding the Viet Cong the Jarai have been known to cut trees along roads to construct road blocks, cut power and telephone lines, to dig traps and emplace "punji" stakes on trails. The Viet Cong have used the land utilization program of the South Vietnamese government to good advantage in their efforts to subvert the Jarai. The taking of tribal lands by the government without notice or bargaining and giving such land to ethnic Vietnamese for farming has been a major issue with the Jarai.

f. The South Vietnamese government has used printed leaflets in the Vietnamese language among the Jarai. Despite the success of the Viet Cong in disseminating propaganda by radio, the Vietnamese have not used that means for the government program, although it is known that the Jarai have been impressed by hearing their dialect spoken on radio programs of the Viet Cong. Dissemination propaganda by "storytellers" and minstrels is considered an effective means of obtaining interest among the tribesmen.

g. The Jarai, as potential soldiers, have been compared by US military advisors as similar to basic trainees in the US Army, as they seem to require close supervision in the same military subjects, especially individual weapons training. In other matters they learn slowly due to their lack of education. Many points of instruction and techniques must be repeated numerous times in order for them to learn. The language barrier and an absence of printed instructional material in the Jarai dialect also make instruction and understanding difficult. The Jarai, by their nature, are well suited for employment as irregulars. US Army Special Forces has spent a considerable effort at training the Jarai for counterinsurgency operations. Ability to defend their villages, to keep roads and trails open in their areas, and to cut the Viet Cong supply lines from Laos and Cambodia will aid the South Vietnam effort. Both the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese government recognize that control of the mountains is essential to the control of South Vietnam.

24. THE MNONG TRIBE

a. The Mhong tribe numbers approximately 40,000 people. It includes many sub-groups among which are the Pnong, Biet, Gar, Rolom, Nong, Bumar, Bih, and Rohong. They generally inhabit the plateau area southwest of Ban Me Thout, in the province of Quang Duc, with scattered villages in the provinces of Darlac, Lam Dong, and Phuoc Long. It is estimated that an additional 12,000 Mhong are living across the border in Cambodia.

b. Until a few years ago the Mhong were regarded as the most savage and bloodthirsty of all the Montgnard tribes. Anyone who dared to venture into Mhong territory could expect to be tortured and killed, if captured. The few survivors of Mhong attacks told tales of blood curdling experiences with the Mhong. In recent years, as a result of more contact with civilization and more association with adjacent tribes, notably the Rhade, the attitude of the Mhong has changed so that docility has replaced savagery.

c. There is some Viet Cong activity among the Mhong, primarily by Viet Cong agents who have settled in the Mhong villages and trade with and share the same living conditions as the Mhong.

d. The best means of disseminating propaganda to the Mngong is considered to be by use of movies, or pictures with a story. The Mngong are not known to have radios and do not understand the Mngong dialect. Caution must be taken in any psychological warfare effort not to violate any of the tribes' taboos.

25. THE SEDANG TRIBE

a. The Sedang, estimated at between 40,000 to 80,000 live in Kontum, Quang Nam, and Binh Dinh provinces. Strategically the tribe is located in the rugged country that comprises the Republic of Vietnam - Laotian - Cambodian border. This tribe is one of the keys to holding that area in any counterinsurgency effort and can be of great help in any conventional military operation in that area. One importance of the Sedang is their knowledge of the jungle and mountain areas in which they live, which will make them excellent guides and good irregular soldiers if properly trained and well led.

b. The Sedang have no written language with the possible exception of some work by missionaries in developing a written language for the purpose of translating the Bible to a readable text for instructing the tribesmen and training them to read their tribal language. This will be a long term project. The Sedang villages which are located near villages of another tribe can communicate in another language to some extent. A few Vietnamese tradesmen know the Sedang language. A few Sedang learned French through service in the French Colonial Army before 1954. Some Sedang can speak Vietnamese as a result of trade with the lowlanders, or in more recent years, service in the South Vietnamese Army. The skill of those individuals in French and Vietnamese is, for the most part, limited to the spoken language. There are no known interpreters, with the exception of a few missionaries, who can translate from English to Sedang.

c. Little is known of the factual or legendary origin of the Sedang or of their history in modern times. The tribe migrates only to the extent necessary to procure new ground for farming, as the Sedang practice swidden agriculture as do most of the other Montagnard tribes. The South Vietnamese government is causing an artificial migration by attempting to resettle the Sedang from the more isolated areas into areas which are controlled and protected by government troops. The Sedang tribal areas do not lie in close proximity to international boundaries and their movements are not extensive enough to cause them to cross into Cambodia or Laos.

d. The Sedang have a history of resisting control by outside groups. The tribe fought the French until they were defeated, then

continued to resist by burning bridges and sabotaging the roads. The Sedang captured and executed several French officials and soldiers, including one French Provincial Governor. During the French-Viet Minh war Sedang tribesmen fought on both sides. Since the French defeat in 1954, the South Vietnamese government has been trying to control the Sedang and arm and train them to defend themselves from the Viet Cong.

e. Simultaneously with the RVN effort, the Viet Cong are pursuing their efforts to utilize the Sedang. The Viet Minh had agents living and working with the Sedang during the French-Viet Minh war. The Viet Cong propaganda for the Sedang is much the same as that for the other Montagnard tribes - promise of an autonomous tribal state if the Viet Cong win the war. The Viet Cong are known to have trained many of the Sedang and armed them to fight against the South Vietnamese.

f. The Sedang still use spears, axes, and crossbows and arrows as weapons. The use of modern firearms is known to some of them from training given by the French, Viet Minh, Viet Cong, and South Vietnamese. Special Forces have trained and utilized many Sedang in the CIDG units. The Sedang have a high potential for insurgency and counterinsurgency in their area. They, like the other tribes, are the controlling factor if their tribal area is to be secured under the South Vietnamese government control.

26. THE STIENG TRIBE

a. The Stieng are considered the fifth most significant tribe in the highlands from the standpoint of population. There are approximately 23,000 in Vietnam with an additional 40,000 across the border in Cambodia. The tribe is concentrated in some 650 villages in the provinces of Binh Long, Phu Long, and Quang Duc near the Cambodian border. Sub-groups of the Stieng are the Budip, Budeh, Bulach, and Bulu. There are villages of Stieng in Bien Hoa and Thu Dau Mot who call themselves Tho or Ta Mun.

b. The Stieng have a definite political organization within the tribe. Each village "parliament" consists of the heads of each of the autonomous households in the village. The Stieng villages, like all other Montagnard villages, are not tied together in a tribal controlled political organization.

c. Most of the Stieng appear to be ignorant of the aims of the Viet Cong and appear to have no understanding of the meaning of the conflict in South Vietnam. For the most part the Stieng consider it as just another of the many wars in which the Vietnamese have been involved and want no part in it. The Stieng feel no obligation to join either side, preferring to be left out of the conflict completely. There has

been little evidence of successful propaganda by the Viet Cong among the tribesmen.

d. There are two specific field of civic action which have been attempted in an effort to improve the Stieng way of life: an attempt to improve sanitation and health, and an attempt to educate the tribesmen. Sanitary conditions among the tribesmen are deplorable, which accounts for the short life span of approximately 37 years. Attempts have been made to teach better means of sanitation, but the influence has been insufficient to effect a noticeable change in the existing habits and customs. Wells have been dug to provide water but the Stieng persist in using the same contaminated water sources. Medical assistance has been readily accepted. The government has built schools in the tribal area and provided teachers but a lack of interest on the part of the tribe keeps enrollment low.

e. The Stieng, once a warlike tribe, are now relatively peaceful. Like other Montagnards, their knowledge of their lands in the tribal area gives the Stieng considerable potential value for employment as irregulars and for assistance to the regular military forces. The tribal location along the Cambodian border places the Stieng in a favorable position to deny the Viet Cong the use of infiltration routes into South Vietnam through country occupied by the tribe.

RECENT POLITICAL PROBLEMS

27. For years there has been animosity between the Montagnards and the ethnic Vietnamese. These feelings have varied from a feeling of mutual distrust to a feeling of outright hatred and scorn. This animosity apparently is not the fault of any particular person or incident, but rather the result of years of two cultures reacting to each other, while both cultures were interaction of the lowland by more and more outside influence. The interaction of the lowland Vietnamese culture and the highland Montagnard culture has produced problems which culminated in the Montagnard uprising of September 1965.

28. In December 1958 and 1959 the Government of South Vietnam signed decrees which, in effect, prohibited Montagnards from owning land. The Montagnards bitterly resented these decrees. Another event which increased the Montagnard bitterness concerning the same subject was the establishment of Vietnamese land development centers in the highlands. These centers were established on land which, although not in use at the time, was considered by the Montagnards to be their tribal lands.

29. Two conferences between Republic of Vietnam Government and

Montagnard representatives were convened at Pleiku on 25 August 1964 and 15 October 1964. At these two conferences the Montagnards representatives presented their aspirations and grievances to the Vietnam government representatives. The aspirations, 12 in number, are called the "Kontum Demands". Generally requests to the South Vietnamese Government were for:

- a. Representation at high government levels.
- b. A separate administrative system for Montagnard affairs.
- c. The return of confiscated lands.
- d. Employment of Matagnard military officers.
- e. Cessation of corruption among officials.
- f. Improved military educational and medical facilities.

In October 1965, as the result of a directive from General Vinh Loc, II ARVN Corps, a Montagnard delegation consisting of representatives of the Bahnar, Henago, Sedang, Halang, and Jarai ethnic groups met with the Kontum Province Chief. The aspirations presented at the Kontum conference are contained in Appendix I. These aspirations closely resembled those articulated at the Darlac and Pleiku conferences in October 1964 and June 1965.

30. A Montagnard organization FULRO (UNITED FRONT for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races) has been actively pursuing a campaign to form an autonomous Montagnard government for the highlands. It has presented demands to the South Vietnamese Government, formed a provisional government, attempted to organize its own military force, and on two occasions has succeeded in conducting armed insurrection against ARVN elements in the highlands. The leader of the FULRO is Y Bhan Bnoul in exile in Cambodia. On 5 June 1965 FULRO representatives were granted an audience and presented the following demands to the province chief of Darlac Province.

- a. An autonomous highland state with its own flag.
- b. To be permitted to raise an army of 50,000 men commanded by Montagnard officers, advised by the Vietnamese, and supported by the United States Government.
- c. To meet South Vietnamese Government representatives in the Philippines or in Thailand to conduct negotiations.

A list of Montagnard aspirations, in addition to the demands, were presented at the Darlac Conference. In December 1965, FULRO units

conducted a series of revolts and attempted to take over ARVN and RVN units and headquarters at several locations within the II Corps Tactical Zone. Primary targets were at Gia Nghia in Quang Duc Province, Lac Thien in Darlac Province, and Phu Thien in Phu Bon Province. Some 32 ARVN military and several civilian personnel were killed. The leaders of these revolts were captured and brought to trial in Pleiku on 27 and 28 December 1965. Four individuals were sentenced to death and executed.

31. The South Vietnamese Government recognizes the aspirations of the Montagnards and is attempting to correct many of the wrongs of former regimes. As a result of the October 1964 Conference five concessions of accords were granted.

a. Withdrawal of the land ownership decrees of 1958 and 1959 which denied the Montagnards title to their lands.

b. The establishment of a Junior Military School to educate Montagnard children.

c. Permission for Montagnards to enroll in the Thu Duc Military School if they possessed a diploma for 4 years of high school (Vietnamese must have a diploma for 6 years).

d. Montagnard dialects to be taught along with Vietnamese in the Montagnard primary school program.

e. Montagnard Students to be granted a ten percent increase in their academic grades when competing with Vietnamese students for jobs.

32. Some real progress has been made to honor the five accords granted and to provide reform in political, administrative, cultural, economic and social, judicial, and financial categories as well.

a. The Montagnard desire to be represented at the national level has been partially fulfilled by the creation of the Office of Directorate of Montagnards Affairs as an adjunct to the Prime Minister's Office, giving the Director direct access to the Prime Minister and the Chief of State. The Directorate has representatives in 22 provinces. Montagnard efforts to obtain more Montagnard officials at the province level have been partially successful. Since the September 1964 revolt several provinces have appointed Montagnard Assistant Province Chief and lesser officials.

b. The land decrees of 1958 and 1959 have been withdrawn, however the Montagnards still have not been given ownership of the land. There are essentially three reasons for this: the first, the Viet Cong

Control much of the land, thus surveying and granting titles can not be accomplished. Secondly, the Montagnard practice of land utilization presents a complex problem. An equitable distribution of land between tribes and villages is complicated by the type of terrain available and the techniques of farming. The slash and burn techniques of removing vegetation from a piece of land, farming it for 3 to 5 years, then moving to another piece of land is prevalent among many tribes. These tribes will not reoccupy a plot of land for a period of 12 years. A third problem exists due to the refusal of some tribes to understand the reason why they should apply to the government for land ownership inasmuch as their tribal ancestors have occupied the same land for centuries and the land is considered the property of the tribe and its villages, and government administrative action is considered unnecessary. Most authorities agree that if the land distribution could be solved, the most important of the Montagnard demands would be satisfied. The matter of land tenure rights has been included in every set of Montagnard aspirations, including those of FULRO.

c. The problem of teaching the tribal languages in the schools is extremely difficult. There are more than 35 different dialects among the Montagnard tribes. Complicating this problem is the lack of qualified teachers and a lack of textbooks in tribal languages. A proposal to teach only the three major dialects has met considerable opposition from Montagnards as they desire their own dialect taught to preserve their tribal culture. The Montagnards are also demanding more schools, more boarding houses for their students and special privileges to enter schools having entrance examination requirements. As of March 1965 there were 35 Montagnard boarding schools located in 9 provinces. Much of the budget for the rural reconstruction program goes toward the construction of village and hamlet schools. A teachers college, trade schools, and agricultural schools augment the regular primary and secondary school programs.

d. The economic demands of the Montagnards are essentially for more agricultural aids such as fertilizer, seed, farm equipment, livestock, irrigation dams, and better roads. The normal provincial technical services are supposed to provide most of these services. The relative backwardness of the Montagnard contributes to the ineffectiveness of this program. The tribes also desire more medical support. Much of this support is furnished by South Vietnamese Government agencies, however active social work is hindered by a dispute concerning responsibility for administration.

e. A south vietnamese government decree has been promulgated to recognize the Montagnard common law courts in the highlands. The new courts will deal with civil affairs, "Montagnard affairs",

and penal offenses when both parties are Montagnard. Crimes and offenses committed by Montagnard military personnel, crimes against the nation, or involving Vietnamese will be brought before the national courts. The law provides for courts at the village, district, and province levels. The legislation also specifies the organization and function of courts of appeal, and gives procedures for drafting judicial documents and for execution of court rulings.

f. The Montagnards desire that all funds and all foreign aid allocated to the Montagnards be put under the control of the organization in charge of Montagnard affairs. Considerable funds, both US and ARVN are being expended in the highlands.

g. The Montagnards desire that Montagnard military forces be commanded by Montagnard officers. They have probably achieved more actual results from this demand than from any other. A related demand was that the Montagnard's educational requirements be lowered to permit Montagnards to enter Officer Candidate School. This concession was granted and the first class of approximately 24 Montagnards graduated in August 1965. The Montagnards have expressed demands for improvement of the general military situation in the highlands. Organization of at least one Montagnard battalion in each province, commanded by Montagnard officers has been demanded. This demand will have increased importance if the military situation becomes more critical.

THE MONTAGNARD ATTITUDE

33. Many Montagnards are dissatisfied with the efforts which the south Vietnamese government has made to meet Montagnard demands. Organized efforts to express dissatisfaction have taken the form of peaceful presentation of demands by tribal representatives, efforts of FULRO to organize a provisional Montagnard Government in the highlands, and the conduct of armed uprisings against Vietnamese military and what government authority in which many Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were massacred. The VC situation in the highlands causes the Montagnard to devote more consideration to his own security than to thoughts of revolt. If the military situation in the highlands improves and the government of South Vietnam loses interest in meeting the demands, a strong Montagnard leader may again attempt to foment an uprising. In such a case only the fear of ARVN's military power might prevent an uprising. However, the Montagnards are not an organized group ready to revolt; on the contrary, they are far from being organized and united. the revolt of September 1964 involved mainly the Rhade tribe.

THE POLICY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

34. Previously stated, the government of South Vietnam has

made efforts to satisfy the Montagnard demands. In some areas there are concrete results, in many other areas the GVN efforts are still in the planning stage. Such demands, and the reforms necessary to satisfy them, can not be accomplished until after the country is cleared of VC Control. On 2 August 1965, the Prime Minister, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky issued a statement of policy directed toward the leaders of the FULRO indicating the willingness of the South Vietnamese Government to receive representatives of the FULRO to discuss matters of concern to that organization. The statement confirmed the will of the government of South Vietnam to continue to fulfill all agreements reached with Montagnard representatives at Pleiku in October 1964. The support of the FULRO for the policies of the government was requested.

UNITED STATES POLICY

35. On 2 August 1965 in conjunction with the statement of policy by Prime Minister Ky, the Deputy United States Ambassador, Mr U Alexis Johnson issued a statement of US policy in which he reiterated that US policy of assistance to the Republic of Vietnam is for all the peoples of the Republic; that the United States does not provide direct assistance to individual groups. The statement recognized the Montagnard FULRO problem as an internal affair between the Government of South Vietnam and the leaders of the FULRO movement.

36. The US interest in the Montagnard is his contribution to the war against the Viet Cong as a citizen of the Republic of Vietnam. US personnel must be guarded in conversations with Vietnamese and Montagnards. Disparaging remarks toward either group must be avoided. It must be understood by all that the US policy opposes any effort by a group or individual to enter into or foment a revolt against the constituted authority of the Republic of Vietnam, and the United States Government will in no way be associated with any individuals or groups with such plans or intentions. US personnel will not deal directly with FULRO representatives. If US personnel are approached by FULRO representatives, the FULRO will be advised to contact the appropriate VN counterpart or the nearest Government of Vietnam official (i.e., District Chief, etc). If discussion can not be avoided personnel will be guided by the policies stated in this paragraph and the fact that the Viet Cong are the enemies of all RVN residents, lowlanders and highlanders alike.

APPENDIX I

KONTUM HIGHLANDERS' ASPIRATIONS (additional)

PRESENTED AT KONTUM PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS,

OCTOBER 6 - 7, 1965

I. PRIORITY

A. Political:

To apply a special and clear policy to protect and to help highlanders;

a. Vietnamese and Highlanders are all citizens of Vietnam and therefore, they should be treated as equals.

b. Since most highlanders are less civilized than Vietnamese, the Government should favor Highlanders so that they can catch up with the Vietnamese.

c. Land (wet ricefields and upland ricefields), of the Highlanders used by local authorities as land development or military agencies since the beginning of the Ngo Dinh regime should be paid for in cash or commodities the land owners need.

d. Vietnamese civilians from Central and South Vietnam forced by Ngo Dinh Diem regime to settle in highland land development areas, and since proved to have participated in Communist activities, should be sent back to their native areas.

e. The government should take severe measures to make Vietnamese learn how to behave toward Highlanders in order to avoid conflict in their relationships.

f. The government should reorganize administrative and military services in the Central Highland.

h. There should be Vietnamese and American advisors in administrative as well as in military services.

B. Administration:

Reconsider rank, position, and power of administrative Highlander cadres. Appoint to proper positions, replace incompetent cadres

(for example, Deputy Province Chief, and Deputy District Chief for Highland Affairs). Graduates from the National Institute of Administration should be employed.

Organize a short training period session for administrative Highlander cadres employed in Districts and Provinces.

C. Military:

The government should continue to favor and give priority to Highlanders in the recruitment of non-commissioned officers in ARVN as well as in local forces and in the recruitment of youths for the military school in Thu Duc. (There should be an equal number from each province).

Request the government to have confidence in Highland soldiers and let them serve in their native areas, and to organize Highlanders squads in various provinces in the Highland.

Establish posts along National Routes 19 and 14.

D. Economics:

The government should establish a Center for Rural Affairs for Highlander cadres in the Highlands at the National School of Agriculture in Bao.

Every family should be obliged to have a garden and grow vegetables and fruit trees in order to develop national economy.

E. Finance

All budgets and foreign aid reserved for Highlanders should be handled by a special service for Highland affairs.

F. Culture and Education:

Each province should have elementary and secondary schools with dormitories for Highland children.

Provide high school students of high academic standing with scholarships.

Provide Highlander students with scholarships and give them permission to study abroad.

G. Social:

Provide guest houses for people from other provinces and other districts.

Request the government to establish land development services and clear the land so that the Highlanders can farm it.

H. Justice

Apply Decree #006/65 of July 22, 1965, of the National Leadership Committee in the reestablishment of Courts of Montagnard Customs.

APPENDIX II



REFERENCES


The following references have been provided for the information presented herein:

- a. Memorandum RM-4041-ARPA, April 1965, The Major Ethnic Groups of the South Vietnamese Highlands by Gerald C. Kickey, Advanced Research Projects Agency.
- b. Memorandum for Record, subject: Kontum Province Montagnard Aspirations and the Land Tenure Questions in Kontum, Pleiku, and Tuyen Duc Province, The Rand Corporation, OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit, 28 Oct 65.
- c. A study of the Montagnards Demands, Their Results, and the United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Race (FULRO), Hq 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces TOC, 27 July 1965
- d. Memorandum, subject: FULRO. Statements given to FULRO representatives by RVN Premier Ky and US Deputy Ambassador Alexis Johnson, Hq, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces TOC, 3 Aug 65.
- e. Memorandum for Record, Special Report of the Montagnards, Hq, US Army Advisory Group, II Corps Tactical Zone, 6 January 1966.
- f. Reference Book, Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of South Vietnam, US Army Special Warfare school, Ft Bragg, North Carolina, July 1964.
- g. Country Study, Republic of Vietnam, The Military Assistance Institute, Dept of Defense, 1965.

MONTAGNARD TRIBAL AREAS CENTRAL VIETNAM

LEGEND





HEADQUARTERS
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

CHANGE 1,
REGULATION
NUMBER 525-3

14 April 1966

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION CRITIQUES

The following changes will be made to I FFORCEV Regulation 525-3.

Remove Inclosure 1 and insert revised attached Inclosure 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN R. DEANE, JR
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

s/Neil M Matsger
t/NEIL M MATZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A

Reproduced at Hq F Force V, 14 April 1966

Incl #36

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION CRITIQUE REPORT

1. Introduction.

- a. Operation title.
- b. Inclusive dates.
- c. Location.
- d. Control or command headquarters.

2. Resume of unit presentations.

Narrative summary of each presentation, to include significant problems encountered and significant successes and failures.

3. Lessons learned.

4. Additional information of command wide importance gained during the operation (new types of enemy mines, booby traps, fortifications and significant changes in enemy tactics and weaponry, etc).

Change 1 to Inclosure 1
I 770000V Reg 585-5

HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
AFO US Forces 96240

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-3

12 January 1966

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION CRITIQUES

1. PURPOSE: To establish procedures for the conduct of operations critiques and the reporting of the results achieved therefrom.

2. APPLICATION: The system of critiques is applicable to all US and Free World Military Assistance Ground Forces operating in the II CTZ. CG II CTZ has indicated he will take action to have similar critiques conducted by ARVN units under his command.

3. GENERAL: After action critiques of combat operations will provide commanders, advisors and higher commands valuable information on which to base future doctrine, tactics, techniques and, when required, corrective action. In addition, these critiques will develop "Lessons Learned" which will be published and disseminated to other in-country forces and US agencies.

4. PROCEDURES:

a. Critiques will be conducted on all significant combat operations by US/Free World Military Assistance Ground Forces.

b. Regardless of mission (i.e., Search and Destroy, Clear, Reaction, Secure or Ambush) significant operations are defined as those considered important by reason of:

(1) Results achieved.

(2) Notable innovations of tactics or techniques including securing operations and ambushes.

(3) Notable errors in planning or execution.

(4) Being brigade or larger size.

5. CONDUCT:

a. Critiques will be conducted along the guidelines set forth in inclosure 1. Portions may be added or deleted as appropriate to the operation being critiqued.

b. Critiques will be conducted within 30 days of the termination of the operation; Written summaries will be prepared and forwarded to Ft Field Force Vietnam not later than 45 days after the termination of the operation. (Summaries will include sketches or overlays where needed).

12 January 1966


6. RESPONSIBILITY: The following commanders are responsible for the preparation and conduct of critiques:

- a. CG, 1st Air Cav Div.
- b. CG, Capital ROK Inf Div.
- c. CG, ROK Marine Bde.
- d. CO 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.
- e. CO 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

7. All critiques/seminars conducted in conjunction with ARVN will encourage full ARVN participation. US participation will be reduced to the minimum consistent with critique objective and in no case exceed that of ARVN.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



NEIL M. MATZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

PAUL F. SMITH
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

A

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION CRITIQUE SEQUENCE

1. INTRODUCTION: (To be given by the host commander)

- a. Operation Title.
- b. Task Organisation (w/supporting forces).
- c. Inclusive dates.
- d. Location.
- e. Control or Command Headquarters responsible.

2. INTELLIGENCE:

- a. Background prior to operation.
- b. Terrain and weather environment.
- c. Enemy.
- d. Population reaction (if applicable).
- e. Equipment captured.
- f. Intelligence "Lessons Learned".

3. OPERATIONS:

- a. Concept of the Operation.
- b. Execution:
 - (1) Chronological development of the operation.
 - (2) Significant actions with their durations.
 - (3) Deception plans used (if applicable).
 - (4) Adequacy of supporting fires.
 - (5) Close air support requested, provided and the results achieved.
 - (6) Psy War techniques employed (if applicable).

c. RESULTS:

- (1) Summarise friendly and enemy personnel losses.
- (2) Summarise equipment losses or destruction (VC and friendly).

d. "Lessons Learned".

4. ADMINISTRATION:

- a. Personnel (highlight any significant aspects other than normal).
- b. Logistics (cover shortcomings requiring corrective or new techniques developed which should be adopted).
- d. Civil Affairs (discuss only those items requiring change or which produced unusual or unique results).
- e. Summary of administrative "Lessons Learned".

5. DISCUSSION: An open question and answer period to develop solutions to problems, to emphasize new techniques or tactics, and to summarize "Lessons Learned." (Normally conducted by the host commander).

6. Closing by the host commander.

7. Attendance and participation in critiques will be as directed by the senior commander responsible.

CONFIDENTIAL

FRMPQ VVSVA956VV MAG210

PP RUMNMF

DE RUMSMA 017C 0600250

① ZNY CCCCC

P 010235Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF

RUMNMF/CG FFORCEV

RUMSBJ/CDR 2D AD

RUMSVF/CG 1ST INF DIV

RUMSBB/CTF 115

① RUMSVT/SA IV CCRPS

BT

CONFIDENTIAL 06455 MACJCO SECT 1 OF 2 SFCTSO

WESTMORELAND SENDS SUBJECT: PURSUIT .

1. IT IS CLEAR THAT VC MAIN FORCE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
UNITS AVOID COMBAT WITH US AND FREE WORLD UNITS UNLESS THEY ARE
① ABLE TO ENGAGE ISOLATED SMALL ELEMENTS WITH SUPERIOR FORCE. MOST
OF THE MAJOR OPERATIONS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED HAVE AS THEIR OBJECTIVE
FINDING AND DESTROYING VC FORCES. A NUMBER OF THESE LARGE
OPERATIONS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN FINDING LARGE VC FORCES EVEN
THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A LARGE EXPENDITURE IN TIME, TROOPS, HELICOPTER LIFT,
AMMUNITION AND CASUALTIES FROM MINES, BOoby TRAPS

CONFIDENTIAL

Inc #39

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0170 C O N F I D E N T I A L

AND SNIPERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VC CONTINUE TO ATTACK IN COMPANY AND BATTALION SIZE FORMATIONS, USUALLY AGAINST REGIONAL FORCES, POPULAR FORCES AND ISOLATED ARVN UNITS. WE ARE NOT YET EFFECTIVELY EXPLOITING THE OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED WHEN A VC UNIT THUS REVEALS ITS PRESENCE. THEREFORE, ALL COMMANDERS ARE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ENGAGEMENT AND PURSUIT OF VC FORCES WHICH REVEAL THEIR PRESENCE BY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS MUST BE PRIORITY NUMBER ONE AT ALL LEVELS. THE SCHEDULED OPERATIONS MAY BE ADJUSTED OR DELAYED TO ACCOMMODATE QUICK REACTION OPERATIONS AGAINST LUCRATIVE VC TARGETS.

2. IN ORDER FULLY TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR RAPID ENGAGEMENT, WE MUST TIGHTEN UP OUR LIAISON AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE FORCES ACROSS THE BOARD. IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION ON VC ATTACKS THROUGH ARVN CORPS LEVEL. THIS IS TOO TIME CONSUMING AND RESPONSE IS NOT THEREFORE, SUFFICIENTLY RAPID. US TACTICAL UNIT COMMANDERS WILL ESTABLISH DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE DIVISION, PROVINCE AND REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS WHENEVER THEY ARE OPERATING IN THE AREA COVERED BY THOSE HEADQUARTERS AND QUICK REACTION PROCEDURES WILL BE WORKED OUT. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE MISSION OF US AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 KUNSM 017C C O N F I D E N T I A L

FREE WORLD FORCES IN VIETNAM IS TO SUPPORT THE RVNAF IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS MISSION. WE DO NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT MISSION.

3. THE VC ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO PURSUIT. AFTER A VC ATTACK, WHICH IS USUALLY BROKEN OFF AT OR NEAR DAY BREAK, THE VC WITHDRAW TO ASSEMBLY AREAS WHICH ARE NOT FAR DISTANT FROM THE POINT OF CONTACT. THEY MAY DO THIS IN LARGE OR SMALL FORMATIONS -- USUALLY SMALL. THIS MEANS THAT THEIR COMBAT FORMATION IS FRAGMENTED AND ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THEY DO NOT MOVE FAR. PROBABLY NOT MORE THAN 5 KILOMETERS, AND OFTEN ONLY 1 OR 2 KILOMETERS, WHERE THEY HIDE OUT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING NIGHT. IT IS ENTIRELY LOGICAL THAT THE VC SHOULD PERFORM IN THIS MANNER. FIRST, THEY HAVE CASUALTIES WHICH MUST BE EVACUATED TO NEARBY AID STATIONS. SECOND, THEY ARE TIRED AFTER HAVING MOVED AND FOUGHT FOR AT LEAST A 12 HOUR PERIOD PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ATTACK AND SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE ATTACK. THIRD, EXCEPT IN HEAVY JUNGLE, THEY DO NOT WISH TO MOVE DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, ESPECIALLY UNDER AERIAL SURVEILLANCE.
4. THESE VC HABITS PRESENT AN UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SUCCESS OF AGGRESSIVELY EXECUTED PURSUIT OPERATIONS. SUCH OPERA-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 4 RUMS 1 0170 C O N F I D E T I A L

TIONS MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY GREAT IMAGINATION AND MUST UTILIZE ALL THE COMBINED ARMS, INCLUDING AIR. THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS ARE A MINIMUM:

- A. IMMEDIATELY UPON AN ATTACK AGAINST A US OR VIETNAMESE UNIT, THE COMMANDERS INVOLVED MUST NOT ONLY PLAN FOR ADEQUATE IMMEDIATE SUPPORT, BUT MUST SIMULTANEOUSLY ISSUE NECESSARY ORDERS FOR THE PURSUIT.
- B. FRESH UNITS SHOULD BE THROWN INTO THE BATTLE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, THE UNIT UNDER ATTACK SHOULD BEGIN ITS PURSUIT AT FIRST LIGHT.
- C. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED IMMEDIATELY WITHIN A FIVE KILOMETER RADIUS OF THE ATTACK IN ORDER TO INHIBIT THE WITHDRAWAL OF VC FORCES.
- D. ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES SHOULD BE MADE AGAINST LIKELY WITHDRAWAL ROUTES AND ASSEMBLY AREAS WHETHER OR NOT VC ARE SIGHTED, BASED UPON THE TACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF THE COMMANDERS CONCERNED.
- E. THE 12 HOURS OF DAYLIGHT FOLLOWING AN ATTACK REPRESENT THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF OPPORTUNITY TO INFLICT VERY HEAVY CASUALTIES ON DISORGANIZED, TIRED, FRAGMENTED VC FORCES.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. THERE IS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF GROUND COMMANDERS, ARTILLERYMEN AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS TO WITHHOLD THEIR FIRE-POWER WHEN ENEMY TARGETS ARE NOT VISUALLY SIGHTED. THIS IS A TENDENCY WHICH MUST BE OVERCOME IN CONNECTION WITH PURSUIT OPERATIONS. THE GREATEST PROBLEM IN VIETNAM IS TO FIND THE VC. WHEN HE REVEALS HIS PRESENCE BY AN ATTACK, THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN OVERCOME. AT THIS TIME, AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ATTACK, COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS UNDER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND MUST APPLY HEAVY AND SUSTAINED FIRE POWER AGAINST SUSPECTED WITHDRAWAL ROUTES AND ASSEMBLY AREAS WITHOUT HESITATION. THIS IS A PROBLEM OF ATTITUDE AND COMMAND EMPHASIS WHICH MUST BE SOLVED. THERE IS A TENDENCY AFTER A VC ATTACK TO TAKE CARE OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED, TO COUNT ENEMY BODIES AND TO REGARD THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE AS THE END OF THE MISSION. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS IS THE BEGINNING OF THE ENGAGEMENT. THE MOMENT AN ATTACK HAS BEEN LAUNCHED, ALL COMMANDERS AND TROOPS MUST ADOPT THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUNTER WHO IS DETERMINED TO FIND AND KILL THE ATTACKING VC FORCE.

6. I EXPECT ALL COMMANDERS TO INSTILL AN AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT.

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

WXZFLV SV494 MAG209

PP RUMWVF

DE RUMSMA 0180 0600250

ZNY CCCCC

P 010235Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMWVF/CG III MAF

RUMWVF/CG FFORCEV

RUMSBJ/CDRJ2D AD

RUMSVF/CG 1 ST INF DIV

RUMSBB/CTF 115

RUMSVT/SA IV CORPS

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 06455 MACJCO FINAL SECT OF 2 SECTS

OF PURSUIT AT ALL ECHELONS AND I EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE A

PURSUIT AFTER EACH VC ATTACK WITHOUT EXCEPTION. I WILL REGARD A

COMMANDER WHO HAS NOT PLANNED FOR AND EXECUTED A PURSUIT TO HAVE

FAILED IN ONE OF HIS PRIMARY MISSIONS.

7. A SEMINAR ON PURSUIT TACTICS

AND TECHNIQUES WILL BE HELD IN

APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AT

WHICH TIME COMMANDERS WILL

BE EXPECTED TO PRESENT

THEIR VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES.

A TRUE COPY:

GP-4

BT

James O. Day
JAMES O DAY

Major, GS

Assistance D&T Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. During the period 1 Jan - 30 April OPOCW units of I FFORCEV conducted tests and evaluations of the following equipment.

a. **Armament:**

M102 105mm Howitzer

Shotgun Shell Adapter for M79 Grenade Launcher

Starlight Device, Individual Weapon

Starlight Device, Crew Served Weapon

b. **Munitions:**

M546 105mm Howitzer "Beehive" round

M561 106mm Recoilless Rifle "Beehive" round

1231, 232, 233 Signal, 40mm Illumination, Red, Yellow and
Green Riot Control Agent dispenser, M-158/159

c. **Miscellaneous:**

Light, strobe, hand hold

Site Marker, Balloon

Leech Repellent

Xenon Searchlight, 2.2 KW

Auxiliary Power Unit for HH-1 Helicopter

Acoustic Ground Fire Detector

Acoustic Telescope

Troop ladder (for embarking and debarking from a hovering
helicopter)

2. Requirements for new or improved item of equipment submitted during the reporting period for OPOCW units.

a. **Armament:**

OAR-15 Submachine Gun

M148 40mm Grenade Launcher

Grenade Launcher 40mm, Rapid Fire, for Ground Vehicles

Counter Attack Weapon, Multiple Grenade Launcher

b. **Vehicles:**

M-116 Cargo/Personnel Carrier

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl #38

CONFIDENTIAL

M-548 Cargo Carrier

Weapons Platform Vehicles for 106mm HR, Quad 50 MG

c. Munitions:

Expendable, Preloaded, M16 Rifle Magazine

Cartridge, 40mm, Multiple Projectile, XM576

Cartridge, 40mm White Star, XM583 and 585

Cartridge, 40mm WP

Cartridge, 40mm, CS, E-24

Cartridge, 90mm, Tank, XM 580 "Beehive"

Bullet, Multiple Part, Cal .38 and cal .45

Bullet, Multiple, Cal .762

Rocket, 2.75, CS Filled

Shell, 105mm, CS Filled

Shell, 155mm, CS Filled

Shell, 81mm Mortar, CS Filled

Shell, 4.2 Mortar, CS Filled

Flame Projector, Hand Hold, One Shot, Expendable

Launcher, CS, Expendable, E-8

Smoke Screen, Troop Landing

Anti-Personnel Warhead for SS-11

Mine Dispensing System, XM-47

d. Electronic/Communications

Improved Counter-Mortar Radar

FPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radar

AN/PSC-74 Radio

Long Range Survey System

Intrusion Detection Devices

Silent electric generating equipment for forward areas

e. Miscellaneous:

Personnel/Cargo Lowering System for Helicopters

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Jungle Canopy Platform

Dust Palliation

Barbed Tape

Electro Luminescent Runway Marker System

Rice Contaminant

Free Drop Water Container

Campus Shower Bucket

50 Gallon Collapsible Water Bag

Individual Water Filtration Device

Auxiliary Power Unit for UH-1 Helicopter

**Personnel/Explosive Detection Equipment, Chemical, Man Packed
and Electro-Mechanical Man Packed, and Air/Ground Vehicle Mounted**

Aircraft Bullet Detector

Compass, Lightweight, Survival

Body Armor for Infantry and Aviators

Chainsaw blades for cutting hardwood

Vehicular Land Navigation System

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ, I FORCE KEY PERSONNEL AND FMARF SENIOR COMMANDERS ON DATES INDICATED

TITLE	1 Jan 66	30 Apr 66
Commanding General	Maj Gen S. R. Larsen	No change
Deputy Commanding General	Brig Gen P. F. Smith	Brig Gen M. Zeis
Chief of Staff	Brig Gen P. F. Smith	Brig Gen J. R. Deane Jr
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col H. J. Turner	No Change
Artillery Officer	Brig Gen C. A. Symanski	" "
Secretary General Staff	Lt Col O. C. Lynn	Lt Col E. Ingram
Information Officer	Capt L. E. Lubow	No Change
Inspector General	Lt Col W. B. Reed	" "
Judge Advocate	Maj V. Gomez Jr	" "
ACofS 31	Col J. E. Thompson	" "
ACofS 02	Col T. F. McCord	Col W. W. Cover
ACofS 03	Col T. A. Barrow	Col L. S. Bontwright
ACofS 04	Col L. S. Bontwright	Col C. P. Hanson
ACofS 05	Lt Col J. R. Macsuri	No Change
Adjutant General	Col H. M. Matager	" "
Provost Marshal	Col R. E. Lehman	" "
Signal Officer	Col R. G. Horne	" "
Engineer Officer	Col R. L. Waddell Jr	" "
Chaplain	Col W. K. Anderson	" "
Hq's Commandant	Lt Col R. C. Allen	Lt Col A. P. Huns
Aviation Officer	Maj D. B. Billinger	Col G. E. Shea
Chemical Officer	Capt R. W. Arnold	Lt Col J. P. Crispall
Director BADC	Lt Col J. B. Selkregg (USAF)	Lt Col P. P. Huns (USAF)

#38

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 135

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>1 Jan 66</u>	<u>30 Apr 66</u>
CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)	Maj Gen H. W. O. Kimbark	No Change
CG, (CG), 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	Col J. S. Timothy	Brig Gen W. Pearson
CG, (CG), 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	Col H. A. Stoutner	Brig Gen G. D. Walker
CG, Capitol BOK Inf Div	Maj Gen M. S. Chase	No Change
CG, 2d BOK Marine Bde	Brig Gen B. C. Lee	" "

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl. 2, 3, 4

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	NO.	1. FRY/AVCS	ELA	YLA	XLA	DEAD	NON BATTLE INF	SICK	OTHER	RTW TO DY	REPL.
HEAD, I FROCEW	399	115.5					2	6	34.5	166	252
24th Sig Bn	712	90.9				2	3	53	149	67	199
272d MP Co	182	101.0		2			1	21	56	20	76
59th MI Det	72	93.1		1			1		42	21	26
HEAD, I FROCEW Arty	48	93.8						3	12	3	8
1st Bn, 30th Arty	618	94.8		1			4	48	1030	161	375
6th Bn, 14th Arty	573	86.6		1			1	42	235	33	180
1st Air Cav Div	17935	98.5	305	1010	47	14	66	2816	10632	10305	4971
1st Bde, 101st Abn	4469	112.4	110	530	3	11	45	351	2238	1798	943
3d Bde, 25th Inf	4108	100.3	24	152		7	56	510	342	368	509
II Corps	1075	102.3	4	4			3	1	168	7	268
17th Avn Op	85	100.0						6	82	46	70
10th Avn Bn	1337	99.3		16		2	2	98	449	246	453
50th Avn Bn	1922	85.9	3	8		1	11	58	506	451	593
41st CA	98	73.5		1			1	2	39	21	6
Capital BDE Div	16173	99.4	115	329		19	130	471	484	814	4132
2d BDE Marine Bde	5259	96.8	87	225	19	3		134	254	248	158

*Total units are included in HSC I FROCEW statistics:

- HQ, I FROCEW
- HQ Co, I FROCEW
- 3d BN
- 13th MI Det
- 64th Bngr TA

CONFIDENTIAL

APPOINTMENTS FOR HQ's I FORCE AND ASSIGNED UNIT

Number of appointment allocations by month for this quarter were:

MONTH	TO PAY GRADE					
	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4
January	1	3	3	12	11	93
February	0	0	3	3	15	113
March	0	0	0	1	6	92
April	1	1	1	0	1	69
Total number allocations received:	2	4	9	16	39	367

Number of unused appointment allocations returned by month this quarter were:

MONTH	TO PAY GRADE					
	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4
January	1	2	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	8	0
March	0	0	0	0	4	0
April	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total number allocations returned:	1	3	0	0	12	0

BAR QUOTAS RECEIVED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>MO</u>	<u>EN</u>
I FFORCEV	JAN	6		9
	FEB	6		11
	MAR	10		11
	APR	8		7
272d MP Co	JAN	1		4
	FEB			6
	MAR			8
	APR	1		4
55th MI Det	JAN	1	1	
	FEB	1		1
	MAR	2		2
	APR	3	1	2
Hq Co I	JAN			2
	FEB		1	1
	MAR	1		4
	APR			4
213th Sig Det	JAN			
	FEB			2
	MAR	1		
	APR			
245th PayOps	JAN			1
	FEB			1
	MAR			
	APR			
54th Sig Bn	JAN	1		20
	FEB	2	1	16
	MAR	3	1	25
	APR	2		28
1st Bn, 30th Arty	JAN			6
	FEB	2		17
	MAR	3		27
	APR	4		28
6th Bn, 14th Arty	JAN			14
	FEB			26
	MAR	4		16
	APR	2		16
TOTAL		<u>64</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>303</u>

Allocations were received as follows:

Bangkok	153
Hong Kong	71
Tokyo	79
Taipei	23
Manila	38
Singapore	<u>8</u>
	372

I FORCECV ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS FOR JANUARY THROUGH APRIL 1966

<u>BROWSE STAR</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
I FFV	11	0	1
54th Sig Bn	0	0	1
HQB I FFV Arty	1	0	0
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	7	0	16
Total	19	0	18

<u>AIR MEDAL</u>			
I FFV	22	0	0
54th Sig Bn	9	10	9
6th Bn, 14th Arty	10	0	0
Hq Co, I FFV	18	3	2
HQB, I FFV Arty	7	0	0
55th MI Det	1	0	0
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	15	0	0
Total	80	13	11

<u>ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL</u>			
I FFV	1	0	4
54th Sig Bn	1	0	1
Hq Co I FFV	1	0	0
HQB I FFV Arty	0	0	1
55th MI Det	2	0	1
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	0	0	3
Marine, III Amphibious Force	1	0	0
DASC Alfa	1	0	0
7th Marines	1	0	0
Total	8	0	10

<u>SOLDIER'S MEDAL</u>			
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	1	0	11
Total	1	0	11

NON-RECEIPT OF PERSONAL LETTER MAIL

UNIT

3/25

1/101

1st DAY

I FFV

FEB 66

5, 6, 13, 16, 18, 24, 26

1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 19 9

1, 7, 8, 17

4, 5, 6, 18, 24, 26

MAR 66

2, 3, 10, 14, 22, 23, 27

4, 5, 6, 7

5, 6, 9, 10, 13

6, 9, 10, 22, 23


APR 66

4, 7, 12

18, 21, 25


CONFIDENTIAL

HQ I F FORCE V
1st FLOOR: G5, JA, HQ COMD'T, IO, IG
2nd FLOOR: G4
3rd FLOOR: CHEMICAL
COMMUNITY (PM)



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
HQ I F FORCE V



CONFIDENTIAL

1 FORCEV

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC
APO San Francisco 96558

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 56

11 March 1966

REDESIGNATION

1. TC 010. Following Organizations/Units REDESIGNATED.

Effective date: 15 March 1966
Authority: AR 220-5

Fund obligation: Obligate to the extent necessary the appropriate allotments in accordance with current fiscal procedures.

<u>Present Designation</u>	<u>New Designation</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>UIC</u>
Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam	Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam	96240	WDDL AA
30th Headquarters Company	Headquarters Company, I Field Force Vietnam	96240	WC83 AA
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 30th Corps Artillery	Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery	96240	WFFH AA
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Field Force	Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Field Force Vietnam	96227	WDRK TO
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field Force Artillery	Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery	96227	WDRK _

Assigned to: United States Army, Vietnam.


Files/records: Will be maintained in accordance with AR 345-210 or AR 345-215 as applicable.

Morning report: Initial and subsequent morning reports will be submitted in accordance with AR 335-60.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

EDGAR C. DOLEMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff


JOHN S. TYLER
Colonel, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

(GO 56, HQ USARPAC, 1966)

61
62
63
64
65
SCS
AG
10
SJA
H602FFV
ABTY

DISTRIBUTION:

A - (2 ea) (G3 add 5; G1 and
G4 add 1 ea)

B - (2 ea) (USARV add 50)

D

6 - CO, USARPAC ICP

2 - CO, 27th DPU, APO 96309

2 - OIC, AG DPU, USARPAC

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION:

20 - TAGO ATTN: AGAO-0

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO I FFV

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>Period of Visit</u>
<i>Mo</i> Senator (D-Mont)	Hon Stuart Symington Party of 3	2 Jan
Asst CofS Army Republic of China	Maj Gen Yang Yu Tseng Party of 4	4 Jan
Secretary of the Army	Hon Stanley R. Resor	3 - 4 Jan
Commander, USAF Air Reconnaissance	Maj Gen Robert N. Smith	7 Jan
Commandant, USMC	Gen Wallace M. Greene Jr	10 Jan
Deputy CG, ROCA	Gen O Tu Lan	10 Jan
CG, USA Material Command	Gen Frank B. Benson Party of 13	11 Jan
Senator (R-NY)	Hon Jacob K. Javits	11 Jan
CG, 25th Inf Div	Maj Gen F. C. Wayland	14 - 15 Jan
Vice CofS US Army	Gen G. W. Abrams	17 - 18 Jan
Senator (R-Iowa)	Hon Jack Miller Party of 3	20 - 21 Jan
Congressman (D-SG)	Hon W. J. Byron Dorn	21 Jan
Ambassador, New Zealand	Ambassador Stephen Wier Party of 20	24 Jan
Deputy CG, USARV	Lt Gen Jean E. Hagler Party of 3	28 - 31 Jan
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland	30 Jan
Special Consultant to Senator Russell Long, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee	Mr Raymond F. Huff	15 - 17 Feb
Congressman (R-Ala)	Hon John J. Bachman Jr	16 Feb
Congressman (D-Tex)	Hon Olin M. Teague	19 - 21 Feb

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>Period of Visit</u>
G4, USARPAC	Maj Gen A. J. Adams	24 - 25 Feb
DA, Terminal Operations Logistical Management	Maj Gen J. J. Lane	25 Feb
Deputy COMUSMACV	Lt Gen John A. Heintges	25 Feb
Commander, Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center	Maj Gen Milton B. Adams	24 - 25 Feb
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland	27 Feb
Members of German Congress on Defense Committee	Dr. Eberhard Eppler Herr Willi Burkham Col Goachin Tschasch	1 Mar
Director, J5 Joint Chiefs	Lt Gen Barton E. Spivy Jr	3 - 7 Mar
Commandant, ROK Marine Corps	Lt Gen Kong Jung Shik Party of 6	9 Mar
Head of Electronics Dept, Rand Corporation	Mr. Bill Graham	3 - 5 Mar
MACV J3 (Designee)	Maj Gen John C. F. Tillson III	10 - 11 Mar
USAP (Ret)	Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada	11 - 12 Mar
CG, US Army Munitions Command	Maj Gen F. A. Hansen	11 - 12 Mar
CINCPAC	Gen John E. Waters Party of 9	13 - 15 Mar
British Ambassador to Thailand	Sir Anthony Hambold Party of 4	13 Mar
Chief of General Staff Australian Military Forces	Lt Gen Sir John Wilton Party of 3	15 Mar
Chief Surgeon, USARPAC	Maj Gen Byron Stager	16 Mar
Chief Engineer, DA	Lt Gen William F. Cassidy Party of 8	19 Mar

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>Period of Visit</u>
CG, US Army Artillery & Missile Center	Maj Gen Harry H. Critz Party of 2	28 - 31 Mar
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 3	3 Apr
Deputy Secretary of Defense	Hon Cyrus R. Vance	4 - 5 Apr
CG, 1st Log Command	Maj Gen Charles W. Hifler	3 Apr
Deputy Director Tactical Warfare Programs, Office of the Secretary of De- fense	Dr. Tom P. Cheatham	6 - 7 Apr
Chief MBTE	Rear Admiral Lucien B. McDonald	8 Apr
Senator (R-Tex)	Hon John G. Tower	8 - 9 Apr
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)	Maj Gen Harry W. O. Kinnard	8 Apr
Chairman, Joint CofS Republic of China Army	Gen Chang Chang Hak	8 - 10 Apr
Inspector General, DA	Maj Gen James A. Richardson	12 Apr
Chief of Staff, US Army	Gen Harold K. Johnson	20 - 21 Apr
Asst Deputy CG, USAF	Maj Gen John Norton	23 - 27 Apr
CG, II Corps (ARVN)	Maj Gen Vinh-Loc	27 Apr
Commander, Air Training Command	1st Gen William W. Momyer	29 Apr
ACofS J5, MACV	Maj Gen John H. Roberts Jr	29 Apr

Information Office
I Field Forces Vietnam
4 May 1966

Effective 1 March 1966 names of individual visitors were recorded as noted below:

March

Mr Le Figaro Cros
J. Caserly
Mr. Peterson
Peter Kalscher
Don Dedera
J. Pettifer
Donald Weeden
Sam Angelloff
Cal Olsen
John Mason
Jim Pickersell
Dick Swanson
Bob Jones
Walter Dilbreck
Ed McCarthy
Mort Perry

ABC TV
ABC TV
ABC TV
CBS TV
BBC TV
BBC TV
Life Magazine
Life Magazine
Fargo (ND) Forum
Newsweek Magazine
Newsweek Magazine
Time Magazine
Honolulu Advertiser
Marshall (KY) Courier
Marshall (KY) Courier
Newsweek Magazine

April

Ann Bryant
Jim Pickersell
Mary Pickersell
Rick Marren
Red Moore
Al Nichols
John Baker
Bill Dolan
Woody Dickstrum
LT JO Scott Turner
Don Oberdoff
Paul Humphill
Bill McWhirter
Eric Soveroid
Don Rather

Overseas Weekly
Black Star Photo
Black Star Photo
Associated Press
Pacific Traveler & Associated Press
Stars & Stripes
Stars & Stripes
Stars & Stripes
(NY) Herald Tribune
NAVJO Day
Knight Newspaper
Atlanta Constitution
Time Magazine
CBS
NBC

Information Office
I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96240
February 11, 1966

RICE HARVEST

By Captain Larry R. Imbenow

WITH FIELD FORCE VIETNAM—Protected by a combined Vietnamese, Korean and American force of more than 3,000 men, rice farmers in the rich Song Giang River Delta, near Tay Hoa, are harvesting and placing in government control more rice than ever before.

While the troops of the 47th Army of Vietnam (ARVN) Regiment, the US Army's 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Brigade have stood guard since January 25, in Operation "Van Buren", more than 22,000 tons of rice have been cut and harvested. Approximately 2,000 tons are being harvested daily by the 15 to 20,000 Vietnamese farmers working in the rich rice bowl, one of Vietnam's richest.

Under the direction of Major General Stanley E. (Suede) Larsen, a native of Honolulu, who visits Tay Hoa almost daily, keeping in touch with the progress being made, Van Buren has produced dramatic economic, psychological and military results. Conceived as a major effort to deny the Viet Cong the harvest, estimated at around 50,000 tons, or enough food to feed 100 Viet Cong regiments for an entire year, the present total far out-distances the best previous harvest.

Vietnamese district officials estimate that the last harvest returned only about 12,000 tons of rice to government control. The rest was claimed by the communists. In addition, until Van Buren was initiated, roughly 600 tons of rice a month had to be imported to feed the population. One sign of success observed this week was the cancellation of the order for more imported rice. The area can now feed itself.

The efforts of the Allies haven't gone unchallenged by the Viet Cong. The importance of the harvest to the VC has been demonstrated by the reported presence of one Main Force Viet Cong Regiment and one North Vietna-

2/2/2/2/2

these regiment in the Tuy Hoa area. The communists don't normally deploy in this strength unless their mission is of paramount importance. Furthermore, historically the Tuy Hoa area was the scene of bitter fighting during the French Indochina War and was largely controlled by the Viet Minh.

The forces have battled with the enemy when he has challenged their right to protect the rice. The 101st, under the direction of Brigadier General Willard Pearson of Clairton, Penn., has had repeated bitter, hand to hand encounters with the VC in the area south-west and south of the coastal city.

Brigadier General Spong Chool Lee's Korean Marines have also had heavy contacts with the communists. The first coming right after the Vietnamese Tet cease fire. The 47th ARVN Regiment under the command of Major Binh, is stationed to the north and northwest of the city and although they haven't had extensive combat they are preventing Viet Cong entry into that portion of the harvest operation.

To date U.S. and Korean forces have killed a total of 589 VC, with another 208 Communists estimated killed.

But, Van Buren's results are far from strictly military in nature. Confidence has once more been brought back to the people of the Tuy Hoa area. A rice crop the farmers assumed would go to the communists, as it has in the past, has been and is continuing to be protected. Earlier this week, an American officer told an interesting story of how one Vietnamese showed his gratitude. As the officer was riding through the area on the 15 kilometers of roads that the U.S. Army Engineers have constructed, he noticed an elderly Vietnamese sitting by the side of the road eating a bowl of rice with chopsticks. The American waved hello to the peasant. The peasant replied by holding up the rice bowl, pointing to the rice and saying, *Merci-Merci.*

Although the small incident may seem minute in nature, there are other indications that Van Buren's numerous civic action programs have left their mark. Among them are:

3/3/3/3

1. An end to the present inflationary trend in rice prices in Tuy Hoa. Prior to Van Baren, rice was selling at between 10 to 12 piastres a kilo. The present price of rice is six to eight piastres a kilo.

2. A permanent medical facility, under the direction of a U.S. Army doctor, has treated more than 1,000 patients since it opened its doors in January. The first permanent dispensary in the area, plans are to keep it open to Vietnamese civilians on a regular basis.

3. At present, 150 square kilometers, of what was only months ago, considered a Viet Cong dominated area, are under control of Allied forces.

4. One hundred twenty-three VC have rallied from the Communist forces to government control, 47 between February 1st and 5th. One father brought in his wife, two children and a German Mauser rifle.

5. U.S. Army Engineers have repaired three bridges and 700 holes in the existing roads to facilitate the movement of people and products from the outlying areas to Tuy Hoa.

6. Approximately 2,700 refugees have been resettled in Tuy Hoa to provide them protection from Viet Cong terrorism.

7. Almost 100 orphans as well as priests and nuns from the Catholic school in Tuy Ann, about 10 miles north of Tuy Hoa, who had been threatened by the VC, were extracted along with 30 Vietnamese families, under the protection of the 101st and resettled in Tuy Hoa. Field Forces Vietnam's 41st Civil Affairs Company has begun work on houses for the orphans and members of the rescue force, the 2d battalion of the 502d Infantry, have donated 200.00 to the school and have adopted the children as a regular project.

Although the Allied Forces in the areas have encountered numerous problems, such as transportation of both, workers to the fields and rice to the market, they have successfully solved them one by one. Workers are trucked by the three-nation force to the rice fields. As the rice is cut and bagged the workers are given a receipt for the rice which is then transported to a government warehouse. The people can then draw from the warehouse with their receipts.

4/4/4/4/4

Although Van Buren's achievements might not sound impressive to those who dwell only on the importance of massive enemy personnel and equipment losses, to the people of Tuy Hoa they are a stark contrast to what they've faced in the past. Roads, cut by the communists, are being rapidly repaired by the Allies. The sick are being treated and the homeless provided shelter. But more important, night raids by the VC to terrorize, propaganda and tax the population have been halted by the presence of Free World Forces.

Rice, Asia's most precious commodity, will remain where it belongs; with the people who have sweated and toiled under the hot Vietnamese sun to make it grow. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers will have to go elsewhere to fill their rice sacks. Allied forces are seeing to that.

Information Office
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96240
20 April 1966

TROPICAL LIGHTNING STRIKES VC

WITH I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM---The jungle trained, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division came out on top in it's first major operation since arriving in Vietnam from Hawaii three months ago.

The men of the Tropic Lightning Division launched Operation Garfield in the vicinity of the Ban Ma Thuot in the central highlands. Meeting their first test in the Vietnamese war superbly, the troopers proved they were still a formidable fighting machine that earned them the highest praise during World War II when they were in continuous contact with the enemy for 165 days without let up.

The rugged, jungle terrain where Operation Garfield took place had long been a Communist stronghold. The US soldiers maneuvered for nearly a month meeting scattered but tough resistance from the North Vietnamese.

The final results of the operation showed 123 Viet Cong killed and 62 individuals weapons captured. Also taken were 60 tons of rice 112 82mm mortar rounds, and a whopping 27,600 rounds of small arms ammunition.

The "Tropic Lightning" suffered only light casualties in their first battle test.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

AVF-IO


28 February 1966

SUBJECT: Troop Topic--Free Nations Aid Republic of Vietnam

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

The inclosed troop topic, Free Nations Aid Republic of Vietnam, should be presented during the month of March 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. C. BAILLON
Captain, AGC
Asseg AG

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- A
PLUS
2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACOI
3 - USARV: INFO OFF
1 - 13th Mil Hist Det: C-3
10 - AVF-IO

FREE NATIONS AID REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Military, economic and technical assistance is flowing to beleaguered Republic of Vietnam in ever growing quantities from some 35 free world nations who have joined with the United States in what has become a genuinely international aid program of impressive scope.

The Republic of Korea, in late 1965, sent a military division of 17,754 men to South Vietnam. Earlier Korean contributions included a 2,200-man task force of engineers, technicians and security troops, as well as a 130-man mobile surgical hospital.

Several international organizations are involved in assistance to the Vietnamese. These include the International Red Cross, with funds from countries such as Ireland, Pakistan, Greece, and Turkey, and others; the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which receives funds from many nations and is sending \$500,000 worth of medicine to Vietnam; the World Council of Churches, which has distributed food, clothing, and cooking utensils to 3,000 refugee families; and the Mennonite Central Relief Committee, active in Vietnam for many years.

Economic aid from the United States, provided in addition to massive military support, includes technical advice, food, construction materials, and educational assistance. In addition to U.S. civilians, about 725 free world civilians are engaged in various civic actions.

At present more than 600 South Vietnamese are studying or training abroad under government arrangements with the United States and nine other free world nations, and plans are underway to increase the number.

Military assistance provided the RVN, by other free world nations besides the United States and the Republic of Korea includes: Australia--an augmented infantry battalion, 100 combat advisers who are mainly jungle warfare specialists, and an Air Force transport unit; Republic of China--a military psychological warfare team; Malaysia--counterinsurgency equipment, mostly military and police transport such as armored vehicles, and since 1962 the training of about 2,000 Vietnamese military officers in counterinsurgency techniques.

New Zealand--an artillery battalion and an engineer detachment; the Philippines--a psychological warfare detachment and a military medical team; Thailand--an air detachment.

Medical supplies and assistance have been sent or pledged to Vietnam by Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Republic of China, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Spain, Turkey, and Uruguay.

Other free world nonmilitary assistance provided or pledged to Vietnam

includes: Argentina--observers to study possibilities for assistance; Australia--civil engineers, radio and agriculture experts, training for Vietnamese in Australia, a 50-kilowatt broadcasting station, one million textbooks, 3,300 tons of corrugated roofing, radio receivers and loud-speakers, blankets, and hand tools; Austria--blankets and tents; Brazil--coffee and industrial supplies.

Canada--flour and butter, a professor of orthopedics, university buildings, and academic and technical training for Vietnamese in Canada; Republic of China--agriculture experts, agricultural supplies, textbooks, training for Vietnamese in Taiwan, electrical power experts, and electrical power substations; Denmark--training Vietnamese nurses in Denmark; Dominican Republic--offer of cement.

France--since 1956, \$110 million in assistance, physicians and other medical personnel, economic and technical assistants, professors to teach in schools and universities, training and educating Vietnamese in France, grants and low interest credits for industrial and technical training construction projects; Federal Republic of Germany--teachers and technical experts, training of Vietnamese in Germany, credit to import German machine tools and fertilizers, grants for the purchase of transistor radio batteries and gasoline pumps, and credits for building a major industrial complex, an abattoir, construction of three merchant ships, and a technical high school.

India--cloth for flood relief, factories for preparing tea and sugar, and equipment for a blood transfusion center; Iran--petroleum products; Israel--training Vietnamese in Israel; Italy--science scholarships; Japan--more than \$55 million in economic aid, construction workers and other technicians, 20,000 transistor radios, and electrical transmission line, and an agreement to build a bridge over the Mekong River; Laos--flood relief assistance.

The Netherlands--a dredge; New Zealand--a university professor, funds to equip a technical high school and provide a university science building, and training Vietnamese in New Zealand; Pakistan--clothing and financial assistance for flood victims; Spain--blankets; Switzerland--microscopes; Thailand--cement and zinc roofing materials; Turkey--cement; United Kingdom--advisers, an English professor, technical equipment, blankets, fishing boat engines, other supplies, and training for Vietnamese in the United Kingdom; Uruguay--food.

In addition, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have agreed to provide varying kinds and amounts of nonmilitary assistance to the Vietnamese people.

--000--

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO US FORCES 96240

AVF-10

31 January 1966

SUBJECT: Troop Topic—The War in Viet-Nam: 20 Questions and Answers

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed troop topic, The War in Viet-Nam, should be presented during the month of February 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

/s/r/ S.E. Spence LtCol
/t/ NEIL M. MATZGER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- A
- PLUS
- 2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACOI
- 3 - USARV: INFO OFF
- 1 - 13th Mil Hist Det: G-3
- 10 - AVF-10

A. TRUE COPY:

Thomas W. Dalton
THOMAS W. DALTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst AG
1st Bde 101st Abn I
APO SF 96347

Sheet 8'

THE WAR IN VIET-NAM: 20 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Most U.S. Service personnel know why American is keeping its promise to help the Republic of Viet-Nam resist Communist aggression. Sometimes, however, it is difficult for the Serviceman to put into words the answers to questions he encounters at home and abroad. Here are 20 questions most widely asked, with concise, factual answers.

1. Q: Viet-Nam is a long distance from the United States. Just why is the United States involved in the fighting there?

A: The United States has crossed oceans before to help peoples fighting for their freedom and independence--in World War I, World War II, and in Korea. President Johnson, in reaffirming the pledges of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy "to help defend this small and valiant nation," has stressed that American military forces are in South Viet-Nam because "the United States is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression."

2. But isn't the fighting in Viet-Nam different--a war between the Vietnamese people themselves, a kind of civil war?

A: The fighting primarily involves the Vietnamese, but this is no civil war. In 1954 a 14-nation conference at Geneva agreed that newly-independent Viet-Nam should be separated into two parts--North Viet-Nam for followers of Communist leaders, and South Viet-Nam for those who wanted another way of life. Since then the two parts have gone their own ways--North Viet-Nam as a typical Communist Dictatorship, South Viet-Nam as a republic. The war against South Viet-Nam is directed from Hanoi, capital of the North, through an organization of Communist guerrillas called the Viet Cong. It is not a rebellion of the people of South Viet-Nam--it is aggression from North Viet-Nam.

3. Q: How did the Vietnamese people react after the division of their country?

A: After partition the Vietnamese were given an opportunity to move north or south, and so select the type of government they wanted. Less than 100,000 went north, to become subjects of the Hanoi Communist regime. Ten times as many--almost one million--fled from the Communist dictatorship to South Viet-Nam.

4. Q: Was the partition of Viet-Nam in 1954 intended to be permanent?

A: No. The Geneva agreements provided for the cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina and sought to make the new peace of enduring one by "temporarily" dividing Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel--pending a future reunification of the country based upon free national elections.

5. Q: Why were these elections never held?

A: Although the Geneva accords called for "free general elections

by secret ballot," it was soon apparent that this type of voting would be impossible under existing conditions. The Communist regime in Hanoi quickly demonstrated its dictatorial character by liquidating opposition elements in the North through force and terrorism. It was evident that the more populous northern half of the divided country, whose inhabitants now had no choice but to vote as Hanoi directed, would have dominated any reunification referendum that could have been held. Saigon recognized this and refused to participate in an election which would have amounted to national suicide. President Diem of South Viet-Nam, explaining this stand in a 16 July 1955 radio broadcast, pointed out that his country was pledged to the goal of "unity in freedom and not in slavery...We do not reject the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to achieve that unity. However, if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy, they will be meaningful only on the condition that they are absolutely free. Now, faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the Viet Minh, we remain skeptical concerning the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of free elections in the North." In subsequent years, Hanoi made it increasingly clear that it has no interest in elections it cannot control, or reunification arrangements it cannot dominate. Any remaining doubts as to the North Vietnamese regime's real intentions were removed long ago when it launched the campaign of military aggression and political subversion through which Hanoi still seeks to subjugate the free South Vietnamese people.

6. Q: Did the United States endorse the 1954 Geneva accords?

A: Because of reservations over certain features of the accords, in particular their failure to include a provision for free elections throughout Viet-Nam under supervision of the United Nations, the United States withheld its formal approval. The American representative stated, however, that the United States would do nothing to disturb the agreements and that it would regard "any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern as seriously threatening international peace and security."

7. Q: What is the basis for Communist claims that their aggression against South Viet-Nam is a "war of national liberation"?

A: For strategic and propaganda purposes, Communists attempted to disguise their aggressive activities against other countries as support for "national liberation movements." If such a movement exists, they seek to join and eventually to dominate it. And if an exploitable national revolutionary movement does not exist they endeavor to create one. The situation in Viet-Nam today is a classic illustration of what Communists actually have in mind when they pledge support for "national liberation movements" throughout the world. The Hanoi regime, in 1960, for example, deliberately created a mechanism called the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam" as a cover for its aggression. Communists in Malaya and the Philippines attempted similar but unsuccessful "liberations"

campaigns after World War II. And Communist China claimed it was "liberating" Tibet when it invaded and conquered that nation in 1950.

8. Q: Have there been free elections in South Viet-Nam?

A: On a number of occasions since 1955 the South Vietnamese people have voted in national elections. As recently as 30 May 1965, elections by secret ballot were held throughout South Viet-Nam for provincial and municipal councils.

9. Q: Why are North Viet-Nam and Communist China blamed for the aggression in South Viet-Nam?

A: For the first years of the guerrilla fighting—it has been going on in varying degrees of intensity since the middle and late 1950's—Hanoi tried to make it look like a genuine insurrection. The guerrillas, including Communists from all parts of the country, were built around a hard core of trained insurgents who were directed to remain in South Viet-Nam after the country was divided, lead ostensibly normal lives, and await orders. The orders soon came, from Hanoi, and the aggression of North against South began. As the struggle went on, more and more evidence piled up showing the involvement of Hanoi and Peking: captured weapons made in Communist China; documents identifying units of the North Vietnamese army fighting with the guerrillas; letters found on captive Viet Cong telling how they had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North. Hanoi now takes full responsibility for the Viet Cong; and the Chinese Communists, although not officially connected with the war, talk much like partners in it.

10. Q: Has Hanoi acknowledged sending troops into South Viet-Nam?

A: Yes, except that they refer to their army units as "volunteers"—just as Communist China sent "volunteers" by the million to fight the U. N. forces in Korea.

11. Q: How does the invasion of South Viet-Nam affect the United States?

A: The people of South Viet-Nam have had the sympathy and support of the American people since 1954, when the first U. S. aid was provided to resettle the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the North. Economic aid and advice continued to flow from the United States. Later, when South Viet-Nam's national survival was threatened by the invading Communist guerrillas, the United States also provided military equipment and advisers. As Hanoi's aggression has increased, so has American military support for South Viet-Nam's only supporter and defender. More than 35 other nations are providing or have pledged military, economic, and technical assistance.

12. Q: How have the Viet Cong managed to gain and hold control over parts of South Viet-Nam?

A: The Viet Cong rule by force and terror. Deliberate killings and kidnappings are instruments of their policy. In 1964 alone, for example, at least 1,500 local officials who resisted Viet Cong demands were kidnaped or murdered.

13. Q: Do the Viet Cong attack only South Vietnamese soldiers and civilian officials?

A: By no means. The Viet Cong also attack teachers, agricultural technicians, anti-malaria team—anybody, in fact, who is working to improve social and economic conditions in South Viet-Nam. About 11,000 civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnaped by the Viet Cong in 1964 alone. Total civilian casualties in South Viet-Nam now stand at well over 60,000.

14. Q: How long has Hanoi been carrying on its current large-scale war against South Viet-Nam?

A: Military aggression has been intensified since 1961, as Hanoi has sent more and more troops across the border to fight with the Viet Cong.

15. Q: Why has the United States become so deeply involved?

A: As Hanoi's aggression has increased, so has American military support of South Viet-Nam. President Johnson summed up the U. S. position recently, pointing out that the United States is in South Viet-Nam to carry out a promise made in 1954 to help that country build and develop in peace and freedom, as the Geneva agreements provided. The country's peaceful development was well on its way, although a substantial part of South Viet-Nam's resources and manpower had to be diverted to fighting off the Viet Cong. But the addition of tens of thousands of North Vietnamese Communists to the Viet Cong changed the picture. The Communists made their objective plain: to drive the United States out of South Viet-Nam, and then to conquer the country for communism. It was then that President Johnson reaffirmed the solemn commitment of the United States to support the people of South Viet-Nam in their struggle against aggression from the North.

16. Q: Does that mean that the United States now is out to destroy North Viet-Nam?

A: No. President Johnson put it this way: "We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Viet-Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Viet-Nam under international supervision. And they shall have no government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it."

17. Q: What about U. S. bombing in North Viet-Nam?

A: Limited air attacks by the South Vietnamese and U. S. Air Forces

on military targets in North Viet-Nam have the direct effect of hampering the large-scale infiltration from the North. Also, they are a warning and a reminder that—as Secretary of State Dean Rusk said—"there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression."

18. Q: Will the war continue until one side or the other achieves a clear-cut military victory?

A: This solely a matter for decision by Hanoi and its supporters in Peiping. The war was started by the North and could be ended by the North at any time. All that is necessary is for Hanoi to withdraw its forces and order a halt by its Viet Cong agents. U. S. Secretary of State Rusk has emphasized: "We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone."

19. Q: What stands in the way of a negotiated peace?

A: This question can only be answered by Hanoi. President Johnson has repeatedly proclaimed that the United States is ready to begin unconditional peace discussions "at any place, at any time" and with any government. Exploratory moves toward a peaceful settlement have been made by the Commonwealth nations, by the United Kingdom, by a group of 17 nonaligned nations, by the President of India, by Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations, and others. The United States, in May, opened the door for a favorable Communist response by briefly suspending its air attacks on military installations in North Viet-Nam. President Johnson, in addition to his many public statements of willingness to negotiate without pre-conditions, has urged all member states of the United Nations to help find a way to the conference table. So far, however, every peaceful gesture has been rejected with scorn by Hanoi and Peiping.

20. Q: Does this mean that hopes for peace in Southeast Asia must be abandoned?

A: This is certainly not the intention of South Viet-Nam and its allies. The channels for communication of a change of mind in Hanoi and Peiping are constantly kept open. The United States and South Viet-Nam, at the same time, are determined that Communist aggression shall not succeed. It is their hope that, once Hanoi is convinced of this, the way to a peaceful solution will be cleared. "I pray every night," President Johnson said recently, that "the day will come when others will be willing to accept our proposals and join us in our hope of satisfying those problems and dealing with these differences by talking instead of fighting."

—oOo—

CHIEU HOI AND YOU

INTRODUCTION: The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program was formally proclaimed on 17 April 1963. It appeals to all those who served or are serving with the Viet Cong to return and re-establish allegiance to the Government of Vietnam. Chieu Hoi offers an opportunity to the Viet Cong to return voluntarily to government control and offers many individual benefits to those returning under its provisions.

IT'S IMPORTANT TO YOU

How does the Chieu Hoi program affect you? Most importantly, it could save your life. Each Viet Cong who turns himself in under this program is one less armed enemy you have to guard against, hunt, fight, capture or kill. Before he can be killed or captured he must be defeated and to do this you must risk your life. If he turns himself in voluntarily, there is no hardship or danger to you.

Returnees also affect the enemy's morale. When large numbers of Viet Cong disappear and return to government control, doubt is created for others in their ranks; defection grows, and if sufficient numbers return, the enemy is weakened.

A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

The returnee is important to military intelligence as it is far easier to obtain information from a voluntary returnee, than from a prisoner of war who has been captured against his will. A returnee is of great propaganda value in enticing others to come in; many voluntarily approach their friends, other Viet Cong and Viet Cong families. Each Viet Cong who leaves his unit is one less to deal with and is one more factor toward ultimate victory.

To induce a massive return of Viet Cong to government control, the Vietnamese government, with the assistance of the FVMAF in Vietnam, has developed a large scale psychological warfare campaign.

This campaign employs radio, loudspeaker broadcast, talks in hamlets and leaflets to inform the VC of their opportunity to return to government control.

To facilitate their return, millions of safe conduct passes have been dropped over South and North Vietnam. These safe conduct passes are designed to make it possible for the Viet Cong to feel assured of safe conduct and humane treatment when he decides to return to government control.

The safe conduct pass is easily identified. One side has a picture of the national flags of South Vietnam, the United States, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Printed on the same side in English, Vietnamese, and Korean are the words, "Safe conduct pass to be honored by all Vietnamese government agencies and Allied Forces." On the other side is a picture of

Incl 1

a South Vietnamese soldier welcoming a Viet Cong to the side of the government. It says in Vietnamese that this piece of paper is a valuable passport to the Republic of Vietnam and allied Forces.

SAFE CONDUCT PASS MUST BE HONORED.

The results of this campaign are impressive.

Last year 2,230 Viet Cong rallied to the government. So far, in the first three months of this year, this figure has been surpassed with 2,947 ralliers. Based on these figures it must be agreed that the campaign is a success.

The program must go forward. It is up to all of us to recognize and honor the safe conduct passes and treat ralliers in a humane manner. Mis-treatment drastically hurts this important program.

There have been reported incidents where some VC turning themselves in and having a safe conduct pass in their possession were treated less than properly.

One alleged instance was when a Vietnamese turned himself in after a sharp fight near a village. This individual had two safe conduct passes on his body, but when he presented them to his captors, they were torn up and thrown to the ground. Another alleged case occurred when a captive was beaten around the face after he had turned himself in. A fifteen year old boy was shot in the arm after he had come in with a safe conduct pass. This type of treatment defeats the entire purpose of the program. If the VC cannot feel safe in using the safe conduct pass, the pass is not worth the paper it's written on.

Honor his safe conduct pass. Let him join the government. He is one less you will have to fight. All soldiers must know and understand the importance of proper treatment of the people who come in under the Chieu Hoi program. It is up to the commanders to assure knowledge and purpose of surrender leaflets is understood by all. Commanders must see that this program is properly carried out.

The success of the program depends on you!